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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Demons and death then I sing,
Put in all, aye all wiIl I, sword-shaped pennant for war,
And a pleasure new and ecstatic, and the prattled yearning of
children,
Blent with the sounds ofthe peaceful land and the liquid wash
of the sea,
The Continent, devoting the whole identity without reserving an
atom,
Pour in! whelm that which asks, which sings, with all and the
yield of all,
Fusing and holding, claiming, devouring the whole,
No more with tender lip, nor musical labial sound,
But out of the night emerging for good, our voice persuasive no
more,
Croaking like crows here in the wind.
-Walt Whitman, Leaves afGrass
In 1609 Richard Crakanthorpe stood at Paul's Cross in London and delivered a
sermon to promote the Jamestown colony in Virginia. He told his listeners that they
should embrace the noble enterprise of settling the new continent, a land he believed to
be almost as large as England itself. Its fruitful soils and bountiful commodities could
supply all the wants of the nation, he promised, but the real mission was not for worldly
2gain. He told the gathered crowd that they should support colonization as a quest for
renewal through the creation of a new society in America. "[W]hat glory!" he exclaimed,
"What honour to our Sovereign! What comfort to those subjects who shall be [the]
means of furthering so happy a work... to see a New Britain in another world."] In his
breathless enthusiasm, Crakanthorpe encapsulated a vision shared by many of his
compatriots. They hoped to see the fledgling settlements in Virginia become the seed of
an entirely new nation modeled on England.
Crakanthorpe, like many promoters of colonization before and after him,
believed that their new society could be built peacefully. The English, said Richard
Hakluyt, had no desire to become blood-drenched conquistadors building an empire with
fire and naked stee1.2 Instead, they planned to exploit the resources of a bountiful land
and reap the harvests of its rich soils. In recompense they would offer the native peoples
of those lands the blessings of civilization and Christianity. Colonization was a mutually
beneficial arrangement, wrote Robert Johnson, that would work to the Indians'
"inestimable gain.,,3 Yet the realities of English settlement in America did not fit this
hopeful prediction. Instead of wealthy colonists uplifting their Indian neighbors, Anglo-
1 Richard Crakanthorpe, "A Sermon ... preached at Paules Cross ..." March 14, 1608/9, in The Genesis
ofthe United States, ed. Alexander Brown, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1890), 1:256.
2 Richard Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," 1584, in The Original Writings and Correspondence
ofthe Two Richard Hakluyts, ed. E.G.R. Taylor, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser.,
no. 76-77 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1935),2:257-65.
3 R[obert] J[ohnson], "Nova Britannia: Offering Most Excellent fmites by Planting in Virginia," in Tracts
and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress ofthe Colonies in North
America: From the Discovery ofthe Country to the Year 1776, ed. Peter Force, 4 vols. (New York:
Murray Printing Company, 1947), vol. 1, doc. 6, p. 13.
3Indian relations in the early seventeenth century often slid into a spiral of chronic
antagonism, frontier skirmishes, and spasmodic outbreaks of internecine warfare.
In fact, combat in the New World possessed an exceptional brutality that shocked
Europeans and Indians alike. Armed conflict in the borderlands often escalated to levels
of violence that far outstripped the conventions of Algonquian warfare, exceeding even
the carnage of European battlefields. It was a way of war characterized by routine
atrocity, deliberate massacre, and the intentional targeting of non-combatants, resulting
in levels of destruction that more than one scholar has characterized as "total war.',4
English militias relied on strategies designed to destroy their enemy's means of
subsistence, depriving them of the resources essential for survival. The unambiguous
purpose of these strategies was to starve their enemies into submission or flight. On
more than one occasion, colonial authorities explicitly defined Indian populations as
enemies who should be killed on sight. By conflating soldier and civilian into a single
enemy, they effectively classified non-combatants as legitimate targets and carried out
policies in which the whole population became the target of large-scale military action.
These policies resulted in the mass killing of Native American non-combatants, the
4 See, for example, 1. Frederick Fausz, "The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: A Historical Study of
Ethnocentrism and Cultural Conflict" (Ph.D. Diss., College of William and Mary, 1977),369; John E.
Ferling, A Wilderness ofMiseries: War and Warriors in Early America (Westport, Conn. and London:
Greenwood Press, 1980), 42; Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century
New England," Journal ofAmerican History 74, no. 4 (March 1988): 1204; Alden T. Vaughan,
'''Expulsion ofthe Salvages': English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 35, no. 1 (January 1978): 77; Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War:
Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1991),75. On
the characteristics of early American warfare, see John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War
Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-10,21-43.
4expulsion of individual tribes from contested territory, and genocides perpetrated against
entire tribes.
This thesis explores the dynamics of extreme violence during two conflicts in the
early years of English colonization. The Second and Third Anglo-Powhatan Wars in
Virginia, between 1622 and 1646, began with a massive assault on English colonists by
the Powhatan chiefdom. More than three hundred settlers died during the Jamestown
massacre, and hundreds more perished during the subsequent siege. The survivors rallied
and mounted a merciless offensive, aiming to destroy the Powhatans' food supplies and
drive them beyond the borders of Virginian territory. During the Pequot War in New
England, from 1636 to 1637, the Puritans responded to small provocations with
overwhelming force. In the Mystic massacre, Puritan forces killed over four hundred
Pequots by barricading the village, burning it to the ground, and slaughtering all those
who tried to flee the flames. Though the surviving Pequots fled their territory, the
Puritans carried out a sustained campaign that included summary executions, bounties
on Pequot body parts, the enslavement of captives, and the legal dissolution of the
Pequot tribe.
There is little need to revisit the specific causes and consequences of these
conflicts, which historians have examined in great detail.5 Rather, this study seeks to
5 The historiography on these subjects is substantial; the following are only the most important studies that
J have consulted in the preparation ofthis thesis. On the Pequot War, see Alfred A. Cave, The Pequot War
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996); Alfred A. Cave, "Who Killed John Stone?: A Note
on the Origins of the Pequot War," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 49, no. 3 (July 1992): 509-521;
Laurence M. Hauptman, "The Pequot War and Its Legacies," in The Pequots inSouthern New England:
The Fall and Rise ofan American Indian Nation, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry
(Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); Francis Jennings, The Invasion ofAmerica:
Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant ofConquest (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1975),
177-227; Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making ofNew England,
5explain why the benevolent intentions of colonization articulated by English writers
consistently deteriorated into armed conflict, and to elucidate the reasons that Anglo-
Indian wars repeatedly escalated to levels of staggering intensity. This requires two
complementary strands of analysis. First, this study explores the large-scale structural
forces that drove the English colonial project and created opportunities for conflict with
Native Americans. Second, it describes the role of subtle intellectual and psychological
forces in the English worldview that encouraged colonists to resort to violence in
response to Indian resistance. These forces converged with the flows of human power
along the contested frontier between Native American societies and English colonies. At
the intersection, a discourse of conflict emerged that propelled Anglo-Indian violence to
extraordinary levels, leading, in extremis, to genocide.
In the twenty-first century, genocide is a crime under international law and is
therefore as much a juridical standard for criminal prosecution as a tool for academic
investigation. The needs of human rights lawyers seeking to prevent and punish
genocide, however, do not always agree with the needs of scholars trying to refine useful
tools for conceptual analysis. Because of this basic divergence, it can be notoriously
difficult for scholars to find common ground on what constitutes genocide and what does
not. Unfortunately, this state of affairs often leads to an academic discourse that is mired
1500-1643 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982),203-39; Alden T. Vaughan, New
England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1629-1675, 3rd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1995), 122-54; Vaughan, "Pequots and Puritans: The Causes of the War of 1637," in Roots ofAmerican
Racism: Essays on the Colonial Experience (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 177-
99. On the Anglo-Powhatan Wars, J. Frederick Fausz has conducted the most comprehensive study; see
Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising"; but see also William S. Powell, "Aftermath of the Massacre: The First Indian
War, 1622-1632," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 66, no. 1 (January 1958): 44-75; William
L. Shea, "Virginia at War, 1644-1646," Military Affairs 41, no. 3 (October 1977): 142-147; Vaughan,
'"Expulsion of the Salvages,''' 57-84.
6in definitional dilemmas.6 As the genocide scholar Martin Shaw writes, "We need to
remember that classification is the beginning, not the end, of analysis.,,7 The excessive
focus on whether a particular conflict was genocidal should not obscure the more
important question of why extreme violence occurred, whether it is classified as
genocide or not.8
This paper treats genocide as one extreme on a continuum of violence, loosely
defined as the perpetration of mass violence against unarmed non-combatants because of
their membership in a particular collective. The word "genocide" is used only in
circumstances when perpetrators displayed an ideological commitment to the destruction
of their target groUp.9 By this standard, the Pequots were the victims of genocide, but the
6 For useful overviews of the debate over the definition of genocide, see A. Dirk Moses, "Conceptual
Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the 'Racial Century': Genocides ofIndigenous Peoples and the
Holocaust," in Colonialism and Genocide, ed. A. Dirk Moses and Dan Stone (London and New York:
Routledge, 2007): 148-180; Christopher Powell, "What Do Genocides Kill? A Relational Conception of
Genocide," Journal o.fGenocide Research 9, no. 4 (December 2007): 527-547; Scott Straus, "Contested
Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide," Journal o.fGenocide
Research 3, no. 3 (2001): 349-375.
7 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 13.
8 I omit several works of relevant scholarship from the historiograph ical discussion below for just this
reason. Paul Bartrop reviews well-known evidence and concludes that the Anglo-Powhatan Wars should
not be considered genocide, and Steven Katz performs the same operation for the Pequot War. See Paul R.
Bartrop, "The Powhatans of Virginia and the English Invasion of America: Destruction Without
Genocide," in Genocide Perspectives J: Essays in Comparative Genocide, ed. Colin Tatz (Sydney: Centre
for Comparative Genocide Studies, 1997): 66-108; Steven T. Katz, "The Pequot War Reconsidered," New
England Quarterly 64, no. 2 (June 1991): 206-224; see also Michael Freeman's critique of Katz's article
and Katz's rebuttal: Freeman, "Puritans and Pequots: The Question of Genocide," New England Quarterly
68, no. 2 (June 1995): 278-293; Katz, "Pequots and the Question of Genocide: A Reply to Michael
Freeman," New England Quarterly 68, no. 4 (December 1995): 641-649. Aside from the negative
determination on genocide, these studies shed little light on the dynamics of extreme violence during these
conflicts.
9 This formulation is similar to that of several scholars who emphasize the conflation of soldier and
civilian into a single enemy as a defining characteristic ofgenocide. See A. Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony,
Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History," in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest,
Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and Oxford:
Berghahn Books, 2008), 26; Jacques Semelin, PurifY and Destroy: The Political Uses o.fMassacre and
7Powhatans were not. Reasonable scholars can and will disagree with this formulation.
For the purposes of this study, however, categorizing a particular instance of Anglo-
Indian violence is less important than analyzing the connection between colonialism and
extreme violence in early America. The fates of both the Powhatans and Pequots were
part of a larger pattern.
Though genocide is often assumed to be a modern phenomenon, a wave of
revisionist scholarship in recent decades has connected mass killing to the colonization
of the Americas. Francis Jennings spurred much of this work with The Invasion of
America, in which he asserts that English colonization included a premeditated and
sustained commitment to conquest and the dispossession of Native Americans. 1O Richard
Drinnon builds on Jennings' basic argument by emphasizing racism as the prime cause
of exterminatory warfare. In Facing West, he explains that English aggression was
motivated principally by "Indian-hating," an ideology that included the belief that
"Indians were truly animals that could be killed or enslaved at will."]] According to
Drinnon, the string of massacres and atrocities that English colonists inflicted on Native
Americans was the outgrowth of racial hatred during an umelenting military incursion.
Genocide, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007),134-46; Shaw, What is
Genocide?, 111-17. It should be noted that these scholars do not necessarily share my standard for an
ideological commitment to the target group's destruction. On the conceptualization of genocide on a
continuum of violence, see Semelin, PurifY and Destroy, 325.
10 Jennings, Invasion ofAmerica, vii. Jennings's thesis can only be sustained through a selective reading of
evidence and ultimately a resort to a form of conspiracy theory. He dismisses any sources suggesting less
sinister intentions on the part of the colonists as "cant," and claims that their unwavering commitment to
conquest was disguised by "the pervasive calculated deception of the official records" (p. ix).
11 Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics ofIndian-Hating and Empire-Building (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1980),50.
8Subsequent scholars have embroidered the conquest thesis, arguing that English
colonists came to North America with the calculated intention to exterminate Native
Americans. David Stannard makes this argument in American Holocaust. "The
destruction of the Indians of the Americas was," he writes, "far and away, the most
massive act of genocide in the history of the world.,,12 Ward Churchill similarly writes,
in A Little Matter ofGenocide , that the history of the Americas since European contact
has been a single sustained campaign of genocidal destruction, "an experience
unparalleled in its scope, magnitude, and duration.,,13 Unfortunately, the polemical tone
of these authors leads them to assert arguments based more on moral outrage than on a
serious examination of the evidence. On the causes of the Pequot War, for example,
Stannard states flatly, "The colonists simply wanted to kill Indians.,,14 This rather
unhelpful conclusion sheds little light on the causes of mass violence. Churchill frankly
admits that he is "not prompted by primarily academic concerns (as in 'The Quest for
Truth')" and that his "goals are unequivocally political." Preemptively responding to
critics, he claims that "denial in any form is anathema," and implies that one cannot
disagree with his basic thesis without sinking to the morally reprehensible level of
Holocaust deniers. IS
12 David E. Stannard, American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest ofthe New World (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), x.
13 Ward Churchill, A Little Matter ofGenocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the
Present (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997),250.
14 Stannard, American Holocaust, 112.
15 Churchill, Little Matter ofGenocide, 11, 53.
9Alfred Cave presents a more balanced argument and concludes that the events of
the Pequot War constitute genocide. He judiciously limits the application of this term
specifically to the Pequots, rejecting the position that European colonization represented
a continuous act of genocide against all Native Americans. Fantasies about Indians
wielding diabolical power, argues Cave, led the Puritans to dehumanize the Pequots. The
colonists' hatred and fear thus led to the imaginary transformation of the Pequots into
enemies fit for extermination. There are two shortcomings to this interpretation. First,
Cave stresses that the Puritans specifically targeted the Pequots, but paradoxically
explains that genocide resulted from an ideology of demonic savagery that they applied
to all Indians. Second, he maintains that the causes of extreme violence against Native
Americans can only be determined "by a case by case analysis.,,16 While clearly an
appeal for responsible scholarship to replace inflammatory invective, this approach also
prevents him from locating the genocide of the Pequots in a larger structure of Anglo-
Indian violence.
Leaving aside the question of genocide, Ronald Dale Karr proposes an
explanation for the violence of the Pequot War, which by any standard was
exceptionally brutal and destructive. He argues that English conduct was fully consistent
with the standards of European warfare in unconventional conflicts against infidels and
rebels. By the time that hostilities erupted in 1636, he maintains, the Puritans considered
the Pequot tribe to be a political tributary subordinate to English sovereignty. By
resisting English power the Pequots marked themselves, in the English point of view, as
16 Alfred A. Cave, "The 1637 Pequot War and the Question of Native American Genocide," (paper
presented at the Genocide Studies Seminar, Yale University, 2005), 10.
10
illegitimate enemies to whom the rules of war did not apply. Karr's legally based
explanation sheds light on a significant aspect of Anglo-Indian conflict previously
ignored by scholars. However, he admits the limitations of this model. Although military
massacres were not unusual in European combat, Karr acknowledges that the sustained
pursuit and summary execution of Pequots during the months that followed was a
dramatic departure from normal practice. Moreover, Karr cannot explain why other
conflicts in which Indian tribes allegedly rebelled against colonial authority did not
reach the same heights of bloodshed. 17
1. Frederick Fausz's subtle and compelling dissertation, "The Powhatan Uprising
of 1622," is the only full-length study of the Anglo-Powhatan Wars. Fausz's
comprehensive approach places these conflicts within the larger context of English
imperialism, emphasizing that the colonial project fundamentally necessitated the
destruction of Indian societies. He elucidates the ambivalent nature of this process by
exploring the aspects of imperial ideology that encouraged coexistence through
assimilation, as well as those that led to violence when the Powhatan Indians defended
the integrity of their culture. Fausz's keystone for this dynamic is ethnocentrism, both
English and Powhatan. When they came into contact, he argues, these two proud and
powerful cultures inevitably clashed. While undoubtedly a relevant factor, ethnocentrism
is ultimately too limited a concept to explain Anglo-Powhatan conflict. It creates a false
equivalence between English and Powhatan worldviews regarding the nature and
17 Ronald Dale Karr, '''Why Should You Be So Furious?': The Violence of the Pequot War," Journal of
American History 85, no. 3 (December 1998): 876-909. Karr's article is offered as a corrective to Adam
Hirsch's earlier argument that the violence of the Pequot War was caused by cultural misunderstandings
over the rules of military engagement; see Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures," 1187-1212.
11
exercise of power. Moreover, his explanations for outbreaks of extreme violence rely on
dubious psychological mechanisms. Fausz often accounts for the colonists' resort to
atrocity and massacre as the result of frustrated desire, "peer pressure," and "mob
frenzy." Though Fausz's analysis of war and culture in early Virginia is groundbreaking
and important, these problems limit his contribution to an understanding of the deep
roots of colonial violence.18
The problem with all of these explanations is that they are too static to explain
the wide range of Anglo-Indian interactions. The radical arguments for Native American
genocide appeal to an overly simple formulation ofIndian-hating to explain European
hostility. This position cannot account for the numerous examples of peaceful
intercultural contact, including repeated attempts by English missionaries to find a way
to incorporate Native Americans into colonial society. Even the persuasive explanations
put forth by Cave and Karr cannot help but treat the Pequot War as an aberration, rather
than a single episode in a larger pattern of frontier violence. None of these explanations
are able to capture the dynamism of Anglo-Indian relations. Neither can they explain the
mechanism by which peaceful interaction shifted to extreme violence and then back to
relatively peaceful coexistence, often within just a few years.
This thesis argues that the extreme levels of violence that characterized early
Anglo-Indian conflict, up to and including genocide, were inextricably linked to the
basic process of colonization. The new English society that colonizers planned to build
could not inhabit the same space as the Native American societies that were already
18 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 276.
12
there. The success of the colonial project was therefore predicated on the disappearance
of indigenous peoples, a basic structural relationship that Patrick Wolfe calls the "logic
of elimination.,,19 The need to eliminate Native Americans virtually guaranteed conflict
between Indians and colonists. Aspects of the English worldview led them to devalue
Native American societies, beliefs, and practices, thereby intensifying violence during
the resulting wars. In most cases these conflicts were self-limiting, and colonists ceased
hostilities once they had achieved the elimination of Indians through territorial
expulsion. However, extraordinary circumstances-when the colonists experienced a
sense of overwhelming crisis-resulted in what A. Dirk Moses calls a "genocidal
moment.,,20 The colonists then focused their sense of collective fear on a single target,
unleashing the terrible violence within their worldview through a sustained commitment
to the destruction of their enemy.
19 Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal ofGenocide Research
8, no. 4 (December 2006): 397-98.
20 Moses first introduced the concept of the genocidal moment in "An Antipodean Genocide?: The Origins
of the Genocidal Moment in the Colonization of Australia," Journal ofGenocide Research 2, no. 1 (March
2000): 89-106. He has subsequently refined and expanded this idea; see Moses, "Genocide and Settler
Society in Australian History," in Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous
Children in Australian History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004): 3-48.
13
CHAPTER II
NEW WORLD VISIONS
When Indians and Englishmen met along the shores of the Atlantic, each trying
to make sense of the other, the differences between them often took center stage. They
acted according to different concepts of power and authority, obeyed different rules of
economic exchange, and organized their societies in ways that were different in a
thousand particulars. They worshipped different gods, and though they both believed in
the wonders of an invisible world, they understood that realm in profoundly different
ways. They organized the space around them, reshaping their environment to fit their
needs and desires, so differently that they often baffled each other. There were many
similarities between them as well, although these basic points of human kinship were
often lost in the clash between cultures. On the most fundamental level, Native
Americans and English colonists both carried the full weight of their own histories, with
centuries of myths and legends and memories about who they were and where they had
come from. These narratives about the past helped them to make sense of their
environment, ordered their perceptions of the world around them, and allowed them to
14
find their place within it. Perhaps more importantly, such stories shaped the way that
they imagined the future.
The meeting of Indian and English minds was thus a meeting of two different
imaginative constructions of self, society, environment, and the larger universe. Both
peoples hoped that they could preserve the essence of their identity and pass their legacy
to future generations. Each sensed the promise and the perils of engaging with the other.
And each possessed starkly different visions of the new world shaped by contact.'
Visions of Empire
In the latter part of the sixteenth century the people of England began to awaken
to the idea of empire. Though latecomers to the imperial stage, the English looked west
to the lands of the New World and saw the makings of a rich future. Apostles of
imperialism, such as the two Richard Hakluyts, articulated for their countrymen a
comprehensive rationale for "planting," as they referred to colonization projects. They
argued that colonies would enlarge the royal domain, enrich the commonwealth through
commerce, swell the ranks of the army and navy, help the nation defend its honor against
imperial Spain, and bring glory to God through the spread of Protestant Christianity.2
Writers often clearly phrased the call to empire in the stark language of finance,
1 This concept of a broad cultural vision is largely inspired, in form if not in content, by Elliot West. See
The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1998).
2 The most famous statement of the English imperial vision is Richard Hakluyt's Discourse ofWestern
Planting (1584); see The Original Writings and Correspondence ofthe Two Richard Hakluyts, ed. E.G .R.
Taylor, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., nos. 76-77 (London: Hakluyt Society,
1935),2:211-326.
15
diplomacy, and war; but the budding movement across the Atlantic was also animated
by more subtle currents that stirred dreams of extraordinary power and emotional
resonance. Forging an empire brought material advantages, but it also evoked visions of
revitalization and renewal. Samuel Purchas, the Hakluyts' intellectual successor,
imagined colonization as a singular act of creation and called upon his compatriots "to
plant another England in America.") The idea of a land reshaped into a new Albion was
as complex as it was single-minded and as ambiguous as it was powerful. It was, at
heart, a vision of total transformation: a new creation built on the ruins of what carne
before it, a vision pregnant with the threat of violence.
While a comprehensive analysis of English colonial ideology is beyond the scope
of this study, there were four aspects of their vision that increased the likelihood of
conflict between colonists and Native Americans: stereotyped perceptions of Indians as
an alien "other," exclusionary theories of land use and property rights, rigid concepts of
political sovereignty in early modern law, and the continuity of extreme violence in
English history and antiquity.4 These factors often influenced English colonists to
3 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or, Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History ofthe World in
Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, 20 vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and
Sons, 1905), 19:266.
4 The four themes of violent ideologies that I explore here are similar to the themes that Ben Kiernan
identifies as common to a variety of historical contexts. Kiernan's four themes are racism, a cult of
antiquity, a fetish for cultivation, and an imperative for territorial expansion. See Kiernan, Blood and Soil:
A World History ofGenocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 2007), 22-33. For more comprehensive treatments of English colonial ideology, see J.
Frederick Fausz, "The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: A Historical Study of Ethnocentrism and Cultural
Conflict" (Ph.D. Diss., College of William and Mary, 1977), 120-216; Andrew Fitzmaurice, Humanism
and America: An Intellectual History ofEnglish Colonisation, 1500-1625 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); Anthony Pagden, Lords ofAll the World: Ideologies ofEmpire in Spain, Britain,
and France c. 1500-c.1800 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995).
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behave in ways that promoted Anglo-Indian violence, and tended to escalate those
conflicts once they had begun.
The first factor was the English perception ofNative Americans as profoundly
ambiguous figures. In the English mind the Indian was a "savage," a term that was not
necessarily pejorative but denoted instead a bundle of ideas about the state of humanity
prior to the development of civilization. The contours of savagism were based on the
contraposition of English society with those of apparently less-developed peoples. In
that sense, the savage was quintessentially "other." Like a figure seen in an inverted
mirror, the savage was defined by everything that the English were not, and lacked
everything that the English possessed. The idea of the savage was an intellectual
abstraction that naturally led to cultural misunderstandings when English colonists
encountered actual Native American societies. It also led them to interpret those
societies through a set of preconceived notions and rigid categories based on stereotypes
of "uncivilized" peoples.5
One aspect of this archetype was the "innocent savage." This savage was simple
and ignorant but also gentle and good, a characterization consistent with the tendency of
many writers to compare America with an earthly paradise. For example, Arthur
Barlowe, one of the captains of one of the 1584 Roanoke expedition, called the Carolina
coast "the most plentifull, sweete, fruitfull, and wholsome of all the world," and
5 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images o/the American Indian from Columbus to the
Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 12-21, 27-28; Gary Nash, "The Image of the Indian in the
Southern Colonial Mind," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 29, no. 2 (April 1972): 199-202; Bernard
W. Sheehan, Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980), 1-6.
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concluded that the "earth bringeth foorth all things in aboundance, as in the first
creation." It did not surprise him, then, to find that the Indians were "people most gentle,
louing, and faithfull, void of all guile, and treason, and such as liued after the manner of
the golden age.,,6 Walter Raleigh similarly described Indians as a people who were
ignorant of arts, letters, and philosophy, but were also free from evils like greed and the
dark instinct to violence. Summarizing his impressions, he wrote that "The Indians for
the most parte are a people very faythfull, humble, patient, peceable, simple without
subtilty, mallice, quarrels, strife, rancor or desyer of reuengement, as meeke as lambs, as
harmeles as children of 10 or 12 yeares.,,7 At one extreme, then, the savage represented a
prelapsarian virtue, like humanity before the expulsion from Eden.
Though this sort of Arcadian rhetoric made a lasting impression on the English
mind, it was not as common as the closely connected portrayal ofIndians as fera1.8 In his
pamphlet Nova Britannia, the chaplain Robert Johnson explained that Virginia was
"inhabited with wild and sauage people, that liue and lie vp and downe in troupes like
heards of Deare in a Forrest: they haue no law but nature, their apparell skinnes of
beasts, but most goe naked." Despite their rude ways, though, such people were merely
ignorant and could be taught a better way. "[T]hey are generally very louing and gentle,"
6 David Beers Quinn, ed., "Arthur Barlowe's Discourse of the First Voyage," 1584-5, in The Roanoke
Voyages, 2 vols., Works Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., nos. 104-105 (London: Hakluyt Society,
1952),1:106,108.
7 Walter Raleigh, The Discovery ofthe Large, Rich, and Beautiful Empire ofGuiana, with a Relation of
the Great and Golden City ofManoa. ... ed. Robert H. Schomburgk, Works Issued by the Hakluyt
Society, no. 3 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1848), 150.
8 Roy Harvey Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study ofthe Indian and the American Mind (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988),4-8; Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, 63-71.
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Johnson concluded, "and doe entertaine and relieue our people with great kindnesse:
they are easy to be brought to good, and would fayne embrace a better condition.,,9
Tractability was the defining trait of the "innocent savage." Whether the English
perceived American natives as edenic children or uncultured barbarians, they imagined
the Indian as a blank slate: unsophisticated, docile, and willing to accept the imprint of
the English vision for a new world. IO
The stereotype of the innocent savage coexisted with a darker twin in whom the
absence of civilization led, not to virtue, but to depravity. The "ignoble savage"
represented sin incarnate, all the basest instincts of mankind shorn of the controls of
religion and government.}} Imagined as the antithesis of everything that defined English
identity, such peoples flagrantly practiced all of the vices most abhorrent to the English
mind. Daniel Waterhouse, secretary for the Virginia Company, catalogued the
deficiencies of Native Americans, writing that they were "by nature sloathfull and idle,
vitious, melancholy, slouenly, of bad conditions, lyers, of small memory, of no
constancy or truSt.,,12 The Reverend Alexander Whitaker similarly condemned their
shameless immorality, charging that "They liue naked in bodie, as if their shame of their
9 R[obert] J[ohnson], "Nova Britannia: Offering Most Excellent fmites by Planting in Virginia," in Tracts
and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress o/the Colonies in North
America: From the Discovery o/the Country to the Year 1776, ed. Peter Force, 4 vols. (New York:
Murray Printing Company, 1947), vol. 1, doc. 6, p. 11.
10 Anthony Pagden, The Fall o/Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins o/Comparative
Ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 104-5.
11 The phrase "ignoble savage" comes from Bernard Sheehan; see Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, 1-2.
12 Edward Waterhouse, "A Declaration of the State of the Colony and ... a Relation of the Barbarous
Massacre," 1622, in The Records 0/the Virginia Company 0/London (hereafter cited as RVCL), ed. Susan
Myra Kingsbury, 4 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906-1935), 3:562.
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sinne deserued no couering ... they esteeme it a vertue to lie, deceiue and steale as their
master the diuell teacheth them.,,13 This sort of savage represented the peril-and the
dark temptation---of a world without law or moral restraint.
Taken to an extreme, the ignoble savage became an archetype of atavistic horror:
the bloodthirsty cannibal held in Satan's thral1. 14 In this guise, savages were natural
killers, their hearts ruled by viciousness and brutality. Under the banners of evil gods
they marched in unending warfare in the dusky forests, butchering and burning and
torturing each other until the land lay in waste. IS "[T]hey are continually in warres,"
reported Jamestown colonist George Percy, "and will eate their enemies when they kill
them, or any stranger if they take them... they worship the Deuill for their God, and
haue no other beliefe.,,16 The worst such Indians were the priests, who goaded their
people into blood sacrifices to dark powers. William Strachey, secretary of the
Jamestown colony, called these priests "monsters" who "doe offer up unto the devill
their owne childrene, and being hardened against all compassion, naturall and divine,
13 Alexander Whitaker, Good Newesfrom Virginia, reprint ed. (New York: Scholars' Facsimiles &
Reprints),24.
14 Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London and New
York: Methuen, 1986),99-100; Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, 38-48. For the roots of this image in
Spanish thought, see Hulme, Colonial Encounters, 13-88; Pagden, Fall o/Natural Man, 80-90.
15 Quinn, "Arthur Barlowe's Discourse," in Roanoke Voyages, I :112-13; Sheehan, Savagism and Civility,
56-61.
16 Philip L. Barbour, ed., "George Percy's Discourse," l608(?),in The Jamestown Voyages Under the First
Charter, 1606-1609,2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., nos. 136-137 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 1:130.
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enforce their owne mothers to deliver them to the executioner with their owne hands."I?
Against such implacable evil, the English thought, there was no alternative to swift and
merciless violence. John Smith related the belief among some Virginian colonists that
colonization would be impossible "till their Priests and Ancients have their throats cut."
The irredeemable evil of the satanic savage justified their extermination.I8
Of course, the perception of the savage as other, in both its stereotyped guises,
was an imaginary construct that bore little or no resemblance to actual Native American
societies. Rather than a realistic paradigm for understanding foreign cultures, the duality
of savagism was an English abstraction designed to serve English needs. Viewed
through such a lens, actual Native Americans could be seen differently depending on
their reception to English actions. The innocent savage cried out for help, seeking the
order of benevolent government and salvation from sin, while the ignoble savage was a
monster who could be destroyed with impunity. Both of these mental constructions
served the colonial project by legitimizing the extension of English power across the
A I . 19t antIc.
17 William Strachey, The Historie ofTravaile into Virginia Britannia: Expressing the Cosmographie and
Comodities ofthe Country, Togither with the Manners and Customes ofthe People, ed. Richard Henry
Major, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, no. 6 (London, 1849),88-89.
18 John Smith, "The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles ..." 1624, in The
Complete Works ofCaptain John Smith (1580-1631), ed. Philip L. Barbour, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill and
London: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1986),2:286; Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 87-89. See also
the Virginia Company's instructions to Sir Thomas Gates in Samuel M. Bemiss, ed., The Three Charters
ofthe Virginia Company ofLondon, Jamestown 350th Anniversary Historical Booklets, no. 4
(Williamsburg: The Virginia 350th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957),57-58.
19 Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, 3-5, 37; Nash, "Image of the Indian," 206; Alden T. Vaughan, "Early
English Paradigms for New World Natives," in Roots ofAmerican Racism: Essays on the Colonial
Experience (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),53-54. For discussions of the "other"
in psychology and its connection to mass violence, see Donald G. Dutton, The Psychology ofGenocide,
Massacres, and Extreme Violence: Why "Normal" People Come to Commit Atrocities (Westport, Conn.
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English dismissal of Native American patterns ofland use as illegitimate, the
second factor that precipitated Anglo-Indian violence, expressed the dual image of
savagism in concrete terms. Feudal concepts of communal rights and common
ownership still governed concepts of land in early modern England. At the same time
that the impetus for colonization gained momentum, however, these traditional ideas
increasingly conflicted with emerging models of the marketplace that emphasized
exclusive ownership of alienable property and the intensive cultivation of that bounded
possession.20 Many of the theorists for this proto-capitalistic model were the same men
who promoted English imperialism, so it is unsurprising that they applied their theories
to new and potential English colonies. Citing the biblical injunction to "bring for the
frute and multiplie, and til the earth, and subdue it," Samuel Purchas stated
unequivocally that "The first and last thing therefore in this Virginian argument" over
the right of Englishmen to colonize "is God; that is, whether we have Commission from
him to plant, and whether the Plantation may bring glory to him." He concluded that the
Native Americans in Virginia, who "I can scarsly call inhabitants," had failed to fulfill
and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 108-11; Jacques Semelin, PurifY and Destroy: The
Political Uses ofMassacre and Genocide, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press,
2007),22-51; Ervin Staub, The Roots ofEvil: The Origins ofGenocide and Other Group Violence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 58-62.
20 Jess Edwards, "Between 'Plain Wilderness' and 'Goodly Corn Fields': Representing Land Use in Early
Virginia," in Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making ofthe North Atlantic World, ed.
Robert Applebaum and John Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 217-
235.
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God's commandment because there were "wild, and holdeth no settled possession in any
parts.,,21
Transatlantic travelers confirmed Purchas's conclusions. The Algonquian tribes
of the Atlantic coast exploited the resources of their homelands through a semi-nomadic
combination of hunting, gathering, and shifting cultivation. They transformed the natural
ecology in ways that any observer would have to acknowledge, with neatly surveyed
villages occupied throughout much of the year, networks of fishing weirs along the
coast, and planted fields of corn, beans, and squash. Nevertheless, this pattern of
subsistence left large swathes of land apparently unused?2 William Strachey called this
land "wast[e] and uninhabited growndes of their[s], amongst a world of which not one
foote of a thousand doe they either use, or knowe howe to turne to any benefit.,,23
English writers seized on this impression of "waste," as they generally referred to land
not being maximally exploited, and argued that they had a right to settle on any
uninhabited ground. Filtered through English preconceptions about Native American
lifeways, this argument led to three conclusions: Indians inhabited the land but did not
use it properly, Indian ownership extended only as far as their current occupancy, and
21 Genesis 1:28; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:218,222-23. This and all subsequent biblical
quotations are from the 1560 Geneva Bible, available at http://www.thedcl.orglbible/gb/index.html
(accessed April 2, 2009).
22 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology ofNew England, revised
edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 24-53. The orderliness and sophistication ofIndian settlements
are clearly visible in the engravings accompanying Thomas Hariot's ethnographic description of the
Indians of the Carolina coast. See Thomas Hariot, A Briefe and True Report ofthe New Found Land of
Virginia (New York: J. Sabin and Sons, 1871),51-52,59-62, available at
http://docsouth.unc.edu/nc/hariot/hariot.html (accessed April 17, 2009).
23 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 19.
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Europeans had the right to claim everything else?4 Codified in a principle known as
terra nullius, or "empty land," English and other European thinkers thus developed a
legal theory of property rights that in principle recognized native title to their own land,
but in practice actually facilitated their dispossession?5
Eager to differentiate themselves from the scandalous violence perpetrated by the
Spanish conquistadors, English promoters of colonization generally accepted arguments
that non-Christians, such as Indians, possessed legitimate rights of ownership?6 They
also argued that all humans had the natural right to "traficke," which the landholder and
colonization booster George Peckham described as the right to "lawfully travaile into
those Countries and abide there," and which "the Savages may not justly impugne and
forbidde." In the broadest sense, traffic included freedom of movement on land and sea,
the right to proselytize among non-Christian populations, and unrestricted trade. Any
group interfering with these rights, for example by perpetrating violence against
missionaries or declining to engage in commerce, flouted basic human rights under
natural law. "Then in such a case," concluded Peckham, "I holde it no breache of equitye
for the Christians to defende themselves, to pursue revenge with force, and to doo
24 "True Declaration of the Estate of the Colonie in Virginia," 1610, in Force, Tracts, vol. 3, doc. 1, p. 6;
Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:219-20, 222-223; Raleigh, Discovery . .. o.fGuiana, 141-42. See also
Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge and
London: Cambridge University Press, 2005),15-16,29-33.
25 Pagden, Lords o.fAll the World, 76-80. See also Andrew Fitzmaurice, "Anticolonialism in Western
Political Thought: The Colonial Origins of the Concept of Genocide," in Empire, Colony, Genocide:
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 62-64; L.C. Green and Olive P. Dickason, The Law o.fNations and the
New World (Edmonton, Alberta: University of Alberta Press, 1989),233-36,246.
26 Andrew Fitzmaurice, "Moral Uncertainty in the Dispossession of Native Americans," in The Atlantic
World and Virginia, 1550-1624, ed. Peter C. Mancall (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press,
2007),383-409.
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whatsoever is necessary for attayning oftheyr safety: For it is allowable by all Lawes in
such distresses, to resist violence with violence.,,27 By impeding English trade or
settlement projects, Indians invited retaliatory violence, which even in its most extreme
manifestations was backed by the full force of legal and moral validation.
The third factor that increased the likelihood of violence in English colonial
practice was a hierarchical concept of sovereignty combined with the legal sanction for
extreme violence in early modern law. For the English, as for all European powers in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the extent and exercise of sovereignty rested on a
set of general propositions collectively known as the law of nations (jus gentium). The
law of nations was based, in part, on the medieval concept of a just war (jus ad bellum),
which defined the circumstances in which a Christian nation could rightfully go to war
and specified the rightful conduct of such wars. Conquest, however, was never a just
cause; the law of nations mandated that righteous warfare could only be waged in self-
defense after an aggressive provocation. In theory, the law of nations required that armed
forces obey a code of conduct that protected surrendering combatants and unarmed
civilians. In practice, though, even when fighting each other European armies often
27 G[eorge] P[eckham], "A true reporte of the late discoveries ... of the Newfound Landes ..." 1584, in
The Voyages and Colonising Enterprises a/Sir Humphrey Gilbert, ed. David Beers Quinn, 2 vols., Works
Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser., nos. 83-84 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1940),2:450,453; see also
Richard Hakluyt, "Pamphlet for the Virginia Enterprise Ascribed to Richard Hakluyt, Lawyer," 1584, in
Writings a/the Hakluyts, 2:342; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:222. The right to traffic builds on
Salamanca theologian Francisco de Vitoria's conclusion that the right of communication (consortium
hominum) was a central tenet of natural law. See Pagden, Fall a/Natural Man, 76-77.
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ignored these restrictions, as the widespread atrocities of the Thirty Years' War
demonstrated.28
Rebellion was a particularly heinous violation of the law of nations because it
threatened the foundations of the organized state. Because their armed resistance against
a lawful sovereign was legally illegitimate, internal enemies such as rebels and traitors
did not receive the protections extended to soldiers and civilians, even in theory.
Moreover, warring armies could easily distinguish soldiers from civilians, but rebellious
populations seldom put uniformed troops into the field. Insurrection was the work of an
entire population, and European commanders often considered non-combatants
legitimate military targets in their own right. When a just authority exercised sovereignty
over a given territory and faced internal rebellion, European armies typically fought with
unbridled ferocity.29
In the hands of English colonizers, the concept ofjust war and the law of nations
became a potent weapon of war rather than a measure of protection. They might have
envisaged a new England in America, but they never doubted that the old England would
rule it as an extension of the crown's authority. Thus they made particular efforts to
bring Native American polities formally under English dominion and reduce the people
to lawful subjects of the English monarch. In 1609, for example, Captain Christopher
Newport convinced Wahunsenacawh, the Powhatan paramount chief, to become a vassal
28 Ronald Dale Karr, "'Why Should You Be So Furious?': The Violence of the Pequot War," Journal of
American History 85, no. 3 (December 1998): 876-909,879-83. Stephen Neff notes that the devastation of
the Thirty Years War proved to political philosophers that the existing rules of war were insufficient, and
thus spurred the development of modem international law; see Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of
Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 82.
29 Karr, "'Why Should You Be So Furious?'" 883-88.
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of King James 1. Newport invested the Indian "king" with a crown and scepter, though
the Powhatan leader rendered the ceremony farcical by refusing to kneel down and abase
himself in the proper fashion. Though Wahunsenacawh almost certainly did not consider
his coronation an act of submission, the English nevertheless considered him to have
accepted his place in the hierarchy of feudal power. When Powhatan warriors attacked
the Jamestown colonists later that year in reaction to English provocations, the colonists
judged that Wahunsenacawh had breached the law of nations, committing treason
against the crown by raising the standard of rebellion. In the eyes of the English, this act
justified a virtually unlimited military response against the entire offending population.3D
Finally, historical precedents of extreme violence made a deep impression on
English thinkers and increased the aggressive tendencies of colonial practice. The
biblical conquest of Canaan, a familiar story to nearly everyone who lived in an
intensely religious age, served as a particularly vivid example. The inhabitants of
Canaan became the victims of a genocide that was not merely sanctioned but in fact
ordained by God. In the book of Deuteronomy, God directed the Israelites to annihilate
the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites, and Jebusites, with the injunction,
"thou shalt saue no persone aliue, But shalt vtterly destroye them.,,3! The great leader
Joshua executed this commandment, starting with the city of Jericho. The Israelites
30 "True Declaration," in Force, Tracts, vol. 3, doc. 1, p. 6-7; Smith, "The Proceedings of the English
Colonie in Virginia since their first beginning from England in the yeare of our Lord 1606, till this present
1612," 1612, in Complete Works, 1:234-37, Smith, "Generall History," in Complete Works, 2:181-84. On
Wahunsenacawh's interpretation ofthe coronation ceremony, see Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas
Powhatan Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown (Charlottesville and London:
University of Virginia Press, 2005),112-14.
31 Deuteronomy 20: 16-17.
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"vtterly destroyed all that was in the citie, bothe man and woman, yong and olde, and
oxe, and shepe, and asse, with the edge of the sworde." Joshua devastated all of Canaan,
even exceeding his mandate by massacring the populations of ten cities in addition to the
nations divinely marked for destruction. In this manner, "Joshua smote all the hyl
cou[n]treis, and the Southcountreis, and the valleis, and the hilsides, & all their Kings, &
let none remaine, but vtterly destroyed euery soule, as the Lord God of Israel had
commanded.,,32 The Israelites had thus claimed their promised land through genocidal
slaughter.
English colonizers did not, of course, march off to the New World with the
confident intention of exterminating its inhabitants, and anyone claiming to have
received a divine commandment to that effect would likely have been accused of heresy.
Biblical precedents were significant less as models for colonization than as imaginative
templates for mass violence. As a celebrated episode of God's will in action, the utter
destruction of the Canaanites provided a ready justification for genocide to anyone
reaching for an evocative parallel. William Strachey, for example, cited Joshua's war as
an example of what came to those who resisted the truth of God's word: "when strange
and great nations would not submitt to the yoake of this knowledge of the everlasting
God by faire entreaty, they were,jerro etjlammis [with sword and flame], compelled
32 Joshua 6:21, 10:40. Joshua's genocidal campaign "utterly destroyed" the cities Jericho, Ai, Makkedah,
Libnah, Lachish, Gezer, Eglon, Hebron, and Debir; at Hazor his armies destroyed the city but halted their
slaughter after killing all of the men. See Joshua 8:24-28, 10:8-40, 11 :6-15.
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thereunto.,,33 Biblical examples of mass killing thus easily conferred, by rhetorical
sleight of hand, a kind of righteousness to brutal warfare in America.
English thinkers drew a more direct connection between colonialism and
classical antiquity, characterizing their Atlantic enterprise as a modern version of the
Roman imperium's civilizing mission.34 Though proud of their civilization, the English
also believed that they had achieved this state after Rome's influence uplifted their
barbarous ancestors. Thomas Hariot did much to popularize this belief with the
publication of his Briefe and True Report ofthe New Found Land ofVirginia in 1588. In
addition to detailed descriptions of the manners and habits of the Carolina coast natives,
Hariot included a series of engravings of ancient Picts by Theodore de Bry. Naked,
tattooed, and brandishing severed human heads, these barbarous figures were intended,
wrote Hariot, "to showe how that the Inhabitants of the great Bretannie haue bin in times
past as sauuage as those ofVirginia.,,35 William Strachey made the same connection,
asserting that without outside help the English "might yet have lyved overgrowen satyrs,
rude and untutred, wandring in the woodes... prostetuting our daughters to straungers,
sacrificing our childrene to idolls, nay, eating our owne childrene.,,36 Civilization had
come to England borne on Roman banners and, when the barbarous Britons obstructed
their advance, enforced by Roman swords. Writers such as Robert Johnson were
thankful that "Julius Cresar with his Romane Legions... laid the ground to make vs tame
33 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 22. See also P[eckham], "True Reporte," in Gilbert's Voyages, 2:454-55.
34 Pagden, Lords ofAll the World, 11-28.
35 Hariot, Briefe and True Report, 67-77 (quotation p. 67).
36 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 18.
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and ciuil1.,,37 Because civility was such an obvious boon to the poor natives of America,
the English thought, they should follow the Roman example: offer the blessings of order
and good government to the Indians, and force it upon them for their own good if they
resisted.
Advocates of colonization clearly understood that following the Roman model of
bringing civility with the edge of the sword could entail spectacular carnage. Purchas
asked, "Were not wee our selves made and not borne civill in our Progenitors dayes? and
were not Cresars Britaines as brutish as Virginians? The Romane swords were best
teachers of civilitie to this & other Countries neere US.,,38 In addition to the violence of
conquest, such writers assumed that the process of civilizing an indigenous population
would entail the comprehensive destruction of their culture and society. William
Herbert, a large landholder in Ireland, wrote that the best way to civilize the population
was "to do away with and destroy completely the habits and practices of the natives" so
that "the natives will put on and embrace the habits and customs of the colonists.,,39 For
some, the inherent value of the colonial project justified more than mere conquest or
even cultural destruction. The lawyer Gabriel Harvey, for example, comfortably lauded
Rome's obliteration of its rival Carthage and the annihilation of its people as a pivotal
event in the empire's rise to greatness. "Had Carthage not been Rome's bitter enemy,"
37 J[ohnson], "Nova Britannia," in Force, Tracts, 14.
38 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:62.
39 Quoted in Peter C. Mancall, "English Promotion and Settlement in the Americas," in Envisioning
America: English Plans for the Colonization ofNorth America, 1580-1640, ed. Peter C. Mancall (Boston
and New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1995),9.
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he reasoned, "Rome would never have become the powerful mistress of the world.',40 In
formulating a vision of England's place on the imperial stage, then, English thinkers
raised the specter of genocidal war in the greater service of civilization.
More directly than the half-mythological examples from scripture or classical
texts, the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland gave England its first real lessons in overseas
colonialism. There had been a limited English presence in Ireland for several centuries,
but in the mid-sixteenth century Englishmen attempted to live up to the civilizing
mission of ancient Rome by fundamentally reshaping Ireland's society and people to
conform to their own model. They intended to uplift foreign peoples by bringing order
and proper government, followed by proper dress, behavior, and agriculture. The whole
enterprise was predicated, therefore, on the characterization of the Irish people as
culturally inferior, if not outright savage.41
By the l560s, English leaders increasingly relied on coercive policies that
demanded Irish obedience to their authority. The declaration of martial law in 1558
resulted in a wave of rebellions over the next decade, notably by Shane O'Neill of Ulster
in the north and by James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald of Desmond in the south. English
40 Quoted in Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 172.
41 Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," William and
Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 30, no. 4 (October 1973): 84-90, 92. Andrew Hadfield has recently challenged
this view, arguing that the equation ofIrishness with savagery in the English mind has been overstated. He
nonetheless acknowledges that views of the Irish as inferior but tractable animated the English colonial
mission, and that these views tipped dramatically towards a belief in Irish barbarism in the wake of
indigenous resistance. Andrew Hadfield, "Irish Colonies and the Americas," in Envisioning an English
Empire, 172, 177,188.
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tactics became increasingly brutal as Irish resistance intensified.42 Beginning in 1569
Humphrey Gilbert ravaged the southern region of Munster, proudly reporting,
I slew all those from time to time that did belong to, feed, accompany, or
maintain any outlaws or traitors; and after my first summoning of any castle or
fort, ifthey would not presently yield it, I would not afterwards take it of their
gift, but won it perforce, how many lives so ever it cost, putting man, woman and
child of them to the sword.43
Thomas Churchyard, who accompanied Gilbert throughout his campaign, justified this
carnage by arguing that non-combatants were legitimate military targets. Because non-
combatants produced the food supplies vital to sustaining the rebel armies, he reasoned,
"the killyng oftheim by the sworde was the waie to kill the menne ofwarre by famine."
English commanders tried to defeat their enemies by massacring civilian populations and
destroying their food supplies. This devastatingly effective tactic became a central
feature of warfare in the New World.44
Despite such draconian tactics, Irish resistance to English colonial rule continued
throughout the late sixteenth century. During this time English commanders emphasized
the incorrigible savagery of their enemies and increasingly maintained that the Irish
could only be subdued by overwhelming force. Cultural devaluation justified the policies
of slaughter and starvation that became standard practice by the mid-1570s. In 1574
Walter Devereaux, the Earl of Essex, declared the people of Rathlin Island to be in revolt
42 Nicholas P. Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest ofIreland: A Pattern Established, 1565-76 (New York:
Barnes & Noble, 1976),36-44, 137-53; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 188-92.
43 Quoted in Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 192.
44 Quoted in Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," 582.
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and killed the entire population of six hundred during a night attack; later that year his
forces massacred several hundred Clandeboye O'Neills during a Christmas feast held
under a flag oftruce.45 English forces decimated the indigenous population, but in 1593
the Irish rose in a fresh round of rebellion. Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, rallied his
people and called for aid from his fellow Catholics in Spain, thus beginning the Nine
Years War. The vicious fighting escalated until it reached its bloody apotheosis during
Lord Mountjoy's campaign of extermination that virtually depopulated entire swathes of
h 'd 46t e countrysl e.
In 1601 Irish and Spanish forces suffered a disastrous defeat at Kinsale, and two
years later Hugh O'Neill ended the war with his surrender and subsequent execution.
Decades of hideous violence among the green hills of Ireland had made its mark,
however, and permanently imprinted English thinking about colonialism.47 Poet and
colonial administrator Edmund Spenser summarized the lessons of Irish colonization
when he explained the proper way to reform a society of uncooperative savages:
by the sworde; for all those evilles must first be cutt awaye with a stronge hande,
before any good cann bee planted; like as the corrupt branches and unwholsome
lawes are first to bee pruned, and the fowle mosse clensed or scraped awaye,
before the tree cann bringe forth any good fruite.48
45 Canny, Elizabethan Conquest, 120-21.
46 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 187; Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 208-11.
47 Canny, Elizabethan Conquest, 159-63.
48 Edmund Spenser, A Veue ofthe Present State ofireland, Discoursed by Way ofa Dialogue Betwene
Eudoxus and irenius (1596), available at http://uoregon.edu/~rbear/veuel.html (accessed April 5, 2009).
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England's civilizing mission through peaceful means remained an important feature of
colonial thinking, but experience in Ireland taught them that rejection of these efforts
should be met with swift and brutal violence.
These themes of bloodshed and dispossession did not occupy a consistent place
in the English imagination, nor did they inform colonial policy in any systematic
fashion. They were, rather, aspects of a complex and contradictory vision of a New
World that held within them a dark core of violence. Individually they were dangerous,
but that danger multiplied exponentially when all four themes combined within the
larger context of American colonial projects. English perceptions of Native Americans
marked them as alien and dangerous. European theories of property ownership
undermined the validity ofIndian claims to their own land. The law of nations gave
colonists the right to enforce dubious claims of national sovereignty over native peoples.
Episodes of mass slaughter from myth and history gave them a model for dealing with
defiant enemies. These mental constructions possessed strains of latent violence that
could manifest as massacre and genocide. In the crucible of the American borderlands,
conflict between the colonizers and the colonized always threatened to unleash the full
force of their lethal potential.
Visions of Power
Native Americans possessed their own visions of a changing world. The
Algonquian Indians of coastal North America inhabited a dynamic environment that was
constantly altered by war and peace, movement and time, belief and imagination. Like
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all peoples they formed societies in the ways that they thought would give them the best
quality of life, and as circumstances changed they acted to make their lives better.
Unlike the English, these Algonquians did not have any unitary sense of identity.
Spanning hundreds of miles of coastal territory, dozens of separate tribes spoke different
languages and dialects, formed various sorts of political organizations, worshipped gods
and powers in unique ways, and shaped their environments to maximize the resources
particular to the local climate and ecology. Their lifeways were diverse, and their visions
manifold, yet all of the peoples encountered by the English seized on the transformative
possibilities offered by a new world with these strangers in it,49
Long before European contact, the tendrils of an extensive trade network
penetrated deep into the interior ofthe American continent, connecting native societies
through the medium of material exchange. Indians traded a number of items, including
manufactured goods and staple food crops, but much of this traffic involved prestige
goods, such as shards of brilliant copper, deep-hued seashells, and crafted ritual items
from distant places. Because of their rarity these items were thought to possess a
spiritual potency that conferred special power upon their owners, what northern
Algonquians called manitou. With that power came prestige, the intangible currency that
allowed leaders to end feuds, broker alliances, seal marriages, and cement loyalties.
Native leaders who controlled such items also distributed them to followers and allies,
creating a "prestige goods economy" in which wealth translated to political power
49 Peter C. Mancall, "Native Americans and Europeans in English America, 1500-1700," in The Origins of
Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close ofthe Seventeenth Century, ed. Nicholas Canny, Oxford
History of the British Empire, vol. I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),328-350.
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through the acts of gift-giving and reciprocal exchange. Thus when the English and other
Europeans came from across the waters bearing exotic treasures, Indians could imagine
the benefits of such goods and eagerly included them in their ancient trading networks.
Peaceful commerce brought many forms of power-economic, spiritual, and political-
N · A . 50to . atlve mencans.-
The coming of Europeans altered the old trade networks, disrupting some,
strengthening others, and creating entirely new economies. The Pequot Indians of
southern New England, for example, quickly grasped the possibilities presented by the
arrival of the Dutch in the l620s. With the Pequots as their prime partners, the Dutch
West India Company laid the foundations for an economic nexus based on the exchange
of wampum for furs. Wampum-rare white and purple beads, which had to be
laboriously crafted from sea snails and clams and sewn into belts-was initially a
prestige item that connected its owner to sources of spiritual potency. Insatiable demand
for furs in the European market drove the production and exchange of wampum to the
point that it became the standard currency in New England, over time losing its spiritual
significance as it gained commodity value. In addition to this social and economic
impact, the fur trade dramatically altered the balance of power among the region's
Indian tribes. The Pequots extended their political influence through a series of
tributaries in Connecticut and eastern Long Island, but their expansion increased
tensions between them and the nearby Narragansetts, as well as with English merchants
50 James Axtell, "At the Water's Edge: Trading in the Sixteenth Century," in After Columbus: Essays in
the Ethnohistory o/Colonial North America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 144-
181; Cronon, Changes in the Land, 92-98; Daniel K. Richter, "Tsenacommacah and the Atlantic World,"
in The Atlantic World and Virginia, 29-65 (esp. 31-36).
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seeking to replace the Dutch as the region's principle buyer of furs. The Pequots' desire
for power through trade facilitated their meteoric rise but also set the stage for their
downfa1l.5l
Contact with Europeans also brought the power of technology. At first Native
Americans incorporated items that Europeans considered utilitarian into their prestige
economy. Sensing the powerful manitou in brass and steel, they would cut up pots and
other tools into jewelry or items of symbolic significance. The increasing availability of
European goods slowly transformed these items from unique objects into raw materials
and specialized tools. Durable brass pots replaced fragile ceramics and finished woolen
blankets replaced animal skins. Iron-harder and sharper than flint-produced better
hatchets, knives, fishhooks, and a host of other practical items that made everyday tasks
faster, easier, and more efficient. Native Americans' increasing reliance on these items
would cause dramatic and unforeseen changes in their basic subsistence patterns over the
course of generations. In the early stages of colonization, though, Indians understood
that European technologies eased their labor and increased the range of their
b'l" 52capa 1 It1es.
51 Alfred A. Cave, The Pequot War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996),49-54,61-63;
Lynn Ceci, "Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-Century World-System," in
The Pequots in Southern New England: The Fall and Rise ofan American Indian Nation, ed. Laurence M.
Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 50-60; Neal
Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making ofNew England, 1500-1643
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 147-52.
52 James Axtell, "The English Colonial Impact on Indian Culture," in The European and the Indian:
Essays in the Ethnohistory ofColonial North America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1981),253-56; Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History ofEarly America
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 43-46.
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Technology also came in the form of weapons: axes, knives, and swords made
from iron and steel, as well as brass arrowheads. These materials were superior to the
wood, stone, and bone of traditional Indian armaments, and native warriors keenly
understood both their danger and deadly potential. While these weapons presented little
mystery to Native Americans, the wholly unfamiliar firearm represented a more
dramatic innovation. Though noisier, slower, and less accurate than Indian arrows,
European firearms impressed Indian warriors with the psychological power of their
thunderous discharge and the horrific wounds produced when musket balls shredded
muscle and splintered bone. Military technology represented power in its rawest form:
the power to kill.53
Native Americans saw the potential in exploiting the Europeans themselves by
drawing the newcomers into existing political structures. In contrast to the rigidly
hierarchical conception of a sovereign's authority that formed the backbone of English
thinking, Algonquian ideas about political power rested on personal loyalty. Sachems
and sagamores in New England, as well as weroances in Virginia, ruled only with the
consent of their people. Their authority was based on individual charisma, proven
wisdom, military prowess, and the ability to bestow material goods as gifts. Leaders
gained power through alliance and pledges of mutual obligation. Such relationships did
not necessarily imply equality, though: this system had its own forms of hierarchy as
tribes sought protection from stronger neighbors in return for payments of tribute.
53 J. Frederick Fausz, "Fighting 'Fire' with Firearms: The Anglo-Powhatan Arms Race in Early Virginia,"
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3, no. 4 (December 1979): 36-39; Richter, Facing East,
46-49; Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way o/War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England
Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1991),29-31,38-41.
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Within this fluid matrix of power relationships, many Indians saw advantages in
associating themselves with the English.54
Native leaders whose power was threatened or declining saw an opportunity to
reverse their peoples' fortunes. Massasoit, the Pokanoket sachem at the time of the
Pilgrims' landing at Plymouth, made this calculation when he approached the colonists
in 1621. Five years earlier an unknown epidemic had ravaged the peoples of central New
England, causing death rates among the Pokanoket as high as 90 percent.55 While
Massasoit's tribe was devastated, his hostile neighbors, the Narragansetts, remained
virtually unaffected by the contagion and rapidly filled the power vacuum. Unable to
defend themselves against Narragansett aggression, the once powerful Pokanoket gave
up a significant portion of their territory and agreed to become Narragansett tributaries.
The coming of the Pilgrims gave Massasoit the opportunity to alter the balance of power
in his favor. Compared to the Narragansetts, the English offered access to the products
of the Atlantic trade network, military protection with their lethal technologies of guns
and steel, and a lighter burden of annual tribute. Massasoit willingly acknowledged the
sovereignty of King James I and accepted status as his tributary because he seized on the
possibilities offered by the English strangers. He hoped to counterbalance his peoples'
54 Kathleen 1. Bragdon, Native People o/Southern New England, 1500-1650 (Norman and London:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 140-155; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King:
Indians, English, and the Contest/or Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2005),11-14; Helen C. Rountree, The Powhatan Indians o/Virginia: Their
Traditional Culture (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 114-20; Salisbury,
Manitou and Providence, 42-49.
55 Sherburne F. Cook, The Indian Population o/New England in the Seventeenth Century (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976), 31. On virgin soil epidemics and Native American population
decline, see Sherburne F. Cook, "The Significance of Disease in the Extinction of the New England
Indian," Human Biology 45 (1973): 485-508.
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demographic decline, escape his subjection to the Narragansetts, and make himself a
regional power once again.56
Not all native societies, however, acted out of weakness to control the effects of
demographic collapse or military defeat. By the turn of the seventeenth century the
Powhatans of the Chesapeake, who called their country Tsenacommacah, "the densely
inhabited land," were a powerful and confident people. Encompassing a population as
high as 15,000 throughout the Tidewater region, the Powhatans of Tsenacommacah were
aggressive and ethnocentric, fiercely proud of their culture and confident in their
superiority to other peoples.57 Forged by Wahunsenacawh-more commonly known as
Powhatan, though this was an honorific rather than a name-the Powhatan chiefdom had
expanded from six to thirty-one individual tribes between 1570 and 1607.58 Despite their
military strength and history of victorious conquests, the Powhatans were not without
rivals. Enemy chiefdoms and tribal coalitions surrounded them on three sides, including
56 William Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1952), 76-97; Dwight Heath, ed., A Journal ofthe Pilgrims at Plymouth, or, Mourt's Relation
(New York: Corinth Books, 1963), 51-57; Nathaniel Morton, New Englands Memorial! (Cambridge,
1669), 24. See also Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 104-5, 114-16.
57 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising." 117-18.
58 E. Randolph Turner, III, "Native American Protohistoric Interactions in the Powhatan Core Area," in
Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1722, ed. Helen C. Rountree (Charlottesville and London: University
Press of Virginia, 1993), 76. The Powhatan paramount chieftaincy was less cohesive than European
political structures, so there is some degree of ambiguity as to which tribes "belonged" to the Powhatan
domain and which did not; see Rountree, "Who Were the Powhatans and Did They Have a Unified
'Foreign Policy'?" in Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1-7. By the time of the Jamestown Massacre in 1622,
Opechancanough commanded the loyalty of thirty-two tidewater tribes; see John Martin, "How Virginia
may be made a Royal Plantation," December 15,1622, in RVeL, 3:708. On Wahunsenacawh's names and
titles, see Rountree, Pocahontas, 32-33.
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the increasingly powerful Monacans to the west.59 These challengers on the Powhatan
fringe remained a constant threat, but also a potential for future growth if
Wahunsenacawh could marshal the forces to conquer them. When the English came to
Tsenacommacah, Wahunsenacawh saw the possibility that these tassantassas,
"strangers" as the Powhatans called them, might add to the strength of his chiefdom-
not as partners but as subjects.
Powhatans watched the first wave of tassantassas come to the shores of
Tsenacommacah in May of 1607. Unsure at first how to gauge these newcomers,
Wahunsenacawh allowed his subordinate weroances to determine their own responses to
the arrival ofthe English. In their first months on the shores of Tsenacommacah,
therefore, the tassantassas were often baffled by the apparently inconsistent behavior of
the people they visited, which ranged from cautious friendliness to outright hostility.60
After testing the mettle of the new arrivals, Wahunsenacawh determined that they would
make useful allies and attempted to absorb them into the power structure of his
chiefdom. In December 1607 he formally made the swarthy Englishman his weroance,
giving him the territory of Capahowasick to rule as a Powhatan tributary.61
59 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 102-5; Jeffrey L. Hantman, "Powhatan's Relations with the Piedmond
Monacans," in Powhatan Foreign Relations, 94-111; Rountree, Pocahontas, 42-46; Turner, Ill,
"Protohistoric Interactions," 76-93,.
60 Rountree, Pocahontas, 53-66.
61 Smith initially accepted this offer, but clearly did not behave in a way that Wahunsenacawh expected of
a subordinate. The tense meeting between Smith and the paramount chief in January of 1609 indicates that
Wahunsenacawh understood him to be his weroance, but Smith rejected this assertion, answering, "1 have
but one God, 1honour but one king; and 1 live here not as your subject, but as your friend." See Smith, "A
True Relation of Such Occurrences and Accidents of Noate as Hath Hapned in Virginia ..." 1608, in
Complete Works, 1:53-57; Smith, "Proceedings of the English Colonie," in Complete Works, 1:249.
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Wahunsenacawh thus attempted to assimilate the newly arrived English into the political
and economic structure ofTsenacommacah.62
What these diverse groups of Native Americans had in common-Pequots,
Pokanokets, and Powhatans-was their recognition that the coming of the English and
other Europeans offered tremendous opportunities. The futures that they envisioned were
different in each case. For the Pequots, it was command of the western hub of the
burgeoning transatlantic fur trade; for the Pokanokets, a recovery from the ravages of a
virgin soil epidemic; and for the Powhatans, an opportunity to make their nation an even
greater Tidewater power. Each of them, though cautious of the threat that the English
presented, nevertheless sought to fold the newcomers into existing structures. In so
doing, they sought the many forms of power-political, economic, technological, and
spiritual-that would help them to create a better future in a rapidly changing world.
Visions of Ruin
When Indians met Englishmen along the shores of America, their different
visions came into contact. Their meeting was not merely between cultures or
civilizations, but between fundamentally different understandings of the world and
different ways of imagining the future. To some extent both English and Indian visions
held the promise of peaceful coexistence, of creative dialogue, and of the possibility that
together they might create something genuinely new. Native Americans in Virginia and
New England reached for this outcome, pursuing their many paths to power in ways that
62 Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan's World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict a/Cultures (Lincoln and
London: University ofNebraska Press, 1997), 115-22; Richter, Facing East, 69-78.
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would be advantageous to both themselves and the English newcomers. English
ideologies of colonization, however, were too rigid to reach any sort of middle ground
with native peoples. The latent violence embedded in their dreams of transformation led
inexorably to warfare and destruction.
Native Americans imagined a future in which both Indians and English had a
place. The basic nature of their visions was regional, limited, and flexible. The Pequots,
for example, did not have an overarching design to gain complete control of the Atlantic
fur trade. Rather, they saw an opportunity to increase their power over neighboring tribes
by dominating the local sites of exchange.63 Massasoit's goals in allying with the
Plymouth colonists were relatively short-term. In order to achieve reconstitution and
recovery he was willing to submit his people to the Pilgrims' authority, but without
intending to remain English subjects forever.64 Even when Native Americans were
vastly more powerful than the English, as were the Powhatans, their political structure
was sufficiently adaptable that they could assimilate the newcomers into their chiefdom
without demanding drastic cultural change by the colonists. The people of
Tsenacommacah did not abandon their conviction that their lifeways were superior to
those of the tassantassas, but neither did they require the English to change their habits
of dress or speech, convert to the worship of their god Okee, or prove their masculinity
by enduring the rigors of the huskanaw initiation ceremony.65 Wahunsenacawh allowed
63 Bradford, O/Plymouth Plantation, 257-59; Cave, Pequot War, 61-63.
64 Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 115-17, 122-23.
65 The huskanaw marked a male's transition from adolescence to manhood, and involved an arduous
regimen of ritual beatings, hallucinogenic drugs, and long periods of isolation and hunger. See Rountree,
Powhatan Indians, 80-83.
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the "tribe" of tassantassas to have their own territory, their own culture, and some
measure of autonomy in exchange for political loyalty and the tribute due to a sovereign.
In the bargain he hoped to add another tribe to his growing nation, cement access to their
trade networks, and augment his military forces with the newcomers' lethal weaponry. It
was precisely the differences between English and Powhatans that made them desirable
11 ' 66ales.
The ideology of English colonialism, in contrast, was totalizing and inflexible.
The English vision assumed a complete transformation of the American environment
into something resembling their homeland. The landscape onto which they projected this
outcome, though, was already occupied. Native Americans possessed well-developed
cultures, economies, political structures, belief systems, and physical ecologies, all of
which were incompatible with the patterns that the English wanted to impose. Rather
than contemplate interacting creatively with these peoples by adapting to the exigencies
of intercultural contact, the English sought to replace them entirely.
The success of the English colonial project was therefore predicated on the
erasure of the existing Indian societies; Powhatans and Pequots had no more place in
their imagined Albion than the ancient Picts had in metropolitan London.67 In the zero-
sum game of settler colonialism, the "logic of elimination" mandated that in order for
66 Martin H. Quitt, "Trade and Acculturation at Jamestown, 1607-1609: The Limits of Understanding,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 52, no. 2 (April 1995): 227-258; Richter, "Tsenacommacah," 64-
65; Rountree, Pocahontas, 82-85.
67 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 176-77; James Horn, "The Conquest of Eden: Possession and Dominion in
Early Virginia," in Envisioning an English Empire, 47-48. Daniel Richter notes the dramatic
incompatibility ofNative American and English uses of the environment: "European and 1ndian ways of
using the land could no more share the same ecosystem than could matter and antimatter share the same
space." Richter, Facing East, 59.
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colonists to succeed they must necessarily remove the native inhabitants of the land they
intended to claim. The process of removal need not be genocidal, however, for the
indigenous people in a colonized area could be "eliminated" in more than one way.68
Several methods of elimination were possible, including social and cultural assimilation,
limited legal and political inclusion, slavery or servitude, and territorial expulsion. The
variety of possible strategies for elimination fell into two general categories:
incorporation and exclusion. The dynamic between these two strategies shaped the
course of Anglo-Indian conflict during the process of colonization.
English imperial theorists originally intended to follow a broad policy of
incorporating Native Americans into their vision for a new England. Guided by their
perception of the innocent savage as harmless and malleable, they crafted a civilizing
mission inspired by the example of the ancient Romans. By bringing Christianity and
civility to the Indians, the colonists expected to transform them into loyal subjects to the
English crown, faithful members of the Church ofEngland, and industrious farmers on
English-patterned fields. William Strachey articulated this belief when he wrote proudly,
"we shall by degrees chaunge their barbarous natures, make them ashamed the sooner of
their savadge nakednesse, informe them of the true God and of the way to their
salvation, and, finally, teach them obedience to the king's majestie and to his
68 Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal ofGenocide Research
8, no. 4 (December 2006): 387-88,402.
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gouvernours.,,69 Indians had a clear place in this new order, the colonized living,
worshipping, and working alongside the colonizer.7o
Many advocates of colonization believed that the Indians would eagerly embrace
the English gifts of salvation and civilization. Richard Hakluyt assured his countrymen
that "the people of America crye oute unto us their nexte neighboures to come and helpe
them, and bringe unto them the gladd tidinges of the gospell." He was optimistic that the
dedication of missionaries would quickly bring Indians to the light of Christ because
"they are very easie to be perswaded ... and were very desirous to become christians.,,7]
Similarly, inA Description ofNew England John Smith confidently asserted that the
Indians encountered there would adopt English methods of agricultural production that
were clearly superior to their own. "[C]ould they but once taste the sweet fruites of their
owne labours," he wrote, "doubtlesse many thousands would be advised by good
discipline, to take more pleasure in honest industrie, then in their humours of dissolute
idlenesse." He imagined that with native help the English could build a glorious new
country. What could be more magnificent, he asked,
or more agreeable to God, then to seeke to convert those poore Salvages to know
Christ, and humanitie, whose labors with discretion will triple requite thy charge
and paines? What so truly sutes with honour and honestie, as the discovering
things unknowne? Erecting Townes, peopling Countries, informing the ignorant,
69 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 85. See also .r[ohnson], "Nova Britannia." in Force, Tracts, 13-14.
70 Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal ofColonial Virginia (New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975),44.
71 Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," in Writings ofthe Hakluyts, 2:214-16. Hakluyt alludes to
Acts 16:9, which reads: "a vision appeared to Paul in the night. There stode a man of Macedonia, &
prayed him, saying, Come into Macedonia, and helpe vs."
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reforming things unjust, teaching virtue; and gaine to our Native mother-countrie
a kingdom to attend her.72
Both armchair theorists like Hakluyt and pragmatic adventurers like Smith assumed that
the transformation of natives from their traditional patterns of living to English ways
would be an integral component of any colonial project. In principle, the English
welcomed Native Americans to participate in their vision for a reshaped country, an
outcome that would accomplish the logic of elimination through the relatively benign
means of assimilation.73
The inflexibility of the English vision, however, meant that they would accept
nothing less than total assimilation, which essentially demanded that Indians commit
cultural suicide and comprehensively replace their lifeways with English patterns.74 The
English demanded no less, and refused to accommodate Indian attempts to selectively
adopt elements of English civilization while retaining their coherence as independent
societies. In fact, they often interpreted such attempts as evidence of the Indians'
72 Smith, "A Description of New England," 1616, in Complete Works, 1:338,343.
73 Mark Levene, The Rise a/the West and the Coming a/Genocide, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-
State, vol. 2 (London: I.B. Taurus, 2005), 21-22. .
74 There is a large body of scholarship on the phenomenon ofcultural genocide, generally defined as the
attempted destruction of a group's cultural identity without necessarily committing physical violence. The
concept of cultural genocide has often been deployed in order to describe episodes of cultural erasure that
would otherwise fall short of a rigid definition ofgenocide, though recently scholars have stressed the
close connection between cultural destruction and physical destruction. See Elazar Barkan, "Genocides of
Indigenous Peoples: Rhetoric of Human Rights," in The Specter a/Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical
Perspective, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 126-
38; Martin Shaw, What is Genocide? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 66-67; Wolfe, "Settler
Colonialism," 402. The resolution of this theoretical debate is beyond the scope of this study. I
acknowledge that cultural dissolution and reconstruction are symbolically violent acts that have
wrenching, often devastating, effects on indigenous societies. However, my purpose here is not to classify
Anglo-Indian violence in Early America within a typology of genocide, but rather to outline a discourse of
violence in which English intentions shift from a relatively peaceful set of goals to a more violent
alternative, and to explain the mechanism by which this shift occurs.
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inveterate savagery, which demonstrated the impossibility of including them in English
colonial society by any means. When policies of incorporation failed in the face of
Indian resistance to their culture's eradication, however benevolently conceived, English
colonizers resorted to more aggressive policies. The "savage" whom they could not fold
into their vision was then pushed out of it through violence.75
Even as they offered to incorporate Indians, English theorists articulated an
alternative of murderous exclusion. The same writers who surmised the ease of
incorporating Indians allowed for the possibility that their desired goals could be
accomplished with the application of force. Hakluyt, for example, explained that if
natives resisted the English right to "lawfull Traffique," including proselytizing by
missionaries, then settlers could rightfully "be revenged of any wronge offered by
them." Colonization could then proceed through cultural conquest and assimilation at
swordpoint. The English, he concluded, "maye yfwe will conquere fortefye and plante
in soyles moste sweete, most pleasaunte, moste fertill and strounge. And in the ende to
bringe them all [Indians] in subjection or scyvillitie.,,76 George Peckham went further,
asserting that if Native American resistance proved intractable then the English were
justified in abandoning the civilizing mission altogether. In such a case, he argued,
there is no barre (as I judge) but that in stoute assemblies, the Christians may
issue out, and by strong hande pursue theyr enemies, subdue them, take
possession oftheyr Townes, Cities, or Villages... to use the Lawe of Armes, as
75 Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," 596; Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, 3-5.
76 Hakluyt, "Pamphlet ... Ascribed to Richard Hakluyt," in Writings afthe Hakluyts, 2:342.
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in like case among all nations at thys day is used: and most especially to the ende
they may with securitye holde theyr lawfull possession.,,77
According to Peckham, Native American resistance to efforts at incorporation should
precipitate a drastic shift to a strategy of extreme exclusion that culminated in territorial
expulsion.78
The basic structure of English colonialism formulated their approach to Native
Americans as a two-step process: the velvet glove of cultural assimilation followed by
the mailed fist of military conquest.79 Both outcomes fulfilled the fundamental need for
the "elimination" of the native from colonial territory, one through peace and the other
through war. Strategies of exclusion, however, could never be normal processes of
subjugation because they were tangled in the latent violence of English colonial
ideology. Filtered through the idea of the savage, Indian political resistance acquired a
bestial and diabolical character. Shifting agriculture reinforced stereotypes of the savage
and provided a justification for those looking to appropriate Indian land. Armed reprisals
to English provocations violated the law of nations, marking Native Americans as rebels
and traitors. As tensions broke into open fighting, the English looked to murderous
precedents in myth and history to model the scale of their response. The violent
77 P[eckham], "True Reporte," in Gilbert's Voyages, 2:453.
78 For other examples of this commonly articulated strategy of exclusion in the face of native resistance,
see Richard Hakluyt, "Virginia Richly Valued," 1609, in Writings ofthe Hakluyts, 2:503; J[ohnson],
"Nova Britannia," in Force, Tracts, 13-14; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:231.
79 Nicholas Canny, "England's New World and the Old, 1480s-1630s," in The Origins o.fEmpire: British
Overseas Enterprise to the Close o.fthe Seventeenth Century, ed. Nicholas Canny, Oxford History of the
British Empire, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 165-67; Karen Ordahl Kupperman,
Settling with the Indians: The Meeting o.fEnglish and Indian Cultures in America, I580-1640 (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980), 266.
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potentials in these paradigms invested the logic of elimination with a diffuse brutality,
and tended to escalate the violence of frontier clashes to appalling extremes.80
The logic of elimination was an integral feature of colonial expansion. Although
it allowed for a wide array of Anglo-Indian relationships, certain aspects of the English
worldview pushed its people toward the violent end of the spectrum. Nevertheless, the
progression from idealistic evangelism to mass slaughter was neither linear nor
persistent. Rather, the relations of violence between English colonists and Native
Americans followed a sinusoid pattern of escalation and de-escalation. English strategies
for incorporating Native Americans would founder on the rocks ofIndian resistance,
followed by strategies of violent exclusion, and a diminution of violence once the
immediate goal of territorial elimination had been accomplished.
Complex interactions between the many agencies of power on the frontier drove
this ebb and tide. Among the English the imperial metropole, the colonial administration,
and individual settlers on the margins had separate interests that often clashed with each
other. The same was true of Native Americans, since the interests of the commoner did
not always coincide with the interests of the sachem or weroance. The shifting balance
between these many human forces in the chaotic conditions of the borderlands often
tipped the colonial process toward violence. The clash of interests could also act to
restrain it, however, and over time to renew hopes that the imperatives of colonization
80 On the inherent potential for extreme violence in colonial warfare, see A. Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony,
Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History," in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest,
Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New Yark and Oxford:
Berghahn Books, 2008), 26-29.
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could be satisfied peacefully.8! Despite the potential for genocide inherent in the process
of colonialism and the English wOrldview, the friction of competing interests inevitably
sapped the momentum from the process of violent exclusion and prevented a sustained
ideological commitment to genocide among the colonists.
The normal sine curve of settler colonialism was as self-regulating as it was
relentless, but extraordinary circumstances sometimes caused it to spike into a
"genocidal moment.,,82 A society that perceived itself to be in a period of acute crisis
could overwhelm or suppress the basic conflicts of interest between agencies of frontier
power, briefly uniting the community in collective fear. In such circumstances, the
psychological pressures of crisis unleashed the latent potential for violence in the
English worldview. The "logic" of elimination passed into the dark realms of destructive
fantasy, and the ultimate policy of exclusion became manifest as genocide.
81 For an example of recent scholarship treating the interactions of frontier power centers, see Rob Harper,
"State Intervention and Extreme Violence in the Revolutionary Ohio Valley," Journal ofGenocide
Research 10, no. 2 (June 2008): 233-248.
82 A. Dirk Moses, "Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the 'Racial Century': Genocides
ofIndigenous Peoples and the Holocaust," Patterns ofPrejudice 36, no. 4 (2002): 7-36; A. Dirk Moses,
"Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History," in Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence
and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and Oxford:
Berghahn Books, 2004), 3-48.
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CHAPTER III
THE VIRGIN COUNTRY OF TSENACOMMACAH
In 1610, William Strachey visited the Powhatan peoples of Virginia, who called
their home Tsenacommacah. As he learned about their culture and listened to their
stories, they told him about the way their country would die. Their priests foretold that a
great nation would rise from the east, out of the waters of the Chesapeake, and would
challenge them for the mastery ofTsenacommacah. Three times these strangers would
attempt to throw down the Powhatans. The first two times the Powhatans would emerge
victorious and hurl the invaders back into the sea. During the third war, though, they
would go down in defeat and their nation fall to ruin, the once proud rulers of
Tsenacommacah becoming the subjects of their conquerors. They told this story to
Strachey even as the ships of a foreign people came from far away to land on the shores
of the Chesapeake, so that "straunge whispers (indeed) and secrett at this hower run
among these people and possesse them with amazement." Even as the English planted
the first seeds of Virginia in the soil of Tsenacommacah, the Powhatan people heard
dark rumors of defeat and saw shadows of the end of days.1
I William Strachey, The Historie ofTravaile into Virginia Britannia: Expressing the Cosmographie and
Comodities ofthe Country, Togither with the Manners and Customes ofthe People, ed. Richard Henry
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The people who told this story to Strachey were at the zenith of their power when
his countrymen first arrived, but they had good reason to fear. The English tassantassas
came not just to trade valuable goods like copper and iron, nor just to settle for as much
land as the Powhatans might be willing to sell.2 They came as the vanguard of a
burgeoning empire just beginning to extend its fingers across the Atlantic, and they came
with a vision of the New World that filled their eyes and guided their footsteps toward
the future. What the Powhatans called Tsenacommacah the tassantassas called Virginia;
where the natives settled and hunted and cultivated plots of corn, the newcomers saw a
virgin land full of limitless opportunity. They saw in the Powhatans' country a new
Albion waiting to be born. From the moment they landed the English colonists began to
transform one country into the other, breaking apart Tsenacommacah even as they built
Virginia. The two countries could never coexist because they both inhabited the same
place: the same geographical area, the same political territory, and the same imagined
space. For Virginia to be born, Tsenacommacah would have to die.
The Birth of Virginia
The Virginia Company of London, as ajoint stock company, was naturally
interested in profit and conceived its colonial projects as commercial ventures. At the
Major, Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, no. 6 (London, 1849), 101. Strachey noted that
Wahunsenacawh had already gone to war with a Chesapeake tribe in the hopes of averting this
catastrophe, meaning that the prophecy antedated the arrival of the English.
2 Known Powhatan words come from Strachey's glossary and a short phrasebook provided by John Smith.
See Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 183-96; John Smith, "A Map of Virginia, With a Description of the
Countrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion," 1612, in The Complete Works o.fCaptain
John Smith (1580-1631), ed. Philip L. Barbour, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill and London: University ofNorth
Carolina Press, 1986),1:136-39.
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turn of the seventeenth century, though, England was an intensely religious country. Its
people saw America as the center stage of a divine drama that pitted Catholic against
Protestant, the outcome hinging on the fate of the native Indians. Spain had already
carved out a papist empire in Mexico and Peru, wrote Richard Hakluyt, through
"outeragious and infinite massacres" and the forced conversion ofIndians. In order to
defeat their rivals, the English not only had to match Spanish success in building an
overseas empire, but also to do it humanely, to "be good agaynst ye Naturall people" in
accordance with God's unfolding plans.3 From its inception the Jamestown colony was
supposed to be a missionary enterprise to convert Native Americans to Protestant
Christianity as much as a business venture. For financial success, the Company's agents
needed to discover veins of precious metals, harvest the rich resources of the land, and
discover new routes to markets in the Orient. In order to be an undertaking worthy of
England's full faith and support, though, the Company also had to bring freedom,
civility, and the word of God to the inhabitants of the New World.4
In the Virginia Company's 1606 charter, King James I underlined the importance
of the missionary enterprise. Even before delineating the precise economic prerogatives
3 Richard Hakluyt, "Discourse of Westem Planting," 1584, in The Original Writings and Correspondence
ofthe Two Richard Hakluyts, ed. E.G.R. Taylor, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser.,
nos. 76-77 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1935),2:257-65 (quotation p. 258); "A Justification for Planting
Virginia," before 1609, in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records ofthe Virginia Company o.fLondon
(hereafter cited as RVCL), 4 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933),3:2-3.
4 J. Frederick Fausz, "The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: A Historical Study of Ethnocentrism and Cultural
Conflict" (Ph.D. Diss., College of William and Mary, 1977), 134-37; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, The
Jamestown Pro.ject (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), 14-15; Perry Miller, "Religion and Society in the
Early Literature of Virgin ia," in Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1964), 109-26;
John Parker, "Religion and the Virginia Colony, 1609-10," in The Westward Enterprise: English Activities
in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America 1480-1650, ed. K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press, 1979),245-270.
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of the Company's members, the charter commended "so noble a work" as the
propagation of Christianity to the native inhabitants, who "as yet live in darkness and
miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of God."s In 1609 the Company
reorganized itself under a second charter, reaffirming that "the principall effect which
wee cann desier or expect of this action is the conversion and reduccion of the people in
those partes unto the true worshipp of God and Christian religion.,,6 The Company
simultaneously launched an aggressive program of publicity in order to gain support for
the Virginia colony among the English populace, consistently highlighting the spiritual
dividends ofthis benevolent endeavor. The preacher Robert Gray, for example,
proclaimed in his sermon Good Speed to Virginia that spreading Christianity was the
colony's primary purpose: "Farre be it from the hearts ofthe English, they should give
any cause to the world, to say that they sought the wealth of that Countrie above or
before the glorie of God, and the propagation of his Kingdome." The Virginia Company
received a great deal of its financial support by cultivating the idea that English national
pride and power were best served by the holy mission of evangelical colonialism?
Rhetoric of this sort was not merely an apologia for imperial commerce or a
rationalization for the expense of establishing a colony, but an articulation of the English
5 Samuel M. Bemiss, The Three Charters o/the Virginia Company o/London, Jamestown 350th
Anniversary Historical Booklets, no. 4 (Williamsburg: The Virginia 350th Anniversary Celebration
Corporation, 1957),2. See also the King's "Instructions for the Government of the Colonies," November
20, 1606, in Alexander Brown, ed., The Genesis 0/the United States, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1890), 1:67-68.
6 Bemiss, Three Charters, 54.
7 R[obert] G[ray], "A Good Speed to Virginia," April 28, 1609, in Brown, Genesis, 1:299. On the
importance of this publicity campaign to the Virginia Company's fortunes, see Fausz, "Powhatan
Uprising," 255-59, 262-66; Kupperman, Jamestown Project, 242-43.
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belief that colonialism would benefit both themselves and the native inhabitants of
Virginia. In the pamphlet Nova Britannia, Robert Johnson explained that the reasons for
"our coming thither is to plant ourselves in their country, yet not to supplant and root
them out, but to bring them from their base condition to a far better." England would
bring the native inhabitants two great blessings: the spiritual light of Christianity and the
material benefits of civilization. He assured his readers that "Our intrusion into their
possessions shall tend to their great good, and no way to their hurt, unless as unbridled
beasts, they procure it to themselves." Johnson's ominous closing concisely expressed
the fist-in-glove mindset that drove the Virginia Company's agents. They came on a
holy mission to offer Indians Christian civilization, but if they rejected this offer the
Indians would demonstrate themselves to be "unbridled beasts" and call the righteous
wrath of the English down upon them.8 Johnson's attitude exemplified the inflexibility
of the English vision for America. They could imagine only two possibilities: the
Indians' capitulation to God's word and England's banners, or the destruction ofthose
who resisted the English advance.
In 1607, an advance party of colonists sailed up the James River to establish a
beachhead for future settlements, but even this limited project foundered in the face of
early difficulties. After landing on a defensible but otherwise worthless outcrop of
marshland, the expedition quickly met with a number of problems, including a series of
power struggles among their leaders, feckless and undisciplined men, dwindling
8 R[obert] J[ohnson], "Nova Britannia: Offering Most Excellent fmites by Planting in Virginia," 1609, in
Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress ofthe Colonies in
North America: From the Discovery ofthe Country to the Year 1776, ed. Peter Force, 4 vols. (New York:
Murray Printing Company, 1947), vol. 1, doc. 6, p. 13.
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supplies, and the ghastly mortality caused by brackish water and malarial swamps.9 As
the death toll rose from starvation and disease, the colonists faced too many problems
even to consider proselytizing Indians. Their need for food led them to depend on the
goodwill and assistance of the surrounding Powhatan tribes, straining their fragile
relationship as English demands increased. Throughout 1608, the English antagonized
their neighbors by their desperate attempts to get enough food to feed themselves. They
began by trading, then resorted to begging, stealing, and finally naked force to intimidate
the Powhatans into delivering corn. Despite English convictions that the Indians were
lying when they claimed not to have enough corn to share, the severe drought conditions
that prevailed from 1606-1612-the worst in seven hundred years-meant that the
Powhatans were telling the truth when they claimed that they only had enough crops for
themselves. 1o English pressure on finite resources increased tensions, but their reliance
on the threat of violence in order to terrorize deliveries of corn pushed those tensions to
the breaking point. In the eyes ofWahunsenacawh, the Powhatan mamanatowick or
paramount chief, the tassantassas' extraction of tribute from his subordinates amounted
9 On the colony's initial difficulties, see Carville V. Earle, "Environment, Disease, and Mortality ," Journal
ofHistorical Geography 5, no. 4 (October 1979): 96-125; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Apathy and Death
in Early Jamestown," Journal ofAmerican History 66, no. 1 (June 1979): 24-40; Kupperman, Jamestown
Project, 217-240; Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal ofColonial
Virginia (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1975),71-79.
10 Dennis B. Blanton, "Drought as a Factor in the Jamestown Colony, 1607-1612," Historical Archaeology
34 (2000): 74-81; David W. Stahle et aI., "The Lost Colony and Jamestown Droughts," Science, new ser.,
280, no. 5363 (April 24, 1998): 564-567.
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to a concerted attempt to peel away the fringes of his chiefdom. He could not leave this
direct challenge to his authority unanswered. II
In August of 1609, the increasingly strained Anglo-Powhatan alliance splintered
entirely. Fearing an attack by the Nansemond tribe after establishing a new settlement in
their territory, Captain George Percy reacted by burning their village and desecrating
sacred ground. The English soldiers committed sacrilege when, as Percy wrote, they
"ransaked their Temples, Tooke downe the Corpses of their deade kings from their
Toambes," and looted the treasures buried with the honored dead.12 This incident
sparked the First Anglo-Powhatan War. Wahunsenacawh marshaled his warriors to
besiege Jamestown from November 1609 to May 1610, causing the "Starving Time" that
claimed the lives of 120 of the 200 colonists and left the survivors in such desperate
straits that they resorted to cannibalism. Lord De La Warr arrived in June 1610 with
heavily armed reinforcements and the draconian martial law of the Lawes Divine,
Moral!, and Martial! that brutalized the Virginia colonists into an effective fighting
force. 13 From 1610 to 1613, the English relied on tactics honed during the colonial wars
in Ireland, treating non-combatants as legitimate targets and consistently using terror to
demoralize their enemies. English commanders also adapted to the exigencies of combat
in the New World, however, directing their attention to the logistical problems posed by
111. Frederick Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides': England's First Indian War, 1609-
1614," Virginia Magazine 0.(History and Biography 98, no. 1 (January 1990): 19-22.
12 Mark Nicholls, ed., "George Percy's 'Trewe Relacyon': A Primary Source for the Jamestown
Settlement," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 113, no. 3 (2005): 244-47 (quotation p. 245).
13 Thomas West, "Thomas West, Lord De La Warr, to Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury," July 10,1610, in
Brown, Genesis, 1:413-15; [William Strachey, comp.], "For the Colony in Virginea Britannia, Lawes
Diuine, Moral! and Martial!, etc.," 1612, in Force, Tracts, vol. 3, doc. 2, p. 9-19.
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their perennial food shortage. 14 As noted in A Breife Declaration a/the Antient Planters,
Governor Thomas Dale directed his men to the "cuttinge downe and takinge away their
corne, burninge their houses, spoiling their weares, etc." English soldiers ravaged Indian
villages to take their stockpiles of corn by force, destroying their settlements, and
massacring any inhabitants who did not flee. 15
The ideological dimension of the First Anglo-Powhatan War propelled both
Powhatan and English forces to employ an unprecedented level of brutality. As far as
English writers on both sides of the Atlantic were concerned, Wahunsenacawh had
consented to be King James's lawful subject. By their treasonous resistance, the
Powhatans became rebels who stood outside the normal constraints on military force.
The principle ofjust retaliation combined with the crusading spirit of English
colonialism to bring Robert Johnson's ferocious logic to fruition. Indians acting as the
Powhatans did "obstinately refuse to vnite themselues vnto vs ... shall be held and
reputed recusant, withstanding their owne good: and shall be dealt with as enemies of the
Common-wealth of their countrie.,,16 For their part, the Powhatans matched English
brutality tit for tat. The tassantassas' defiance ofWahunsenacawh's authority, coupled
14 On American adaptations of military tactics from Ireland, see John Grenier, The First Way a/War:
American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21-
22; William L. Shea, The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century (Baton Rouge and London:
Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 13-14.
15 H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Journals a/the House 0/Burgesses a/Virginia, 1619-1658/59, 13 vols.
(Richmond, 1905),1 :32 (hereafter cited as JHBV). On the course of events in the First Anglo-Powhatan
War, see Fausz, '''Abundance of Blood,''' 18-42; Darett Bruce Rutman, A Militant New World, /607-1640
(New York: Arno Press, 1979), 114-69,204-15.
16 J[ohnson], "Nova Britannia," in Force, Tracts, 14. See also "True Declaration of the Estate of the
Colonie in Virginia," 1610, in Force, Tracts, vol. 3, doc. 1, p. 6-7; Ralph Hamor, True Discourse a/the
Present State a/Virginia (1615; reprint, Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1957), 14.
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with Percy's unforgivable desecration of the Nansemonds' temple, inspired them to
retaliate with unprecedented fury. The Nansemonds, for example, revenged Percy's
sacrilege by slaughtering a nearby English garrison to the last man, mocking the
colonists' inability to feed themselves by stuffing the corpses' mouths full ofbread.17
The special hatred that the English invaders seemed to have for quiyoughcosoughs,
Powhatan priests, challenged the spiritual powers of the Powhatan pantheon and helped
to transform the conflict into a war over religion. To some extent, the First Anglo-
Powhatan War became a holy war on both sides, justified in theory and unrestrained in
• 18
executIOn.
Driven by ideology, fear, and the specter of cosmic defeat, the two armies hacked
away at each other in a merciless war of attrition. Either decisive victory or final defeat
was impossible while the Powhatans' overwhelming numerical superiority balanced
against the colonists' flow of men and materiel from London. Because of the Virginians'
continuing dependence on external support, however, the officers of the Virginia
Company exerted pressure from the imperial core that forced a policy shift on its agents
in the colonial periphery. Hemorrhaging capital to fund the war and facing national
scandal over the harsh treatment of English subjects under martial law, the Company
pressed hard for an end to hostilities. The Powhatans, still struggling with the effects of
17 Nicholls, "Percy's 'Trewe Relacyon,''' 246-47; Fausz, "'Abundance of Blood,''' 36-9, 53-54. On non-
combatants and atrocities in traditional Powhatan warfare, see Helen C. Rountree, The Powhatan Indians
a/Virginia: Their Traditional Culture (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 123.
18 Fausz, "'Abundance of Blood,'" 30-32, 35-36. The Virginia Company's instructions to Thomas Gates
and the Lord De La Warr called the quiyoughcosoughs "murtherers of soules" who kept their peop Ie
"chained under the bond of deathe unto the divell," and directed the colony's leaders to exterminate the
Powhatan priests. See Bemiss, Three Charters, 57-58 (quotation), 62-63, 73; "True Declaration," in Force,
Tracts, 26.
60
the multi-year drought that taxed their resources to the limit, were equally weary of
fighting. Both sides agreed to step back for a temporary truce in 1613. During that time
Samuel Argall abducted Pocahontas, and her marriage to John Rolfe the following year
helped establish a political detente that allowed both sides to end the war without
conceding defeat. External forces, both political and environmental, denied both sides
the power to maintain a sustained commitment to their enemy's destruction. 19
Pocahontas's conversion and rechristening as Rebecca Rolfe not only sealed a
diplomatic peace in Virginia, but also caused a stir in England. She represented a victory
for those who still desired to bring religion and civility to America. Her visit to England
in 1616 renewed hopes that more concerted missionary efforts could salvage the
Virginian colony and ensure that it became a godly commonwealth rather than a
permanent theater ofwar.2o Even before the fighting stopped, the reverend Alexander
Whitaker exhorted his countrymen to "be not discouraged with those many lamentable
assaults that the diuell hath made against vs," but to "Goe forward boldly, and remember
that you fight vnder the banner of Iesus Christ, that you plant his Kingdome, who hath
already broken the Serpents head.,,21 Working largely alone and without funding in
Virginia, Whitaker's missionary efforts accomplished little before his untimely death by
drowning in 1617. That same year, however, King James I set in motion plans for an
Indian College to be built at the new settlement of Henrico. Ten thousand acres were set
19 Fausz, '''Abundance of Blood,''' 42-47.
20 Fausz, "'Abundance of Blood, '" 48-50. For an example of the shift from war to a renewed desired for
conversion, see "True Declaration," in Force, Tracts, 26-27.
2\ Alexander Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia (1613; reprint, New York: Scholars' Facsimiles &
Reprints, n.d.), 44.
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aside for a university, with one thousand of them devoted to a college known as the East
India School. Benefactors hoped that the school would train Indian children to become
missionaries who would spearhead a movement to convert their people. Between 1619
and 1622 the Virginia Company raised over a thousand pounds sterling from private
donors, indicating that there was considerable interest in this enterprise among the
English public.22
Just as clashing interests between Company officers in London and colonial
administrators in Virginia had limited the violence ofthe First Anglo-Powhatan War, the
disconnect between center and periphery limited the effectiveness of these initiatives.
Those dreaming of colonization from London proved to be far more enthusiastic about
evangelizing than the men and women of Virginia who lived on the frontiers of cultural
contact. Progress on the college stalled because few of the colonists were willing to
divert laborers from their own plantations to finish its construction.23 George Thorpe,
who arrived in 1621 to take up a position as the college's deputy, proved himself a
sincere and energetic advocate for peaceful coexistence between colonists and converted
Indians. Despite his strenuous attempts to win the hearts and minds of the Powhatans,
however, Thorpe complained that the rest of the settlers often treated Indians with an air
22 JHBV, 10; Patrick Copland, "A Declaration how the monies ... were disposed ... towards the building
of a free Schoole in Virginia ..." 1622, in RVCL, 3:537-40; Smith, "The Generall Historie of Virginia,
New-England, and the Summer Isles ..." 1624," in Complete Works, 2:288; Virginia Company,
"Instructions to George Yeardley," November 18, 1618, in RVCL, 3:102; Edward Waterhouse, "A
Declaration of the State of the Colony and ... a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre," 1622, in RVCL,
3:575-77. On the Henrico College and the East India School, see Robert Hunt Land, "Henrico and lts
College," William and Mary Quarterly, 2nd ser., 18, no. 4 (October 1938): 453-498.
23 JHBV, 7; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works,2:292.
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of condescension that made social integration difficult.24 On the other side of the cultural
divide, Powhatans were less interested in Christianity than Thorpe and his backers had
hoped. Missionaries believed that Indian children could acquire English civility only if
they were separated from their families and raised in English households.
Unsurprisingly, few Powhatan families were willing to surrender their children to the
care of strangers. Protestant missionaries persisted in their attempts to procure Powhatan
children for fosterage, including Governor George Yeardley' s clumsy attempts to
purchase them from their parents. Despite the limited commitment and lack of success,
the aggressive nature of these missions represented a form of cultural imperialism that
continued to strain Anglo-Powhatan relations.25
The environmental changes wrought by Virginia's transition to commercial
agriculture increased tensions even further. The introduction of tobacco gave the colony
its first marketable export, fueling an influx of new immigrants hungry for land. Because
tobacco cultivation quickly exhausted the soil, the settlers' demands for land were
insatiable. The exorbitant price of tobacco after 1619 turned a trickle into a flood,
resulting in an explosion of English settlement up the banks of the James River. By 1622
24 George Thorpe and John Pory, "A Letter to Sir Edwin Sandys," May 15-16, 1621, in RVCL, 3:446. See
also Helen C. Rountree, "The Powhatans and the English: A Case of Multiple Conflicting Agendas," in
Rountree, ed., Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1722 (Charlottesville and London: University Press of
Virginia, 1993),189-90.
25 JHB V, 1: 10; RVCL, 1:588; Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or, Purchas His Pi/grimes:
Contayning a History o/the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, 20
vols. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), 19: 159-60; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete
Works, 2:294-95; Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:552. See also Alden T. Vaughan,
'''Expulsion of the Salvages': English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622," William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 35, no. 1 (January 1978): 57-84.
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Virginia consisted of more than eighty separate plantations.26 Virginian livestock,
particularly pigs, spread the ecological imprint of colonization far beyond actual English
territory. Because the colonists lacked the time to tend to them, colonists allowed their
livestock to roam through the hinterland in search of forage. In the process they
effectively promoted a kind of animal incursion into Powhatan lands.27
As far as the Company was concerned, this explosive growth and the greater
proximity to surrounding Powhatan settlements dovetailed nicely with the work of
religious and cultural conversion. After some initial concern about the vulnerability of
far-flung settlements, the London Council directed English settlers to open their doors to
their Indian neighbors. Some colonists invited entire Powhatan families to live and work
with them.28 Despite their willingness to employ Indian laborers, though, English
planters demanded exclusive use of the best agricultural land for tobacco. Every new
plantation that sprouted along the banks of the James meant less land for Powhatan
hunting grounds, and foraging livestock often ravaged Powhatan cornfields. Virginia's
prosperity in the Atlantic marketplace made increasing demands on the physical
environment of Tsenacommacah, and its native people saw the resources oftheir
26 Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company of London," January 20, 1622/3, in RVCL, 4:13;
JHBV, 1:36; Smith, "Generall Historie," Complete Works, 2:293. On the colony's tobacco-fueled success,
see Edmund S. Morgan, "The First American Boom: Virginia 1618-1630," William and Mary Quarterly,
3rd ser., 28, no. 2 (April 1971): 170-198.
27 Virginia Dejohn Anderson, Creatures ofEmpire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),107-140.
28 JHBV, 10; "Two Tragical! Events," William and Mary Quarterly 9, no. 4 (April 1901): 208; Smith,
"General! Historie," Complete Works, 2:292-94; Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:550;
Sir George Yeardley, "A Letter to [Sir Edwin Sandys]," 1619, in RVCL, 3:128-29.
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homeland swallowed by the English invaders.29 Virginia's boom years necessarily meant
a time of contraction for the people of Tsenacommacah.
Wahunsenacawh did not challenge the English even as they began to dismantle
the nation that he spent his whole life building. "I am now olde," he told Ralph Hamor
while negotiating the peace that ended the First Anglo-Powhatan War, "and would
gladly end my daies in peace.,,30 Upon Wahunsenacawh's death in 1618, his younger
(though still quite old) brother Opitchapam inherited the title of mamanatowick.
However, Opitchapam's brother Opechancanough was the real power in the Powhatan
chiefdom. Hamor wrote that even during Wahunsenacawh's reign Opechancanough was
a force to be reckoned with, a prominent Pamunkey weroance who "hath already the
commaund of all the people." He respected the authority of his mamanatowick but
favored a more militant position and consistently advocated resistance to the invaders.31
29 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:164.
30 Hamor, True Discourse, 42.
3\ Hamor, True Discourse, 10. Carl Bridenbaugh has suggested that Opechancanough was the same person
as Paquinquineo (rechristened Don Luis) that appears in the records of Spanish Jesuits in 1561, and that
his hard-line stance towards European incursions stemmed from his kidnapping and forced conversion.
There is an attractive symmetry to this thesis, since it was Don Luis who led the attack that wiped out the
Spanish mission at Bahia de Santa Marfa de Ajacan in 1571, and Opechancanough who orchestrated the
genocidal massacre of English colonists in 1622; see Carl Bridenbaugh, Early Americans (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 7-17; "Letter of Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia," "Relation of Juan
de la Carrera," "Relation of Bartolome Martinez," and "Relation of Luis Geronimo de Ore," in Clifford M.
Lewis and Loomie, ed., The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570-1572 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1953), 103-14, 123-42, 148-65, 170-92. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to
substantiate this assertion. Paquinquineo possessed the rights as weroance among the Paspaheghs, who
were not part of the Powhatan chiefdom in 1571. A19onquian people inherited such status matrilineally,
indicating that he could not be from the same family as Wahunsenacawh (and therefore Opechancanough)
or else he would have inherited the mantle of paramount chief before either of them. See Rountree,
Pocahontas, 26-28. It is more likely that Opechancanough's hostility was a manifestation of indigenous
resistance to English colonization, an explanation that requires no supposed Spanish influence for support.
In a more speculative vein, Opechancanough's humiliation at John Smith's hands may have influenced his
hatred of the English. In 1609 Smith, fearing ambush while among hundreds of Opechancanough's
Pamunkey followers, seized the weroance by the arm and held a pistol to his chest, parading him in front
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Opechancanough realized that Powhatan attempts to assimilate the English would come
to nothing, and that the tassantassas' vision for the country of Virginia would include his
people only if they sacrificed their identity, their culture, and their souls.32 This cultural
contest was all the more dangerous because it included many of the preconditions for
mass violence, principally in the growing recognition that Powhatan and English
patterns of living on the land, and their exercise ofauthority on that territory, were
mutually exclusive. The seeds for the massacre were thus planted when
Opechancanough first grasped the logic of elimination inherent in English colonization
and took steps to defend his people against it.33
By the summer of 1621 Opechancanough was ready to launch his campaign
against the tassantassas, planning to execute an assault during Wahunsenacawh's burial.
Like all weroances, the former mamanatowick had been disemboweled after his death
of his people as a hostage. To a Powhatan weroance, whose authority derived from personal prestige, this
performance was both degrading and politically damaging. According to Helen Rountree, "it is very likely
that Opechancanough never forgave Chawnzmit [John Smith]-----{)r the Tassantassas-for doing such a
thing." See Smith, "The Proceedings of the English Colonie in Virginia since their first beginning from
England in the yeare of our Lord 1606, till this present 1612," 1612, in Complete Works, 1:252-53;
Rountree, Pocahontas, 124-26.
32 James Horn, "The Conquest of Eden: Possession and Dominion in Early Virginia," in Envisioning an
English Empire: Jamestown and the Making ofthe North Atlantic World, ed. Robert Applebaum and John
Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 43; Vaughan, '''Expulsion of the
Salvages,''' 74-75.
33 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 307-14; Horn, "Conquest of Eden," 47-48; Rountree, Pocahontas, 187;
Rountree, "Powhatans and the English," 174. For a biography ofOpechancanough and analysis of his
motivations, see J. Frederick Fausz, "Opechancanough: Indian Resistance Leader," in Struggle and
Survival in Colonial America, ed. David G. Sweet and Gary B. Nash (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1981),21-37. Whether Opechancanough himself understood the process of English colonization in
this way is necessarily speculative, but even the most vitriolic English writers generally attributed this
understanding to the Powhatans. Edward Waterhouse, for example, wrote that the 1622 massacre was
caused by the Powhatan's fear that "we by our growing continually vpon them, would dispossesse them of
this Country." Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:556; see also "Two Tragicall Events,"
213.
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and allowed to decompose on a scaffold. Opechancanough invited most of Jamestown's
leaders and prominent men to the ceremony in which Wahunsenacawh's bleached bones
would be reverently laid to rest. He planned to poison the English dignitaries,
assassinating the colony's leadership while his warriors fanned out in a massive assault
on English settlements. To procure a sufficient supply of poison potent enough to do the
job, Opechancanough sent emissaries to the Accomacs of the Eastern shore where the
venomous plant, spotted cowbane, grew in great quantities. Though enticed by
Opechancanough's gifts, the Accomac weroance Esmy Shichans saw no advantage in
allying with the Powhatans and promptly warned the English of Opechancanough's
plans. Governor Yeardley put the colony on alert and prepared for an attack, forcing
Opechancanough to abort his plans and assure the nervous English of his continued
desire for peace. The assault failed to materialize, and the colonists lapsed back into a
state of complacency. By the time the new governor, Francis Wyatt, arrived in
November, he found "the Countrey at his arrivall in very greate amytie and confidence
with the natives," and firmly believed that the peace would continue.34
Opechancanough probably planned his assault for late summer, after the corn
harvest, so once his plans for 1621 failed he would have bided his time until the
34 "Two TragicaII Events," 213; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company of London," January
1621/22, in RVCL, 3:583·84 (quotation); Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company of London," in
RVCL, 4:10; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:164; Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Complete Works,
1:169; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:284, 298; Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 89;
Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:550, 556. On the relations between the Powhatans and
the chiefdoms of the Eastern Shore, see Thomas E. Davidson, "Relations Between the Powhatans and the
Eastern Shore," in Powhatan Foreign Relations, 136·53; James D. Rice, "Escape from Tsenacommacah:
Chesapeake Algonquians and the Powhatan Menace," in Envisioning an English Empire, 127-30.
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following year.35 The death ofNemattanew in early March, however, forced his hand. A
colorful figure known to the English as "Jack-of-Feathers" for his elaborately plumed
armor, Nemattanew was the Pamunkey war captain and a dynamic leader held in awe by
his fellow Powhatans. During the First Anglo-Powhatan War a decade earlier,
Nemattanew had inspired his men with his courage, defiantly facing English guns and
boasting that he was impervious to bullets.36 Two English servant boys dramatically
disproved this claim: after Nemattanew murdered an Englishman named Morgan for
reasons that remain obscure, they retaliated by shooting and killing the Indian hero.37 His
death was a personal blow to Opechancanough, but it was also a blow to the pride and
prestige of the Pamunkey tribe, whose central position in the paramount chiefdom rested
on the reputation of its leaders. Nemattanew's inglorious death must have enraged
younger warriors and sparked calls for immediate vengeance, while at the same time
weakening Opechancanough's power to command them. Instead of waiting for the first
leaves of autumn, he had to make his move before he lost control of his own people.38
35 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 359-61; Rountree, Pocahontas, 12-13,239-40.
361. Frederick Fausz and Jon Kukla, ed., "A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624," William
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 34, no. 1 (January 1977): 117; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete
Works,2:293.
37 "Two Tragicall Events," 213; Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," 117; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus,
19:168.
38 Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 356-59. On the connection between reputation and authority in the
Powhatan chiefdom, see Rountree, Powhatan Indians, 114-16; Rountree, "Who Were the Powhatans," 7-
13, 18-19. Nemattanew may have preemptively tried to mitigate the political ramifications of his
humiliating death, for his last thoughts were to protect the image of his own invincibility. As he lay dying,
the Pamunkey hero asked his killers to bury him in an English grave and not to tell anyone that he was
killed by a bullet. See Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," 117; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:168;
Smith, "Generall Historie," Complete Works, 2:293.
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English leaders, who had faced Nemattanew in the First Anglo-Powhatan War
and understood his importance to the Powhatans, braced for retaliation-but none came.
Instead, Opechancanough sent word to Jamestown that "for his parte he could be
contented his throte were Cutt" ifNemattanew' s death caused a breach with the English,
"and that the Skye should sooner faIle then [the] Peace be broken." Opechancanough's
skillful diplomacy convinced the colonists that he intended to abide by the peace, and
within weeks they were again welcoming Indians into their houses. 39 Meanwhile,
Opechancanough marshaled his forces for a blow that would tear out the hearts of the
people who had invaded his country.
On the morning of March 22, 1622, Powhatan Indians came to every major
plantation up and down the James River, unarmed and smiling, happily greeting their
English friends. 4o They brought a variety of goods to trade, including game, fish, and
fowl, and in many cases sat down with their neighbors for breakfast. Then, at 8 0'clock,
they suddenly rose up, grabbing anything at hand-tools, knives, unattended English
weapons-and slaughtered their hosts. The Powhatans struck with such suddenness and
ferocity that many colonists did not even realize they were being attacked before they
39 Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:10-11. See also Waterhouse,
"Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:550; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:158.
40 The reason why Opechancanough chose this particular day for the massacre is uncertain. Helen
Rountree suggests that it may have been connected with the date of the quarter moon (March 23), or was
chosen by Powhatan priests based on their divinations; see Rountree, Pocahontas, 212. However,
Opechancanough had spent a great deal of time deceptively courting George Thorpe in order to encourage
his missionary efforts, and no doubt knew that Christians would observe March 22 as Good Friday. This
choice made strategic sense because attacking on a holiday would have accentuated the element of
surprise. In a war of cultures, moreover, it was also a way for Opechancanough to show his contempt for
the religion of those who had come to Tsenacommacah trying to convert his people. On
Opechancanough's insincere embrace of Christianity, see "Two Tragicall Events," 209-11; Purchas,
Hakluytus Posthumus, 161; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:287, 295; Waterhouse,
"Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:552.
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died. The Powhatans planned well, assigning appropriately sized parties to each
settlement and portioning out their targets beforehand. They quickly tracked down any
colonists not at home, a task made easier by their intimate knowledge of the
tassantassas' schedules and habits. The warriors showed contempt for their enemies by
mutilating their remains, slaughtering their livestock, and burning the houses they had
built on the soil of Tsenacommacah. Injust a few hours, the forces ofthe Powhatan
tribes killed 349 men, women, and children, leaving behind nothing but butchered bodies
and smoking ruins. Thanks to the warning of an Indian boy who had converted to
Christianity, Jamestown and some of the larger settlements were able to mount a defense
and drive off their attackers. Even so, one quarter of the colony's population fell that day
and the remainder cowered in isolated pockets of terror and despair. "I thinke the last
massacre killed all our Countrie," wrote one colonist miserably; "besides them they
killed, they burst the heart of all the rest.,,41
41 "Two Tragicall Events," 209, 213; William Capps, "Letter to Doctor Thomas Wynston," March or April (?),
1623, in RVCL, 4:38 (quotation); Council in Virginia, "A Letter to the Virginia Company of London," April (after
20th), 1622, in RVCL, 3:612; Robert C. Johnson, "The Indian Massacre of 1622: Some Correspondence of the
Reverend Joseph Mead," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 71, no. 4 (October 1963): 408-9; Purchas,
Hakluytus Posthumus, 19: 158-59, 162-63; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:294-98; William Noel
Sainsbury, ed., Calendar afState Papers, Colonial Series (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts,
1860), 1:31 (hereafter cited as CSP, Col.); Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:550-55. Both Smith
and Waterhouse report a total of347 casualties, though their lists of names both add up to 349; see Smith,
"Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:301-2; Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 565-571.
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Frontier Power and the Logic of Elimination
The English reacted very differently to the Jamestown Massacre depending on
whether they viewed it from the eastern or western shore of the Atlantic.42 Those who
wrote from England were shocked by the colony's devastating setback and expressed
their vehement outrage. Daniel Waterhouse, secretary for the Virginia Company, wrote
the first published account as A Declaration ofthe State ofthe Colony and... A Relation
ofthe Barbarous Massacre. Breaking the news to the public, he informed his readers of
"a barbarous Massacre in the time of peace and League, treacherously executed vpon the
English by the natiue Infidels." He assured his compatriots that "it was not the strength
of the professed enemy that brought this slaughter" on the Virginian colonists, but "the
perfidious treachery of a false-hearted people.,,43 Samuel Purchas echoed his sentiments
and condemned the "immaine, inhumane, devillish treachery" committed by the
Powhatans with language calculated to inflame the passions of his readers. "Virginia was
violently ravished by her owne ruder Natives," he wrote, "yea her Virgin cheekes dyed"
42 Many scholars prefer to avoid the stigma of the word "massacre," and use different terminology when
discussing the massive Powhatan attack. Fausz, reasoning that the Powhatans were rebelling against
English authority, calls it the "Powhatan Uprising." Rountree, imagining what the Powhatans might have
called their attack, uses "Great Assault." Frederic Gleach suggests that the 1622 attack was not a massacre
according to the Oxford English dictionary because Powhatan violence was neither "unnecessary" nor
"indiscriminate," so he prefers the more neutral term "coup." See Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 6; Helen
C. Rountree, Pocahontas Powhatan Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown
(Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2005), 6; Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan's
World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict ofCultures (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press,
1997),4-5. All three scholars, whatever term they use, nevertheless agree that Opechancanough launched
his attack to accomplish to accomplish specific ends. The Powhatans, therefore, systematically used mass
violence, including the slaughter of unarmed non-combatants, in order to accomplish political goals. This
fits any reasonable definition of massacre; in fact the pol itical scientist Leo Kuper coined the term
"genocidal massacre" to describe the instrumental use of mass killing in this manner. See Kuper,
Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Centwy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1982), 10.
43 Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:542 (emphasis in the original).
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with blood.44 A torrent of such condemnations flooded the streets of London, accusing
Indians of treachery and murder, demanding vengeance for the rape of a virgin
country.45
Much of the fury expressed by the homeland-English revolved around their
interpretation ofthe massacre as the Powhatans' extreme rejection ofthe English
civilizing mission. In their eyes, the Indians had repaid kindness and generosity with
betrayal and blood. Waterhouse, for example, was incensed by the murder of George
Thorpe on the day of the massacre. Thorpe's death and the "foule scornes" committed on
his body, so extreme "as are vnbefitting to be heard by any ciuill eare," made him into a
"glorious Martyr.,,46 The poet Christopher Brooke valorized Thorpe as well, and
concluded that his murder represented the end of English hopes for Christian Indians.
The English had come to America "to make those Indians know / The'Eternal God," he
wrote,
To make them apt to what thou didst propound
For our Commence with them; their good, our peace,
And both to helpe with mutuall increase.
44 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:229. On the significance of Purehas's sexualized discourse, see Peter
Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London and New York:
Methuen, 1986), 158-61.
45 On the "revenge literature" coming from England, see Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 404-43.
46 Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:551-53. Thorpe received advance warning that the
Indians whose souls he sought to save were attacking English settlements, but refused to believe that they
would harm him. He was killed as he stood calmly outside his house. See "Two Tragicall Events," 212;
Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19: 161; Smith, "General! Historie," in Complete Works, 2:295.
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But their efforts were useless, because even if the English colonists had been as
numerous as grains of sand on a beach "They could not loose the hold the Diuell hath, /
Or bring them to the knowledge of our Faith.,,47 As far as Brooke was concerned, by
rising up against their supposed benefactors, the Indians had demonstrated their
unwillingness to accept the English vision for the transformation of their culture and
country. The Jamestown Massacre proved that Powhatans were implacable enemies of
the colonial enterprise. More horribly, they had acted as "tools of the devil" and
"despised Gods great mercies so freely offered to them," making them into implacable
enemies of God.48
As voices in England cried for vengeance, their rhetoric took on an ideological
cast that emphasized the radical otherness of the Powhatan perpetrators. English writers
painted lurid pictures of bestial savagery and demonic malevolence. Waterhouse wrote,
"these miscreants ... put not off onely all humanity, but put on a worse and more then
vnnaturall bruitishnesse"; they were scarcely human and "more fell then Lyons and
Dragons. ,,49 Brooke's accusations of inhumanity were more florid and more explicit,
calling the Indians "that Host of Hells black brood, / Wolues, Tygars, Tyrants, that haue
suckt the blood / of Christian Soules." But this was to be expected:
For, but consider what those Creatures are,
(I cannot call them men) no Character
47 Christopher Brooke, "A Poem on the Late Massacre in Virginia," ed. Robert C. Johnson, Virginia
Magazine ofHistory and Biography 72, no. 3 (July 1964): 283-84 (emphasis in the original).
48 "Two Tragicall Events," 213; Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:553.
49 Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:551. See also Smith, "Generall Historie," in
Complete Works, 2:294.
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Of God in them: Soules drown'd in flesh and blood;
Rooted in Euill, and oppos'd in Good;
Errors of Nature, of inhumane Birth,
The very dregs, garbage, and spawne of Earth.
By dehumanizing their enemies, the homeland-English thus crafted a rationale for
genocide rooted in their imaginary construction of the Powhatan Indians. Overcome with
the savage pathos of grief and rage, Brooke called for the outright extermination of the
Indians. "What feare or pittie were it, or what sin," he asked, "To quite their Slaughter,
leauing not a Creature I That may restore such shame of Men, and Nature?"so Going
beyond visceral wrath, Purchas combined evocations of the Powhatans' otherness with a
legal rationale for mass violence. First, he argued, the Powhatans' unprovoked attack
violated the law of nations. "England may both by Law ofNature and Nations challenge
Virginia for her owne peculiar propriety," he wrote, because "disloyall treason hath now
confiscated whatsoever remainders of the right the unnaturall Naturalls had, and made
both them and their Countrey wholly English." The Powhatans' unilateral breach of the
law of nations justified an unlimited response in order to achieve the 'just vengeance of
rooting out the authors and actors of so prodigious injustice." Purchas buttressed this
political claim with a second argument, in which he cited biblical wars of conquest as a
worthy precedent for the English response. "The Holy Patriarks had a promise of
Canaan," he wrote, and their descendants had fulfilled that promise-just as the English
should claim their just rights over Virginian land. Purchas thus invoked one of the
bloodiest episodes of the Hebrew Scriptures, explaining that the English possessed the
50 Brooke, "Poem on the Late Massacre," 276, 285. Maudlin expressions of sorrow and grief can be found
throughout, but see for example p. 274-75.
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legal sanction to do the same to the Indians of Virginia as the Israelites had done to the
inhabitants of Canaan.51
Waterhouse made it clear that the calls for genocide among the homeland-
English were not simply an ephemeral thirst for retribution. Rather, these new attitudes
represented a fundamental shift in their conception of the colonial project. While he
mourned the loss of so many colonists, Waterhouse also rejoiced,
Because our hands which before were tied with gentlenesse and faire vsage, are
now set at liberty by the treacherous violence of the Sa[v]ages not vntying the
Knot, but cutting it: So that we, who hitherto haue had possession of no more
ground than their waste, and our purchase at a valueable consideration to their
owne contentment, gained; may now by right ofWarre, and law ofNations,
inuade the Country, and destroy them who sought to destroy vs: whereby wee
shall enioy their cultiuated places, turning the laborious Mattacke into the
victorious Sword (wherein there is more both ease, benefit, and glory) and
possessing the fruits of others labours. Now their cleared grounds in all their
villages (which are situate in the fruitfullest places of the land) shall be inhabited
by VS.52
For Waterhouse, as for many others in England, the dream of a Christian commonwealth
in America, populated by English colonists and Anglicized Indians, had died along with
hundreds of his countrymen on March 22 of 1622. The Powhatan Massacre
unequivocally demonstrated the incompatibility of English and Indian visions for the
country of Virginia. As far as the English were concerned, they had tried to extend the
hands of holy fellowship, to bring the light of Christ and the glory of English
civilization, but the Indians' hearts were filled with savage hate and their eyes were
51 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:224-25,229-30 (quotation). Purchas also mentions David's conquest
of Ammon to bolster his argument for the justice of retaliatory conquest (p. 224, 229).
52 Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVeL, 3:556-57.
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blinded by the devil's darkness. The colonists' only recourse was to utterly destroy their
enemy.53
Once Purchas, Waterhouse, and others articulated these rationales, the Virginia
Company used them to formulate a colonial policy of mass murder and territorial
expulsion. The London Council ordered its agents in Virginia to take "sharp revenge
vppon the bloody miscreants, even to the measure that they intended against vs, the
rooting them out for being longer a people vppon the face of the Earth."s4 The
Company's prescription was "a perpetuall warre without peace or truce," a total war in
which the Virginian forces were to pursue the Indians,
surprisinge them in their habitations, intercepting them in theire hunting,
burninge theire Townes, demolishing theire Temples, destroyinge theire Canoes,
plucking vpp theire weares, carying away theire Corne, and depriving them of
whatsoeuer may yeeld them succor or relief: by which meanes in a very short
while, both your iust revenge, and your perpetuall security might be certainly
effected.
To maximize the deadliness of the war, the Company suggested that the colonists offer
bounties in copper and beads to any friendly Indians bringing in Powhatan heads. The
instructions allowed for something less than the extinction of the Powhatans, but put the
53 Those few voices in England that opposed the prevailing tide of opinion advocated policies scarcely less
brutal. Captain John Martin, for example, opposed the extirpation of the Powhatan Indians on the
mercenary grounds that they would bring more profit to the colony if subjugated and made into slaves; see
John Martin, "The Manner Howe to Bringe the Indians into Subiection," December 15, 1622, in RVCL,
3:706. George Wyatt recommended the same course of action to his son, Francis Wyatt, writing that some
Indians "are to be taken in Nets and Toiles alive, reserved to be made tame and searve to good purpose."
See Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," 127.
54 Virginia Company, "A Letter to the Governor and the Council in Virginia," October 7, 1622, in RVCL,
3:683.
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minimum acceptable result as "at least the remoueall of them so farr from you, as you
may not only be out of danger, but out of feare of them" forever.55
While those who eyed the conflict from across the Atlantic indulged in
ideological fantasies of ultimate revenge, the Virginian-English balked at grandiose
plans calling for them to raze the Indian empire to ashes. In the immediate aftermath of
the massacre, the Powhatan tribes claimed undisputed mastery of the countryside.
Forced to abandon their far-flung settlements, settlers left more than seventy plantations
empty in order to huddle as refugees in half a dozen defensive bastions. The Virginians
were effectively under siege by an enemy who had mastered the art of forest warfare,
who stalked the shadowed woods and "like violent lightening are gone as soone as
perceived. ,,56 The Powhatans had no need to face the English guns in a direct assault.
Since the colonists were unable to farm or forage for fear of ambush, the Powhatans
simply watched them huddle behind their walls and waited for them to starve to death.57
The hungry refugees packed into the remaining settlements proved easy prey to
55 Treasurer and Council for Virginia, "Letter to Governor and Council in Virginia," August 1, 1622, in
RVCL,3:671-72.
56 JHBV, 1:37; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:11-13; Governor in
Virginia, "Commission to Captain Roger Smith," April 13, 1622, in RVCL, 3:609-11, George Sandys,
"Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys," March 30, 1623, in RVCL, 4:73 (quotation); Smith, "Generall Historie," in
Complete Works, 2:302. Most of the refugees congregated in Jamestown, Elizabeth City, Southampton
Hundred, Shirley Hundred, Flowerdew Hundred, Newport News, and Samuel Jordan's plantation; see
Council in Virginia, "Letter to the Virginia Company," in RVCL, 3:612. On the vulnerability of the
English outside of their strongholds, see JHBV, 1:38; "Notes Taken from Letters which came from
Virginia in the 'Abigail,''' June 19,1623, in RVCL, 4:229; Council in Virginia, "Letter to the Virginia
Company," in RVCL 3:613-14; Richard Frethorne, "Letter to his Father and Mother," March 20 and April
2-3, 1623, in RVCL, 4:58-59; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:210-11.
57 Alternately, Opechancanough may have decided not to follow up his initially successful attack because
he assumed that the English would react in the way that Native Americans would: by withdrawing or
surrendering. See Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through
Four Centuries (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990),75.
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"pestilent feuer" that arrived from a supply of tainted beer aboard the resupply ship
Abigail, and the new arrivals themselves succumbed to "scurvie & bloodie fluxe." In the
first year after the Powhatan massacre more than five hundred of the surviving colonists
died from famine and disease, and many of the rest were too debilitated to work, farm, or
fight. 58 Virginia became a charnel house and its people sank into the paralysis of despair.
"I haue nothing to Comfort me," the young indentured servant Richard Frethorne wrote
mournfully to his parents in England, "ther is nothing to be gotten here but sicknes, and
death.,,59
While the colonists no doubt identified with the outrage that their brethren
expressed in England, the emotional cast of the colony was not zealous rage so much as
hopelessness and dread. The massacre had taken everyone by surprise, and the "sodayne
alteracon of the State of all thinges, so dismaide the whole Colony, as they allmost gaue
themselues for gone.,,60 The massive dislocations left many Virginians vulnerable to
Indian ambushes, and every colonist lived in fear because they could be picked off at
58 "Notes Taken from ... the'Abigail,''' in RVCL, 4:234, 239; Johnson, "Indian Massacre," 410; Richard
Frethorne, "Letter to Mr. Bateman," March 5, 1622/3, in RVCL, 4:41-42 (quotation); Frethorne, "Letter to
his Father and Mother," in RVCL, 58-62; Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:237; George Sandys, "Letter
to Mr. Farrer by the Hopewel," March 1622/3, in RVCL 4:25 (quotation); George Sandys, "Letter to
Samuel Wrote," March 28, 1623, in RVCL, 4:65; George Sandys, "Letter to Sir Miles Sandys," March 30,
1623, in RVCL, 4:71; George Sandys, "Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys," in RVCL, 4:74, Virginia Company,
"Discourse of the Old Company," April (?) 1625, in RVCL, 4:525.
59 Frethorne, "Letter to his Father and Mother," in RVCL, 4:59. On the impact of Richard Frethorne's
letters in England, see Emily Rose, "The Politics of Pathos: Richard Frethorne's Letters Home," in
Envisioning an English Empire, 92-108.
60 Virginia Company, "Discourse of the Old Company," in RVCL, 4:524. As William Powell notes, "So
stunned were the people by the blow and so great was their loss that between twenty and thirty days
passed before any concerted plan of action could be determined." See William S. Powell, "Aftermath of
the Massacre: The First Indian War, 1622-1632," Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 66, no. I
(January 1958): 44-75.
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any moment. One settler reported that "if wee goe out in the morning, wee know not
whether wee shall ever returne.,,61 While it can be imagined that the Virginians hated the
Powhatans as much as sympathetic writers thousands of miles away, the combination of
physical misery and a permanent state of terror left them numb. Begging his parents to
help him escape from his suffering, Frethorne noted that "people crie out day, and
night... Oh that they were in England without their lymbes and would not care to loose
anie lymbe" if it meant that they could "bee in England againe ... for wee live in feare of
the Enimy.,,62 These traumatized settlers were unlikely to prosecute a grueling campaign
of genocidal war. Colonial administrators found it difficult enough to mobilize them for
defense.63
Governor Wyatt complained to his father in England that the Company's
shareholders did not understand how desperate their situation really was. "Such an
Antipathy is there betweene theyr vast Commands and our grumbling Obedience," he
61 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, 19:210-11.
62 Frethorne, "Letter to his Father and Mother," in RVCL, 4:58.
63 In order to raise a force sufficient to defend the colony, Wyatt was forced to levy able-bodied men and
granted his officers the power to enforce a level of military discipline not seen since the abolition of the
Lawes Martial!; see Governor in Virginia, "Commission to Captain Roger Smith," April 13, 1622, in
RVCL, 3:609; Governor in Virginia, "Commission to Capt. Ralph Hamor," April 15, 1622, in RVCL,
3:610; Governor in Virginia, "Commission to Order to Ralph Hamor," April 19, 1622, in RVCL, 3:610;
Governor in Virginia, "Commission to Captain Smith," April 20, 1622, in RVeL, 3:611; Governor in
Virginia, "Proclamation," April 29, 1623, in RVCL, 4:129-30; Governor in Virginia, "Commission to
Captain Roger Smith," May 18, 1622, in RVCL, 3:623; Governor in Virginia, "A Commission to William
Tucker," July 16, 1622, in RVCL, 3:664-65; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:305; Sir
Francis Wyatt, "A Commission to Sir George Yeardley," June 20, 1622, in RVCL, 3:657. See also Louis
Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," Military Affairs 22, no. 2 (Summer 1958), 77. On
mass violence and the psychology of trauma, see Ervin Staub, "Reconciliation after Genocide, Mass
Killing, or Intractable Conflict: Understanding the Roots of Violence, Psychological Recovery, and Steps
Toward a General Theory," Political Psychology 27, no. 6 (2006): 871; Ervin Staub, The Roots ofEvil:
The Origins ofGenocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
162-65.
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wrote in exasperation. "They talke of an Army of 500 to issue out vpon th' Indians in all
parts and after a running Army of 150 to vex them in all places.',64 Treasurer and
Council member George Sandys considered this plan an absurdity at a time "when out of
the whole Collonie wee Could but raise 180 (whereof80 were fit onelie to Carrie
burthens)." He reacted with incredulity when the Company ordered the Virginians to
make a direct assault on thousands of Powhatan warriors while their food stores stood
empty and their streets still ran with the excrement of dying men.65 The Virginia
Company attempted to resolve these problems by pouring men into the colony but
neglected to equip them with adequate food, clothing, and other vital supplies. Supply
ships thus did "not bring either comfort or supply to the Colonie: but only add to their
Calamitie, to their greife," because instead of bringing reinforcements they brought only
more hungry and desperate men who proved to be "an insupportable charge to the
Colony.,,66 The agencies of power in London ordered their colonial representatives to
carry out a policy of genocide, but alienated the leaders who were supposed to execute
that policy and exacerbated the conditions that prevented them from doing so.
Despite their frustration with directives from London, the settlers needed the
support of the Company for its survival. In addition to military and logistical problems,
64 "Notes Taken from the ... 'Abigail,'" in RVCL, 4:237.
65 Sandys, "Letter to Samuel Wrote," in RVCL, 4:67 (emphasis in the original). See also Council in
Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:12-13; Sandys, "Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys," in
RVCL,4:74.
66 Virginia Company, "Discourse of the Old Company," in RVCL, 4:527. See also Council in Virginia,
"Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:13-16; Sandys, "Letter to Samuel Wrote," in RVCL, 4:65. On
the Company's mismanagement in the aftermath of the massacre, see Wesley Frank Craven, Dissolution of
the Virginia Company: The Failure ofa Colonial Experiment (1932; reprint, Gloucester, Mass.: Peter
Smith, 1964),205-19.
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the colony faced the additional imperative of demonstrating its viability to nervous
investors overseas. Virginia was a mercantile enterprise, after all, and for a decade and a
half it had swallowed money and men without having much to show for it. The colony's
only financial success was tobacco, a noxious weed widely considered to be morally
unfit as the economic basis for an English empire. Moreover, the mania for growing
tobacco during the boom years after 1619 meant that the colonists had not bothered to
grow enough com to feed themselves. They survived only by depending on food
supplies from surrounding Indians and shipments from England.67 Once
Opechancanough declared war on the Virginians and his people stopped trading corn,
the settlers knew that they needed to convince the homeland that the devastated and
failing colony deserved further infusions of capital and manpower. That meant
producing a profit-or at least making a case that the colonists could produce a profit
given sufficient assistance. This became all the more difficult when the Company's gross
mismanagement resulted in continual shortages of supplies even as its demands grew
increasingly fantastic. In August of 1622, for example, just one month after receiving
news of the massacre, the Council in London wrote to Wyatt that "yor want of Come
doth much perplex vs," since the colony should have known that the Company could not
afford to send supplies and should have grown their own food instead. Since "it is as fitt
and necessarie to yee1d the return of Adventures [shareholders] as to receiue them," the
67 JHBV, 1:39; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 3:586; Council in Virginia,
"A Letter to the Virginia Company of London," January 30, 1623/4, in RVCL, 4:452-54; Purchas,
Hakluytus Posthumus, 150-53; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:284; Waterhouse,
"Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:546-47. On moral and practical opposition to tobacco culture, see
King James T, A Counter-blaste to Tobacco (London, 1604); The King, "Letter to the Virginia Company,"
July 9, 1622, in RVCL, 3:662; Craven, Dissolution ofthe Virginia Company, 93-94, 176-78.
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Council demanded that the colonists ship back a larger freight of tobacco, build a fort to
guard against the possibility of Spanish invasion, and redouble their efforts to grow
mulberry orchards for sericulture and vineyards for the production of fine wines.68
Despite Wyatt's frustration with these commands, he and his councilors
understood that they could not continue to drain the Company's coffers and expect
unlimited support. They also had to weigh the Company's schizophrenic instructions,
which demanded that the Virginians fulfill Hakluytian dreams of New World riches and
at the same time defend the national honor by sending out vast armies to exact genocidal
vengeance. "Mingling matters of honor and proffitt often ouerthrow both," Wyatt wrote
to his father in exasperation, complaining that it was impossible to defend the colony
from thousands of hostile Indians with a handful of sick and famished men, pay the
Company's debts, and embark upon grandiose new projects, all at the same time.69
Failing to do so, however, might cause the investors to withdraw their support, leaving
the Virginians, as Company secretary Nicholas Ferrar threatened, "deane leafte &
abandoned from any supplies hereafter ... as you iustly deserue."The Virginians had to
balance the commands emanating from the metropole with the realities of life on the
colonial periphery.7o
68 Treasurer, "Letter to Governor and Council in Virginia," in RVCL, 3:668; Virginia Company, "A Letter
to the Governor and Council in Virginia," October 7, 1622, in RVCL, 3:685. The King and Company both
commanded the shift towards sericulture and wine production two days before hearing news of the
massacre, but later orders from the Company reiterated the same instructions. See CSP, Col. 1:31; "An
Answere to a Declaracon of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, in RVCL, 4: 142-43; Virginia
Company, "A Letter to the Governor and Council in Virginia," August 6, 1623, in RVCL, 4:266-68.
69 "Notes Taken from ... the 'Abigail,'" in RVCL, 4:237.
70 Virginia Company, "Letter to the Governor," in RVCL, 3:688; see also Council of the Virginia
Company, "A Letter to Governor and Council in Virginia," June 10,1622, in RVCL, 3:648; Treasurer,
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In this state of emergency, Governor Wyatt and his Council could not afford to
listen to the strident voices in England howling for genocide, but neither could they
afford to alienate their patrons. They decided to chart a middle course that would satisfy
London's calls for revenge while still focusing on the pragmatic goals of survival and
security. Rather than the extermination of the Powhatans, they made their first war aim
the acquisition of enough food to feed the colony. In the months following the massacre,
Wyatt issued a stream of commissions to his commanders authorizing them to procure
corn from the surrounding natives by any means necessary. The instructions suggested
peaceful trade if possible, though the commanders were granted broad latitude to initiate
hostilities if the Indians refused or resisted. The commission granted to Ralph Hamor in
April was fairly typical: Wyatt commanded him to sail the pinnace Tyger up the
Chesapeake's rivers "to trade wth the Indians for corne; and in case he cann get no trade
wth them, or not such as he expecteth, then it shalbe lawfull to take it from them (ifhe
be able) by force."?! The tentative language of these orders belied a keen awareness of
the limits of English power.
"Letter to Governor," in RVCL, 3:666-68; Virginia Company, "Letter to the Governor," in RVCL, 3:685;
Virginia Company, "Letter to the Governor," in RVCL, 4:270. The pressure that the Virginia Company
exerted on its colonial agents, struggling though they were, stemmed largely from its mounting financial
debts and the crippling infighting between two rival factions of shareholders over control of the Company.
Though infuriating from the Virginian point of view, the Company's contradictory instructions at least
partly originated from a real crisis over the Company's solvency and a desperate need for a return on its
investments. See Craven, Dissolution ofthe Virginia Company, 176-220. For examples of the colonists'
earnest efforts to meet these impossible demands, see JHBV, I :26-27; Council in Virginia, "Letter to the
Virginia Company," in RVCL, 3:614; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:14-
15; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company of London," April 4, 1623, in RVCL, 4:99; Virginia
Company, "Letter to the Governor," in RVCL, 4:266-69; Council in Virginia, "Letter to the Virginia
Company," in RVCL, 4:452-54.
71 Governor in Virginia, "Commission to Captain Raph Hamor," May 7, 1622, in RVCL 3:622. For similar
commissions see Sir Francis Wyatt, "A Commission to Sir George Yeardley," in RVCL 3:657; Governor
in Virginia, "A Commission to Sir George Yeardley," September 10, 1622, in RVCL, 3:678-79; Governor
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In their reports to London the Virginians voiced a harder line more in keeping
with the Company's murderous instructions, promising that "by the way of starvinge and
all other meanes that we can possiblely devise" they would engage the Indians and
"Constantlie pursue their extirpatione.,,72 At the same time, they tried to convey the
reality that extirpating the Powhatans was a practical impossibility, explaining that "the
charge of driveinge them away, which woulde reduce us to a better estate then wee
weare in before the massacre, [is] so great as it is to[o] wayghtie for us to support.,,73
Even at their most vitriolic, the Virginians' denunciations of their Indian enemies did not
possess the ideological edge so common among writers in London. While accusations of
treachery abounded, the surviving records from Virginia lack the dehumanizing
language so beloved by Brooke and Waterhouse, and the colonists did not bother to
rationalize their retaliation by appealing to historical precedents or esoteric legal
theories.74
Military strategy during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War revolved around the
tactics that George Wyatt called the "feedfight," in which small raiding parties lanced
of Virginia, "A Commission to Captain Raph Hamor," October 23, 1622, in RVCL, 3:697; Governor of
Virginia, "A Commission to Captain William Eden, alias Sampson," October 24, 1622, in RVCL, 3:698-
99; Governor of Virginia, "A Commission to Captain lsack Maddison and Robert Bennet," November 12,
1622, in RVCL, 3:700-70 1.
72 Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:10.
73 JHBV, 1:38.
74 As Karen Ordahl Kupperman points out, English charges of treachery were less a symptom of cultural
devaluation than a recognition of the sort of social and political tensions between peoples during wartime;
see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "English Perceptions of Treachery, 1583-1640: The Case of the American
'Savages,'" HistoricalJournal20, no. 2 (June 1977): 263-287.
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through Indian territory in search of corn.75 The Virginian militia relied on their thick-
hulled pinnaces for protection as they sailed up and down the Chesapeake's rivers,
preventing Powhatan warriors from using their mastery of stealth and ambush to gain the
upper hand. Moreover, the mobility granted by their vessels allowed the raiders to
approach Native American communities with little enough warning that the widely
dispersed Powhatan fighters could not respond in time, leaving the villages virtually
undefended. When the Indians that they encountered refused to trade, the Virginians
threatened, cajoled, and then attacked. After driving off the villagers, the soldiers seized
as much corn as they could carry, destroyed the rest, and burned anything else the
Indians left behind. During these "harshe visitts," as Francis Wyatt euphemistically
called them, the raiders thus procured food supplies that they desperately needed and at
the same time denied their enemies the same resource.76
The feedfight exemplified what modern military strategists call "unlimited
warfare," or warfare against non-combatants.77 The goal was not to challenge Powhatan
war parties for command of the countryside, but to target the agricultural resources that
the Powhatans depended on for subsistence.78 Wyatt told his officers as much, prefacing
75 Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," 126-27.
76 "Good Newes from Virginia," William and Mary Quarter~y, 3rd ser., 5, no. 3 (July 1948): 353-58;
Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:99; Council in Virginia, "Letter to the Earl
of Southampton and the Council and Company of Virginia," December 2, 1624, in RVCL, 4:508
(quotation); Johnson, "Indian Massacre," 409; Martin, "Manner Howe," in RVCL, 3:704-707; Sandys,
"Letter to Sir Miles Sandys," in RVCL, 4:71; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete Works, 2:308-16;
Waterhouse, "Declaration of the State," in RVCL, 3:557-58. On the feedfight, see Fausz, "Powhatan
Uprising," 453-58; Shea, Virginia Militia, 32-34.
77 Grenier, First Way ofWar, 21.
78 Contrary to the often unexamined assumption that English firearms gave them a decisive offensive
advantage, the success of the Virginian forces was largely due to premodern technologies of defense. The
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several commissions by writing, "there is no meanes so probable to worke the ruine, the
destruction of our Salvage & treacherous enemies, as cutting downe theire Corne.,,79
Despite the Virginians' willingness to target the civilian infrastructure of Powhatan
society, though, they seldom killed non-combatants. One reason for this was that
Powhatan villagers learned to detect the raiders' approach early enough to abandon their
communities in advance of their enemy's arrival. Even when taken by surprise, the
lightly clad Powhatans were nearly always able to elude their heavily armored
opponents. Equally important, the Virginians were often not interested in pursuing them:
feeding themselves, not killing Indians, was the colonists' primary goal in the first hard
year of the Second Anglo-Powhatan war. The ruthlessly efficient tactics of the feedfight
guaranteed a great deal of destruction but little direct combat and few casualties on
either side.8o
King had donated to the war effort an arsenal of obsolete armor, including forty suits of plate, four
hundred coats of mail, five hundred shields, and two thousand helmets, all of which had been rusting in
the Tower of London because they were considered "vnfitt for any moderne service" ("Note of Arms in
the Tower for which the Virginia Company are Suitors," July 17,1622, in RVCL, 3:665; "A Warrant to the
Lord Treasurer," September 1622, in RVCL, 3:676). Soldiers sheathed in medieval steel proved to be
virtually invincible to the flint-tipped arrows and wooden clubs of Powhatan warriors; see Nicholls,
"Percy's 'Trewe Relacyon,'" 258-59; George Percy, "Observations," in Narratives ofEarly Virginia,
1606-1625, ed. Lyon Gardiner Tyler (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 17. Nearly all of the
Virginian casualties during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War were the victims of ambushes, where Indian
warriors could swiftly overwhelm the heavily encumbered Virginians. The defensive advantage of English
armor therefore helps to explain not only the degree of Virginian military success during their raids, but
also their initial reticence to engage the Powhatans on their own ground in the countryside. See Harold L.
Peterson, Arms and Armor in Colonial America (Harrisburg, Pa.: Telegraph Press, 1956), 147-49; Shea,
Virginia Militia, 57-58. Though he focuses on Indian tribes to the north ofthe Powhatans, Patrick
Malone's examination ofNative American military technologies is also helpful; see Malone, The Skulking
Wcry ofWar: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books,
1991),7-23.
79 Governor Wyatt, "Commissions to Captain Pierce, to Captain Samuell Mathews, and to Others," July
17-23,1623), in RVCL, 4:250.
80 Wyatt reported to London, somewhat defensively, that the English had not been able to kill many
Indians in battle, but were assured by friendly Indians that through starvation "we have slayne more of
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By the spring of 1623 the war settled into a vicious stalemate.8l The Powhatans
were unable to penetrate English armor or withstand the concentrated power of English
guns in the open field, making it difficult for them to resist Virginian marauders.
Moreover, they were not willing to suffer the sort of casualties it would take to breach
defensive fortifications, leaving the towns as islands of security from which the colonists
could continue to launch their raids. For their part, the Virginians relied on cumbersome
muskets and heavy armor, making it difficult for them to catch Powhatan fighters
unaware or to force them to stand and fight. 82 After a hard winter for both sides,
Opechancanough sent a message to the English leaders that "blud inough had already
been shedd one both sides," and proposed an exchange of prisoners and a truce that
would allow both peoples to plant corn. Wyatt and the Council were delighted, fully
intending to let the mamanatowick believe they were at peace and then attack when the
Powhatans were most vulnerable.83 The more perceptive Virginians realized that the
wily Indian leader was too cunning to fall for such a transparent ploy, and probably had
them this yeere, then hath been slayne before since the beginninge of the Colonie." See Council in
Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4: 10; "Notes Taken from ... the'Abigail, '" in RVCL,
4:229. The Powhatan subsistence economy, which relied as much on winter hunting and gathering wild
tuckahoe roots as on corn, makes this assessment unlikely. The English depredations certainly caused
hardship for the Powhatans, but destroying their corn crops would not have caused the kind of mass
starvation that Wyatt describes; see Rountree, Powhatan Indians, 32-57; Rountree, Pocahontas, 216-17.
81 For the most detailed account of events during the Second AnglO-Powhatan War, see Fausz, "Powhatan
Uprising," 447-517; see also Powell, "Aftermath of the Massacre."
82 JHBV, 1:38; Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:10; Smith, "Generall
Historie," in Complete Works, 2:310-11. See also Shea, Virginia Militia, 22.
83 Council in Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:98-99; Sandys, "Letter to Sir Miles
Sandys," in RVCL, 4:71; Sandys, "Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys," in RVCL, 4:74-75. The Powhatans took
twenty captives during the Jamestown Massacre, five men and fifteen women. They executed the men
sometime before March of 1623. See Frethorne, "Letter to Mr. Bateman," in RVCL, 4:41; Council in
Virginia, "Letter to Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:98-99; Smith, "Generall Historie," in Complete
Works,2:309-10.
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the same thing in mind. "[W]hen their Corne is readie," wrote William Capps
sardonically, "haue at yor bucklers you braue ... Englishmen.,,84
The Virginians were determined to strike before Opechancanough could ready
his forces, so they hatched a plan to assassinate him during the peace negotiations in
May of 1623. When William Tucker and twelve soldiers sailed up the Potomac River,
ostensibly to retrieve several captive English women and to seal the peace with a
gathering of two hundred Powhatan dignitaries, he carried with him a stock of poisoned
wine. After listening to "many fayned speches" and assuring his hosts of the wine's
safety by surreptitiously drinking from a different source, he proposed a toast in
Opechancanough's honor. The Powhatans became "drunk," allowing the Virginians to
escape back to their ship with the captives in tow. Just before leaving, Tucker and his
men fired on the debilitated Powhatans, killing fifty and bringing their scalps back to
Jamestown. Opechancanough survived this massacre, despite reports to the contrary, but
he was either gravely injured or so politically damaged by this disaster that he
disappeared from the record for several years. His brother Opitchapam, already the
mamanatowick in name, emerged as the leader of the Powhatan war effort.85
Opechancanough's disappearance heralded the decline of Powhatan power.
Bolstered by fresh troops and supplies from London, Virginian forces followed up
Tucker's massacre along the Potomac with a series of overland offenses that challenged
84 Capps, "Letter to Doctor Thomas Wynston," in RVCL, 4:37.
85 RVCL, 2:482-83; Robert Bennett, "A Letter to Edward Bennett," June 9,1623, in RVCL, 4:221-22;
Governor, "Commission to Captain William Tucker," May 12, 1623, in RVCL, 4:190; Purchas, Hakluytus
Posthumus, 19: 170. Opitchapam also appears in the sources under his throne name, Otiotan (sometimes
recorded as Itoyatin).
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Powhatan control of the countryside for the first time. They hoped that by penetrating
the center of Powhatan territory, capturing Pamunkey country and the seat of
Opitchapam's rule, they could force an end to the war.86 The Powhatan tribes slowly but
steadily lost ground, and Pamunkey power eroded as the English invaders burned
villages and put their warriors to flight again and again. Because the Virginians also
began to court potentially friendly tribes, eroding the margins of the Powhatan chiefdom,
Opitchapam needed to demonstrate his fitness to lead by displaying his power. When
Governor Wyatt led a large party of English men into the Pamunkeys' heavily-populated
and well-defended heartland, Opitchapam decided to gamble: he gathered his men to
stand toe to toe against the English, hoping for a decisive victory that would demonstrate
who the true ruler of Tsenacommacah was. 87 Eight hundred Pamunkey fighters, flanked
by an unspecified number of warriors from other Powhatan tribes, stood in the open field
against sixty of Wyatt's men. For two days red-painted warriors in the bloom of
Powhatan glory launched wave after wave of assaults, but they could not break through
the English line. Finally the men of Tsenacommacah looked on dismay from a distance
86 Governor in Virginia, "Warrant," October 20,1623, in RVCL, 4:292; Council, "Letter to the Virginia
Company," in RVCL, 4:450-51.
87 The Virginians seem to have perceived the Pamunkeys' political weakness, reporting to the Earl of
Southampton that Opitchapam gathered his forces to fight "nott only for safegarde oftheire howses and
such a huge quantetie of Corne, but for theire reputatione with the rest of the Salvages." Council, "Letter
to Southampton," in RVCL, 4:508. On Virginian attempts to establish more friendly relations with
neighboring tribes, see Governor in Virginia, "A Commission to Captain Raph Hamor," January 19,
1623/4), in RVCL, 4:448; Governor in Virginia, "A Commission to Rawleigh Croshaw," March 16, 1623,
in RVCL, 4:470.
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while the tassantassas slashed and burned their ripened fields, destroying enough corn to
feed four thousand people for a year.88
Opitchapam's defeat broke the back of the chiefdom's war-making power; the
battle for Pamunkey was a fight that he could not afford to lose. Hoping to draw
previously uninvolved tribes from the north into an anti-English alliance, he had invited
emissaries to witness his men crush the tassantassas. Instead, the ambassadors watched a
tiny contingent of foreigners withstand the full force of the Powhatans' best fighters. The
battle blunted the offensive capability of the Virginians as well: the two-day fight had
virtually exhausted the colony's entire supply of gunpowder and ammunition. Unaware
that the Powhatans were too politically weak to launch any large attacks, the colonists
did not follow up on their victory for fear of being left without sufficient munitions to
defend themselves. Without any formal peace treaty, the war ground to a halt.89
Many in Virginia welcomed this state of affairs. War was expensive, and military
service prevented young men on the make from pursuing their fortunes in the tobacco
88 Council, "Letter to Southampton," in RVCL, 4:507-508. The lone source for this battle is vague on the
tactical details, leaving the question of how so few Virginian militiamen could withstand a force of this
size something of a mystery. Gleach suggests that Wyatt exaggerated the number of enemies to enhance
the prestige of his victory. He bases this conjecture on the assumption that the Powhatans were as familiar
with mass-formation warfare as contemporary European armies; see Gleach, Powhatan's World,43-47,
164-65. However, he bases this assertion on a single incident in which John Smith witnessed a mock-
battle, staged for the benefit of English visitors, in which Powhatan warriors "fought" other Powhatans
dressed as enemy Monacans; see Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Complete Works, 1:166-67. This one
instance is outweighed by the many observations that Powhatans favored ambush tactics and guerrilla
raids. See, for example, JHBV, 1:38; Sandys, "Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys," in RVCL, 4:73; John Harvey,
"A Letter to Sir Nathaniel Rich," April 24, 1624, in RVCL, 4:476; Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice,"
117; Thomas Hariot, A Brie/e and True Report o/the New Found Land o/Virginia (New York: J. Sabin
and Sons, 1871),25; Strachey, Historie o/Travaile, 107. It is more likely that the Powhatans, used to
picking specific targets in their lightning assaults, were unfamiliar with massed-fire maneuvers necessary
to penetrate the Virginians' heavy armor.
89 Council, "Letter to Southampton," in RVCL, 4:508; Council in Virginia, "A Letter to the Commissioners
for the Affairs of Virginia," June 15, 1625, in RVCL,4:566-68.
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fields. Wyatt's military orders in 1624 gave his commanders increasingly harsh powers
to discipline their men, indicating that once the Virginians had achieved a measure of
territorial security they became increasingly reticent to risk their lives and sacrifice their
valuable time. Even if the colonial administrators had wanted to press their advantage
for further territorial conquests, their inadequate coercive power over their people on the
frontier limited their ability to do SO.90 Putting a positive face on the military situation in
the colony, Wyatt reported to London that the colonists would be "most willinge to
performe with our Vttmost abilities" their raids on Indian territory, provided that they
received the necessary supplies and munitions. But they preferred some alternative to
war, hoping "that some course wilbe taken to ease the Countrey of that grete Charge" of
continually harassing the Indians.91 The Virginians fought for practical military goals:
securing their settlements, gaining control of the surrounding territory, and stabilizing
the colony enough to prevent endemic disease and the specter of starvation. Once they
achieved those goals they showed little further interest in prosecuting ideologically
motivated vengeance against the perpetrators of the 1622 massacre.
The Virginians thus developed a pragmatic response to the Powhatans that
reflected the basic process of settler colonialism. Despite London's bloodthirsty calls for
vengeance in 1622, Wyatt's commanders engaged in limited raids in order to feed his
people. As the military strength of the colony increased, they followed the Company's
90 Wyatt, "Commissions," in RVCL, 4:250-51; Governor, "Warrant," in RVCL, 4:292; Council, "Letter to
the Virginia Company," in RVCL, 4:451. On the increasing unpopularity of coercive military service
among the colonists, see Shea, Virginia Militia, 39-41.
91 Governor and Council in Virginia, "A Letter to the Commissioners for Virginia," January 4, 1625/6, in
RVCL, 4:568-69.
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orders for offensive action so long as it satisfied their own territorial ambitions. In fact,
at one point they continued to do so even when orders from London ordered them to
cease hostilities. When in late 1623 the Virginia Company began to reverse its earlier
calls for extirpation, urging instead a renewed commitment to promote religion "as much
as they may among the savage people," the Virginian leadership diplomatically
acknowledged the importance of God's work and then discreetly ignored the London
Council.92 Instead, they continued to pursue territorial expansion at the Powhatans'
expense. "[I]n time," they allowed, "we shall clean drive them from these partes, and
therby have the free libertie and range for our cattle, the increase of whom may bringe us
to plentie.,,93 They would accomplish the Indians' expulsion for their own reasons,
though: not as part of a fanatical vision of a land purified by genocidal war, but to
accomplish the elimination of Native Americans from the territory they desired-not for
hatred or vengeance, but for farmland and pasture. They could only execute this
expansionist policy for so long, however, before taxing the will of the colonists who had
to bear the brunt of the fighting. Having spent their blood to gain territory and
established the means to defend it, the common colonists wanted peace and the
opportunity to make their fortunes. These countervailing forces had propelled the
92 Virginia Company, "Letter to the Governor," in RVCL, 4:269-70; Captain John Bargrave, "A Form of
Policy for Virginia," before December 7,1623, in RVCL, 4:412-13 (quotation p. 413). The Company's
inconsistency can be partially traced to the bitter infighting between rival factions of shareholders, each of
whom blamed the other for the colony's failures. The Sandys faction that controlled the company during
the Second Anglo-Powhatan War tried to rally support from the English public in whatever way it could,
first by appealing to their countrymen's lust for revenge and then by resurrecting the idea of colonization
as a holy mission. See Fausz, "Powhatan Uprising," 523-47.
93 JHBV, 1:37. See also Harvey, "Letter to Sir Nathaniel Rich," in RVCL, 4:476.
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violence of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, but they were also responsible for a
gradual de-escalation of hostilities.
Aside from occasional border skirmishes, by 1624 the fighting had ended.
Though the Virginians were still officially at war with the Powhatans, they had not yet
crystallized this pattern into general Indian exclusion. For two decades afterward, spaces
of contact between Indians and English continued to exist, with many interactions
occurring among commoners on both sides who acted against their leaders' wishes.94
Nevertheless, official Virginian policy gradually moved toward a steady border defense
that effectively segregated Indians and colonists. In 1629, the General Assembly issued a
standing order for periodic raids against the Powhatans to "cleare the woods and the
parts neere adioyning" their settlements, expelling encroaching Indians when they "have
any certaine knowledge of the Indian's aboad in those places." In 1631 the Assembly
forbade colonists from even speaking to Indians, and the following year ordered "the
Indians kept from our plantations" entirely. The Virginians finally achieved some
measure of separation in 1633, when they finished construction on a defensive palisade
stretching across the central peninsula from the James River to the Charles (now the
York). Their fortress wall was dotted with defensive blockhouses and manned at all
times. Indians attempting to breach the line would be shot on sight unless they carried
special badges marking them as diplomatic messengers. The palisade established a
94 Though the significance of this illicit contact has yet to be fully explored, the Assembly's repeated
declarations outlawing Anglo-Indian trade indicate both its prevalence and the inability of the colonial
administration to control it. See H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Minutes ofthe Council and General Court of
Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632, 1670-1676, with Notes and Excerpts from Original Council and General
Court Records, into 1683, Now Lost (Richmond, 1924), III, 147, 184, 189,478; William Waller Hening,
ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection ofAll the Laws of Virginia,from the First Session ofthe
Legislature, in the Year 1619, 13 vols. (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1923), 1:143, 219, 227.
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country of uncontested English control, a land without Indians, whether Powhatan
enemies or the friendly tribes who had been allies during the war. East of the palisade,
Tsenacommacah had been transformed permanently into Virginia, its native inhabitants
pushed beyond the frontier. 95
The Death of Tsenacommacah
The Powhatans gradually recovered from their defeats to fight for their vision of
the country they had lost. Sometime in the 1630s, Opitchapam died and
Opechancanough succeeded him as mamanatowick. Now paramount chief in his own
right, the aging Opechancanough spent the better part of a decade rebuilding the
Pamunkeys' shattered power. Years of the Virginians' unrestrained expansion, and the
colonists' hardening line towards even their friendly neighbors, helped him build a
coalition that virtually united the Tidewater tribes against the Virginians. By 1644
Opechancanough once again prepared to cripple the invaders.96 On April 18, 1644,
warriors of Tsenacommacah attacked along the Virginian border, killing four hundred
colonists. Whereas in 1622 a Christianized Indian boy who loved his master as a father
warned the English of an impending assault, in 1644 the breach between cultures had
grown so wide that the colonists received no warning whatsoever.97
95 Hening, Statutes, 1: 139-41, 153, 167, 199, 208-209 (quotation p. 140). See also Mcllwaine, Minutes,
184-85. On earlier plans to create a Pale, see RVeL, 2:483.
96 Fausz, "Opechancanough," 33-34. There were some notable exceptions to this unity of Indian opinion
on the need to confront the Virginians, notably the Rappahannocks and Accomacs of the Eastern shore.
See Hening, Statutes, 1:293.
97 "Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia: At Sessions of March 1643-1646,"
Virginia Magazine ofHistory and Biography 22, no. 3 (July 1915): 229; Robert Beverley, History of
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Opechancanough's motives for launching the 1644 assault are difficult to
determine. In 1622 he might reasonably have thought that the full might of his empire
could annihilate the nascent English colony, but in 1644 he would have known that this
was impossible. There is some indication that he timed the attack to take advantage of
the destabilizing effects of the English Civil War. He may have believed, as Governor
William Berkeley related, that
now was his time or never, to roote out all the English; For those that they could
not surprize and kill under the feigned masque of Friendship and feasting, and
the rest would be by wants; and having no supplyes from their own Countrey
which could not helpe them, be suddenly Consumed and Famished.98
The eighteenth century historian Robert Beverley, generations removed from the events
and more sympathetic to Indians than his ancestors, concurred that the Powhatans "saw
the English uneasy and disunited among themselves, and by the direction of
Oppechancanough, their king, laid the ground work of another massacre.,,99 On the other
hand, one tantalizing piece of evidence suggests that Opechancanough's grandiose plan
simply fell apart after the initial burst of organized massacre: instead of following up
their success with further attacks, as they had in 1622, many Powhatan warriors melted
Virginia (1722; reprint, Richmond: J.W. Randolph, 1855),48; Hening, Statutes, 1:285-86,290. The
casualty numbers are rough estimates only; Beverley recorded five hundred, but more contemporary
sources list numbers closer to four hundred.
98 [William Berkeley], "A Perfect Description of Virginia: Being, a full and true Relation of the present
State of the Plantation ..." 1649, in Force, Tracts, vol. 2, doc. 8, p. 11 (emphasis in the original).
99 Beverley, History o.fVirginia, 48. John Winthrop noted that a ship from Virginia reported the Civil War
as the cause of the massacre, suggesting that it was widely believed among the colonists; see John
Winthrop, Journal o.fJohn Winthrop, 1630-1649, ed. Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and Laetitia
Yeandle (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996),508.
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into the southern forests. After decades of holding his people together during their slow
decline, the 1644 massacre may have taxed Opechancanough's political capital beyond
the breaking point. Issuing orders from the center, the mamanatowick could not exert
sufficient force to control his people on the fringe. Rather than follow him into another
war, they followed their leader's final thrust into Virginia's heart and then abandoned
Tsenacommacah forever. 100
The English quickly retaliated with an order to extirpate their enemies. The
General Assembly declared, "wee will for ever abandon all formes of peace and
familiarity wth the whole Nation. And will to the uttmost of our power pursue and root
out those wch have any way had theire hands in the shedding of our blood and
Massacring of our People." It is telling, however, that the Assembly's orders lack the
emotionally charged language that characterized the response to the 1622 massacre.
They focused instead on strategic need to starve the Powhatans into submission, ordering
the commanders to cut "downe the Indians Corne generally this Summer in all places
subiect to Opochanckanough."lol The Assembly divided Virginia into four military
districts, each with its own command structure responsible for sending sorties into
Powhatan territory in order to keep hostile Indians at bay. The colonists worked to
defend the boundary that they had established the previous decade, militarizing the
frontier by building a series of larger fortifications along the line between Virginia and
Tsenacommacah. To the familiar tactics of the feedfight, they added small bands of
100 [Berkeley], "Perfect Description," in Force, Tracts, II.
101 "Acts, Orders and Resolutions," 229-30.
96
lightly equipped rangers capable of standing toe to toe with Powhatan warriors in the
subtle art of forest combat. 102
In 1646 a Virginian army marched west into the heart ofPamunkey territory,
intent on achieving a decisive victory by capturing Opechancanough. It was not difficult:
nearly one hundred years old, Opechancanough had "grown so decripid, that he was not
able to walk alone," and was so debilitated by age that "his eyelids became so heavy,
that he could not see, but as they were lifted up by his servants." The militia captured
him and brought him back to Jamestown in chains. Opechancanough was proud even in
defeat: when a crowd gathered to gawk at him, he lifted up his eyelids, composed
himself like the dignified sovereign that he was, and called "in high indignation for the
governor," berating Berkeley for his poor treatment of an enemy leader. Within two
weeks one of Opechancanough's guards shot him in the back, bringing his long career of
resistance to an end. The Powhatan chiefdom that he had defended all his life virtually
collapsed. 103
Defeated by the Virginians, Opechancanough's successor Necotowance signed a
treaty that ratified the legal separation of Virginia from Tsenacommacah. Necotowance
acknowledged himself to be the subject of the English crown, with his people as legal
wards of the colonial authorities. Despite promises that the colonists would "protect him
102 Frank, Joseph, ed., "News from Virginny, 1644," Virginia Magazine 0/History and Biography 65, no.
1 (January 1957): 85; Hening, Statutes, 1:292-93. The frontier defense was so successful that the
Virginians bolstered their line by adding a fourth fort in 1646; see Hening, Statutes, 1:315. For an
overview of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War, see William L. Shea, "Virginia at War, 1644-1646," Military
Affairs 41, no. 3 (October 1977): 142-147. On ranging tactics in American warfare, see Grenier, First Way
0/War,29-39.
103 Beverley, History o/Virginia, 50-51.
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or them against any rebells or other enemies whatsoever," in fact no Indians of any tribe
were allowed between the York and James Rivers, and "neither he the said Necotowance
nor any Indians do repare to or make any abode vpon the said tract of land, vpon paine
of death, and it shall be lawfull for any person to kill any such Indian." The treaty
reserved land north of the York for Indian habitation; though the Assembly retained the
right to expand English territory at will, pushing the frontier outward as they desired
more land. 104 This treaty transformed the formerly proud Powhatans into a liminal
people, subject to an authority that possessed the power of life and death but refused to
grant them meaningful protections under the law. It also set the stage for unlimited
territorial expansion while denying displaced Indians a place within Virginia. East ofthe
expanding and unbreachable border lay a country purged of Indians.
The two Powhatan assaults that sparked the Second and Third Anglo-Powhatan
Wars established a pattern in Anglo-Indian relations that became welded to the process
of English colonialism. The English came to an old land occupied by a people with a
dynamic vision of their environment, the possibilities that it offered, and their proper
relation to it. The Powhatans of the Tidewater region looked around them and saw the
land of Tsenacommacah, an empire forged by the ambition of the paramount chief
Wahunsenacawh. They made war on their neighbors for territory and for captives, and
made alliances with others to draw them into the chiefdom's political orbit. They moved
with the seasons, tending their fields -in the summer, gathering roots and pursuing game
in the winter. They worshipped their own gods and inhabited a world suffused with
104 Hening, Statutes, 1:323-25.
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intangible power. The English looked at the same land and saw something very
different: a virgin land teeming with possibilities, endless pastures for cattle and hogs,
soil that could grow tobacco and vines and mulberry trees. They saw wild neighbors who
might welcome the light of the gospel and grow to till the earth the way that all civilized
people did. They offered these Indians passage into the Virginia of their vision,
expecting that any reasonable people would accept with delight. The colonists were
baffled and hurt when the Powhatans refused, annoyed when they stubbornly resisted,
and furious when they fought back.
Yet the English unwittingly encouraged this outcome, because their vision was as
inflexible as it was ambitious. The colonists consistently demanded nothing less than the
Powhatans' cultural suicide and the total replacement of their lifeways with English
patterns. When the Powhatans proved that they possessed a proud and independent
vision of themselves, the English abandoned plans to incorporate them and sought to
eliminate them through violent exclusion instead. Tensions between the Virginian
colonists on the fringe of empire and their English countrymen in the imperial
metropole, however, impinged on this process in contradictory ways, sometimes
escalating violence and other times limiting it. Emerging from the chaotic conditions of
the borderlands between two countries, the actions of the Virginian colonists relentlessly
followed the logic of elimination that pushed their Indian neighbors beyond the
expanding frontier.
Powhatan priests had foretold the coming of a strange people from the
Chesapeake who would challenge them. They prophesied three wars that would
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devastate the Powhatan people, and an apocalypse that would wipe away the country of
Tsenacommacah forever. Writing just a few years after the first landing at Jamestown,
William Strachey wrote ofWahunsenacawh's people,
Judge all men whether these maye not be the forerunners of an alteration of the
devill's empire here? I hope they be, nay, I dare prognosticate that they usher
gret accydents, and that we shall effect them; the Divine power assist us in this
worke, which, begun for heavenly ends, may have as heavenly period. 105
Had he lived to see the end of the Third Anglo-Powhatan War in 1646, Strachey might
have been astonished at the power of prophecy, both those of the priests of the "devill' s
empire" and of his own.
105 Strachey, Historie ofTravaile, 102.
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CHAPTER IV
SAINTS AND DESTROYERS
In 1643, with the publication of his Algonquian primer A Key into the Language
ofAmerica, Roger Williams laid the groundwork for an enduring myth of Pequot
ferocity. In his section on phrases pertaining to war, he wrote the simple sentence
Pequttoog pauquanan, "The Pequts are slaine," which could also be translated as "the
Destroyers are destroyed." The linguistic identity of "Pequot" with "Destroyer" quickly
became part of a historical discourse that portrayed the Pequots as merciless conquerors.
In 1654 the Puritan historian Edward Johnson wrote that the Pequots were "more warlike
then their Neighboring Nations," a people "swollen with pride." A generation later,
William Hubbard embroidered this characterization with the claim that the Pequots were
interlopers who had invaded the Connecticut Valley and crushed all opposition from the
region's original native tribes. By the turn of the eighteenth century, chroniclers
portrayed the Pequots as a juggernaut ofIndian power. Of Native American nations,
Cotton Mather wrote, "there was none more Fierce, more Warlike, more Potent, or of a
greater Terror unto their Neighbours, than that of the PEQUOTS," who "committed
many Barbarous Outrages" and ruled southern New England as lords of "the Kingdom of
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Satan."] Historians have since shown that the Pequots were neither foreign conquerors
nor the titans of war that the Puritan chroniclers claimed, but modern scholars continue
to repeat the dubious translation of "Pequot" as "destroyer.,,2
In this myth it fell to the Puritans, who called themselves Saints and considered
themselves to be God's chosen people, to face down the might of these ruthless
destroyers. In May of 1637 they proved themselves up to the challenge, trapping
hundreds of Pequots at Mystic and burning it down with the villagers still inside. "It was
a fearful sight to see them thus frying in the fire and the streams of blood quenching the
same," William Bradford observed grimly, "and horrible was the stink and scent
thereof." Despite the carnage, though, the sanctified soldiers felt no remorse: "the
victory seemed a sweet sacrifice, and they gave the praise thereof to God, who had
wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their enemies in their hands and give
1 Roger Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in The Complete Writings ofRoger Williams,
ed. James Hammond Trumbull, 7 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), 1:263; Edward Johnson,
Wonder-Working Providence ofSions Saviour in New-England, 1628-1651, 1654, reprinted as Johnson's
Wonder-Working Providence, ed. J. Franklin Jameson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 148;
William Hubbard, The Present State ofNew-England, Being a Narrative ofthe Troubles with the 1ndians
in New-England, 1677, reprinted as The History ofthe 1ndian Wars in New England: From the First
Settlement to the Termination ofthe War with King Philip, in 1677, ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols. (Bowie,
Md.: Heritage Books, 1990),2:6-7; Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana: or, the Ecclesiastical
History ofNew-England, from 1ts First Planting in the Year 1620 unto the Year ofour Lord 1698, 7 vols.
(London, 1702), 7:41 (emphasis in the original).
2 See, for example, Andrew Delbanco, The Puritan Ordeal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989),
106. Frank Speck notes that the etymology of all other New England Indian tribes come from geographical
markers rather than behavioral descriptions, casting suspicion on the translation of Pequot as "destroyer."
See Speck, "Native Tribes and Dialects of Connecticut: A Mohegan-Pequot Diary," Annual Report ofthe
u.s. Bureau ofAmerican Ethnology 43 (1926): 218. Alfred Cave has conclusively disproven Hubbard's
spurious assertion that the Pequots invaded Connecticut; see Alfred A. Cave, "The Pequot Invasion of
Southern New England: A Reassessment of the Evidence," New England Quarterly 62, no. I (March
1989): 27-44.
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them so speedy a victory over so proud and insulting an enemy.,,3 The surviving Pequots
scattered, abandoning their homeland to the dominion of the Saints.
After the fall of Mystic in a rain of fire, the Puritans had effectively
accomplished their war aims. They had conquered Connecticut and expelled the Pequots,
fulfilling the logic of elimination that propelled their colonial project. Yet the Saints
were not satisfied, for their fear of the Pequots had passed into the realms of delusion
and paranoia. Simply defeating their enemies, or even pushing them beyond the frontier,
was not enough. Driven by their own imaginary construction of the Pequots as an
intolerable threat to their survival, the Saints united to scour the land clean with their
incandescent rage, killing until their enemies could never threaten them again.
Regeneration
The Puritan settlers who came to Massachusetts Bay during the Great Migration
possessed a vision distinct from that of their Virginian counterparts. At its core, the
Saints were guided by a millenarian quest for social regeneration through their exodus to
the New World. They saw themselves as latter-day Israelites who, guided by divine
providence, would venture into the American wilderness. There they would build a new
Zion in New England, what John Winthrop famously called a "Citty vpon a Hill"
governed according to the undiluted lessons from holy Scripture.4 The belief that they
3 William Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1952),296.
4 John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity," 1630, Winthrop Papers, 5 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1929-1947),2:282-95. On the Puritan mission and social regeneration, see Delbanco,
Puritan Ordeal, 41-117; Perry Miller, Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1964), 1-
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were a people chosen by God and guided by providence shaped the Puritans'
formulation of the colonial project. Nevertheless, the Puritan worldview was rooted in
English history and English culture. As they planned their transformation of the
American wilderness, they naturally imagined something patterned on the England they
had left behind. In Good Newes from New England, Edward Winslow wrote, "I cannot
but think that God hath a purpose to give that land as an inheritance to our nation," and
that the land was so ripe and fertile that "one can scarce distinguish New England from
Old.,,5 Just as strains of latent violence lay within the ideology of imperialism guiding
colonists in Virginia, similar factors operated within the Puritan mind to intensify Anglo-
Indian conflict.
The Puritans generally subscribed to the paradigm of Indians as "savages," and
therefore their perceptions of Native Americans were filtered through an intellectual
abstraction that encouraged distortion and misunderstanding. Years of English colonial
experience in America, however, had altered the contours of the savage archetypes. By
the 1620s, descriptions of American natives no longer possessed the edenic glow that
had led Arthur Barlowe to describe them as figures out of a golden age. Nevertheless,
the ethnographic writings of Roger Williams, William Wood, and Edward Winslow
IS; Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: the Mythology ofthe American Frontier, 1600-1860
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1973),37-42.
5 Edward Winslow, "Good Newes from New England: or a true Relation of things very remarkable at the
Plantation ofPlimoth in New-England," 1624, in Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers ofthe Colony of
Plymouth,from 1602 to 1625, ed. Alexander Young (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1841),
355.
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conveyed a sense of respect and even admiration for Algonquian societies.6 Still, the
essential humanity of the savage could not obscure his primitive nature. Robert Cushman
wrote that Indians "do but run over the grass, as do also the foxes and wild beasts."
Moreover, they lived beneath a shroud of ignorance, and they were "not industrious,
neither have art, science, skill or faculty."? For the Puritans, then, one stereotype for
Native Americans emphasized their humanity while still recognizing their wild and
degraded condition.8
The Puritans had their own version of the "ignoble savage." Bradford, for
example, noted with horror that Indians "delight to torment men in the most bloody
manner that may be," even to the point of eating their victims alive.9 The intense
religiosity of the Puritan worldview, and their belief in their colonial project as the
fulfillment of God's divine plan, invested this aspect of the savage archetype with a
particularly diabolical power. Through these demons in human form, the Devil himself
ruled over the wilderness like a dark king. That Satanic realm, hiding in the hollow of
every wood and in the shadows cast by council fires, was implacably opposed to the
mission of the Saints. On the founding of New Plymouth, for example, the chronicler
6 Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in Complete Writings, 1:96-264; Winslow, "Good
Newes," in Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers, 354-67; William Wood, New England's Prospect, ed.
Alden T. Vaughan (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977), 80-116.
7 Robert Cushman, "Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfulness of Removing Out of England
Into the Parts of America," in Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers, ed. Alexander Young, 243.
8 Roy Harvey Pearce, "The 'Ruines of Mankind': The Indian and the Puritan Mind," Journal ofthe
History ofIdeas 13, no. 2 (April 1952): 207-8; Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in
Complete Writings, 1:83-85; Wood, New England's Prospect, 96-97.
9 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 27.
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Cotton Mather wrote that the Devil inevitably caused the natives to engage in some
"bloody Action, for the Extinction of a Plantation so contrary to his Interests, as that of
New-England was."IO In this sinister guise, the ignoble savage was a demon weaving
magics to destroy the English root and branch. I I
The dual image of the savage possessed particular power for the Puritans, with
the dominance of one view over the other in their collective imagination contingent on
native behavior. So long as the Indians were peaceful, submissive, and willing to place
themselves under the aegis of English power, the Puritans could see them as primitive
but capable of acquiring the benefits of civilization.12 When they resisted English
hegemony, however, benevolent perceptions evaporated and the view ofIndians as an
implacable enemy became dominant with astonishing speed. They became "other," a
sinister inversion of everything that defined Puritan identity. While the English were
hardworking and industrious, the Indians were idle and lazy; the Saints were pious and
pure, but the heathens were wicked and idolatrous; civilized men were honest, but
treachery was in the savage's nature; the settlers were merciful but the barbarians were
10 Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, 7:41 (emphasis in the original). This interpretation of the Indian
in the unfolding history of God's will in America became a standard trope by the end of the seventeenth
century, but for early expressions of this belief see Bradford, 0/Plymouth Plantation, 84; Johnson,
Wonder-Working Providence, 148; John Underhill, Newes from America; Or, A New and Experimental!
Discoverie o/New England; Containing, a True Relation o/Their War-like Proceedings These Two
Yeares Past, with a Figure o/the Indian Fort, or Palizado (London, 1638), 19.
11 Alfred A. Cave, "The 1637 Pequot War and the Question of Native American Genocide," (paper
presented at the Genocide Studies Seminar, Yale University, 2005), 7-10; Pearce, "'Ruines of Mankind,'"
203-7; William S. Simmons, "Cultural Bias in the New England Puritans' Perception ofIndians," The
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 38, no. I (January 1981): 56-72.
12 Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in Complete Writings, I :83-85; Wood, New
England's Prospect, 96-97.
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cruel. 13 The Puritans, in short, were the righteous, and Indians were fundamentally,
irredeemably evil. 14
Like earlier colonists, the Saints believed that Native American patterns of land
use were inferior to their own. "This savage people ruleth over many lands without title
or property," wrote John Winthrop, "for they enclose no ground, neither have they cattle
to maintain it, but remove their dwellings as they have occasion." Winthrop offered a
legal theory of property derived from the principle of terra nullius. Known as vacuum
domicilium, or "empty dwelling," this theory posited two different types of land
ownership: natural and civil. A natural right to land existed "when men held the earth in
common every man sowing and feeding where he pleased." But by enclosing land,
claiming it as private property, and improving it through agriculture and animal
husbandry, man gained a civil right to the soil that superceded natural rights. Since
Indians did none of these things, according to Winthrop, they had "noe other but a -
Naturall Right to those Countries," and such land was "free to any that possesse and
improue it.,,15 As they surveyed the land of New England, the Puritans saw an empty
13 For a sampling of these recurring sentiments, see Wood, New England's Prospect, 96-97; Underhill,
Newes from America, 19; Hubbard, Present State, 1:47; Philip Vincent, A True Relation ofthe Late Batte!!
fought in New England, between the English, and the Salvages: With the present state ofthings there
(London, 1637),8; Roger Williams to Sir Henry Vane and John Winthrop, May 15, 1637, Winthrop
Papers, 3:412; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, June 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:436-37; Lion Gardener,
Relation ofthe Pequot Warres (Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Press, 1660),24.
14 Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images ofthe American Indianfrom Columbus to the
Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 81-84; Timothy L. Wood, "Worlds Apart: Puritan
Perceptions of the Native American During the Pequot War," Rhode Island History 56, no. 3 (August
1998): 63. On Puritan perceptions of Native Americans as "other," see Slotkin, Regeneration Through
Violence, 55-69.
15 [John Winthrop], "General Considerations for Planting New-England," 1629, in Chronicles ofthe First
Planters ofthe Colony 0.(Massachusetts Bay,jrom 1623 to 1636, ed. Alexander Young (Boston: Charles
C. Little and James Brown, 1846),272,276; John Winthrop, "Reasons to Be Considered, and Objections
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wilderness that only English skill and industry could bring to bloom, relegating Native
Americans to the status of interlopers who would inevitably have to give way before the
superior pattern of English civilization. 16
Like all Europeans, the Puritan colonists accepted the law of nations as the basis
for all legitimate sovereignty. Their understanding of hierarchical authority and the
limits of state power, though, were informed by theology as much as international
convention. In his systematic disquisition The Marrow ofTheology, the Puritan divine
William Ames strictly limited the circumstances in which a Christian nation could go to
war. Only a legitimate sovereign acting in self-defense against enemy provocations, he
stipulated, could wage a just war. While fighting, moreover, the sovereign's armed
forces were required to obey a code of conduct specifying that surrendering foes be
given quarter. Ames also declared it unlawful "to intend the killing of those who are not
in some way participants in an unjust cause," thus prohibiting violence against non-
combatants. I7 As with other formulations of the law of nations, however, insurrection
threatened the fundamental basis of orderly society and was therefore treated as an
with Answers," 1629, Winthrop Papers, 2:140-41. See also Cushman, "Reasons and Considerations." in
Chronicles o/the Pilgrim Fathers, 243-44.
16 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology 0/New England, revised
edition (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003), 51-57. Stuart Banner notes that the English developed theories
that justified dispossession but tended to recognize Indian property claims as a matter of practicality. See
Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge and
London: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29-35. Policies aside, the ideological power of these theories
reflects the ways that Puritan settlers interpreted, as an imaginative space, the environment of New
England.
17 William Ames, The Marrow o.fTheology, ed. John Dykstra Eusden (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press,
1983),316-17. To support his theological position on just war, Ames cited the following Scriptural
passages: Numbers 31 :3, I Samuel 18:17,25:28, I Chronicles 5: 18,22, Luke 3: 14, Romans 13:14, I Peter
2:14, Psalms 143:1, and I Corinthians 9:7.
108
intolerable threat. For the Saints as much as other Englishmen, a rebellious population,
as "participants in an unjust cause," was collectively guilty of treason. In effect, this
version of just war theory rendered even women and children as legitimate military
targets. 18
For historical precedents validating mass violence, however, the Puritans looked
to different examples than their countrymen. Rather than looking back to the lessons of
Roman antiquity or Irish colonization, the Saints placed special emphasis on genocidal
episodes that they found in Scripture. The conquest of Canaan was a salient example of
divinely ordained genocide, but the Puritans also found a chilling lesson within the
stories of Saul and David. In the books of Samuel, God commanded Saul to "smite
Amalek, & destroye ye all that perteineth vnto them, and haue no co[m]passion on them,
but slay bothe man and woman, bothe infant and suckeling.,,19 When Saul mercifully
spared the life of King Agag, the prophet Samuel accused him of rebellion against the
will of God and stripped him of his legitimacy as God's chosen monarch. The moral of
this was clear to the Puritans: obedience to God fulfilled the covenant that he had made
with them and disobedience broke it. In his famous sermon A Modell ofChristian
Charity, John Winthrop made precisely this point:
When God giues a speciall Commission he lookes to haue it stricktly obserued in
every Article, when hee gaue Saule a Commission to destroy Amaleck hee indented
with him vpon certaine Articles and because hee failed in one of the least, and that
18 Ronald Dale Karr, '''Why Should You Be So Furious?': The Violence of the Pequot War," The Journal
ofAmerican History 85, no. 3 (December 1998): 883-88.
19 I Samuel 15:3. This and all subsequent biblical quotations are from the 1560 Geneva Bible, available at
http://www.thedcl.org/bible/gb/index.html(accessed April 22, 2009).
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vpon a faire pretence, it lost him the kingdome, which should haue been his reward,
if hee had obserued his Commission: This stands the cause betweene God and vs,
wee are entered into Covenant with him for this worke.20
Winthrop, no doubt, meant this to be a lesson on the need for steadfast devotion and
spiritual strength to meet the many challenges he and his brethren would face in the New
World. But it also meant strict compliance to God's will, even to the point of
annihilating an entire nation.
Saul's successor, David, later went to war against the kingdom of Ammon. After
conquering the Ammonites, he mercilessly "put them under sawes, and vnder yron
harowes, and vnder axes ofyron, and cast them into the tyle kylne.,,21 Despite the
relevance of this episode as a dramatic example of extreme violence, it is somewhat
difficult to determine the extent to which David's war against the Ammonites influenced
the Saints' conduct during the Pequot War. David possessed no specific mandate from
God, so the Puritans would have viewed this episode differently from the wars of Joshua
and Saul; certainly, none of the English soldiers ever claimed to have received a divine
commandment to annihilate the Pequots. However, the pastor John Wilson gave a
speech to the Connecticut militia on the eve of the Mystic assault, in which he cheered
on "every faithfull Souldier of Christ Jesus" and assured them that they would be due the
20 Winthrop, "Modell of Christian Charity," Winthrop Papers, 2:294.
21 n Samuel 12:31. Modern translations of this passage suggest that David enslaved the Ammonites and
used their labor in various capacities, rather than slaughtering them outright. In the Geneva Bible that most
of the Saints read, however, the marginal note for this passage makes the genocidal outcome quite clear.
"Signifying," it explains, "[tha]t as thei were malicious enemies of God, so he put them to cruel death."
See also I Chronicles 20:3, which leaves no doubt about David's resort to mass violence even in modern
translations.
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same honor that David earned for "that true valour the Lord hath bestowed on him. ,,22
Puritan chroniclers also clearly connected the two events in their histories of New
England. Hubbard characterized the Pequots as "Children of Ammon," who, like their
biblical forebears, "began to stink in the Nostrils of their Neighbors," and Mather used
the terms "Pequot" and "Ammonite" interchangeably.23 It is unlikely that the Puritans
interpreted this as a divine sanction for the genocide of the Pequots, at least in a direct
sense. But genocide was not unfamiliar to them and was, in fact, celebrated in the stories
of their spiritual ancestors in Israel. All that can be said for certain is that the Puritans'
worldview was rooted in a Scripture that contained spectacular episodes of mass
violence, and that these precedents provided a ready justification for those who sought to
retroactively account for their ferocity.
The Puritans did, however, make a direct link between their clash with the
Pequots and the English struggle against the Powhatans in Virginia. The hideous carnage
of the 1622 massacre had shocked the still struggling Plymouth colonists, who hurriedly
completed their crude fort and began to see hints of Indian conspiracy everywhere.24 In
1629, Matthew Cradock warned the first wave ofMassachusetts colonists "not to be too
confident of the fidelity of the savages," and to guard against the possibility that they
might meet the same fate as their compatriots. Planners like Cradock were careful to
preserve the model of benevolent colonialism that the Massachusetts Bay Company had
22 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 165-66.
23 Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, 7:42; Hubbard, Present State, 2:8.
24 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 110-11,116-19; Winslow, "Good Newes," in Chronicles ofthe
Pilgrim Fathers, 295.
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tirelessly promoted, and counseled moderation in the settlers' actions. "Let us by their
harms learn to beware," he wrote of the massacred Virginians, and even though "we are
commanded to be innocent as doves, so withal we are enjoined to be wise as serpents.,,25
Other New Englanders learned a sharper lesson from the Jamestown Massacre. Philip
Vincent, for example, saw the Virginians' scorched-earth tactics as an archetype for
successful Indian policy and warfare in the New World. "Virginia our mother plantation,
and for her precedent a rule, hath taught us what to do in these difficulties," he wrote,
"forewarned, forearmed." Swift and brutal force was the only way to deal with Indian
threats. Vincent quoted Edward Waterhouse, who had enthusiastically cheered on his
countrymen toward genocide, writing that "From these experiments" in Virginia "shall
the now inhabitants of those two Sister Lands, beat out unto themselves an Amour of
proofe, and lay a sure foundation to their future happinesse.,,26 The New England
colonists were determined to avoid another Jamestown massacre, and by their suffering
the Virginians had shown them how to do it.
25 Matthew Cradock to Captain Endicott, February 6, 1629, in Chronicles ofthe First Planters, ed.
Alexander Young, 136.
26 Vincent, True Relation ofthe Late Battell, 19. On the 1622 massacre, Waterhouse wrote "This will for
euer hereafter make vs more cautelous and circumspect, as neuer to bee deceiued more by any other
treacheries, but will serue for a great instruction to all posteritie there, to teach them that Trust is the
mother ofDeceipt. .. and make them know that kindnesses are misspent vpon rude natures, so long as they
continue rude; as also, that Sauages and Pagans are aboue all other for matter oflustice euer to be
suspected." With these lessons firmly in mind, he concluded, "Thus vpon this Anville shall wee now beate
out to our selues an armour ofproofe, which shall euer after defend vs from barbarous Incursions, and
from greater dangers that otherwise might happen." Edward Waterhouse, "A Declaration ofthe State of
the Colony and ... a Relation ofthe Barbarous Massacre," 1622, in Records ofthe Virginia Company of
London, ed. Susan Myra Kingsbury, 4 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933),3:542,559.
See also Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or, Purchas His Pi/grimes: Contayning a History ofthe
World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, 20 vols. (Glasgow: James
MacLehose and Sons, 1905), 19:211.
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Despite these seeds of violence in the Puritan worldview, the Saints themselves
initially intended to follow a policy of incorporating Native Americans into the Bible
commonwealth that they planned to build. According to John White, the conversion of
Indians was essential to the Puritans' apocalyptic role in the New World. In The Planters
Plea, White laid out the grand sweep of history as the progress of God's word spreading
across the world from east to west. His chief purpose in revealing the New World, White
argued, was to allow the culmination of this movement through the actions of the
Puritans. "God especially directs this worke of erecting Colonies unto the planting and
propatating of Religion," he wrote, and this holy burden "falls in this last age" upon His
chosen people.27 As agents in the historic fulfillment of God's will in America, the Saints
considered the transformation of Indians into good Christians to be integral to the
colonial enterprise.28
In accordance with this understanding, the agents of the Massachusetts Bay
Company promoted the colony as a vehicle for the conversion of Indians to the
knowledge of Christ. The Company's charter asserted that "the principall ende of this
plantacon" was to "incite the natives of the country to the knowledg and obedience of
27 [John White], "The Planters Plea: Or the Grounds of Plantations Examined, and usual Objections
Answered," 1630, in Tracts and Other Papers Relating Principally to the Origin, Settlement, and Progress
ofthe Colonies in North America: From the Discovery ofthe Country to the Year 1776, ed. Peter Force, 4
vols. (New York: Murray Printing Company, 1947), vol. 2, doc. 3, p. 6-7.
28 Pearce, "'Ruines of Mankind,'" 209-10; Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans,
and the Making ofNew England, 1500-1643 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 177-
80. As Kristina Bross notes, the importance oflndians' spiritual status was underscored by the common
belief that they were descended from Jews, who were expected to convert to Christianity shortly before the
advent of the millennium. Based on this interpretation, the conversion of Indians was quite literally a
concern of apocalyptic proportions. See Bross, Dry Bones and Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in
Colonial America (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 12-13,29-34.
113
the onlie true God and Savior of mankinde.,,29 Echoing both the book of Acts and
Richard Hakluyt's writings, the colony's official seal depicted a naked Indian mouthing
the words "Come over and help US.,,30 While such statements might reasonably be
dismissed as propaganda for public consumption, Puritans expressed the importance of
missionary work in their private correspondence as well. In a personal note
accompanying the Company's letter to John Endecott, for example, Cradock wrote that
he trusted him to "not be unmindful of the main end of our Plantation, by endeavouring
to bring the Indians to the knowledge of the Gospel. ,,31
Despite the importance of missionary activity in theory, in practice the colonists
lacked the resources to conduct large-scale efforts. Energetic individuals such as Edward
Howes and Roger Williams converted some individual Indians, such as Wonohaquaham
(John Sagamore) and the Pequot Wequash, but their hopes for widespread acceptance of
Christianity amounted to little.32 For many New Englanders, though, evangelizing was
premature in the early stages of settlement. White wrote that "no man can imagine how
29 Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., Records ofthe Governor and Company ofthe Massachusetts Bay in New
England, 5 vols. (Boston, 1853), 1:17. On the primacy of missionary work, see also Massachusetts Bay
Company, "The Company's First General Letter ofInstructions to Endicott and His Council," in
Chronicles ofthe First Planters ed. Alexander Young, 142; Cushman, "Reasons and Considerations," in
Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers, 242.
30 Acts 16:9; Richard Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," 1584, in The Original Writings and
Correspondence ofthe Two Richard Hakluyts, ed. E.G.R. Taylor, 2 vols., Works Issued by the Hakluyt
Society, 2nd ser., nos. 76-77 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1935),2:216.
31 Cradock to Captain Endicott," in Chronicles ofthe First Planters, 133.
32 Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in Complete Writings, 1:80-87; Edward Howes to
John Winthrop, Jr., March 26,1632, Winthrop Papers, 3:74-77. John Eliot, who later translated the Bible
into the Massachusett language and founded a series of "Praying Towns" for Christianized Indians, did not
begin preaching his conversion efforts until 1646; see Neal Salisbury, "Red Puritans: The 'Praying
Indians' of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 31, no. 1 (January
1974): 27-54.
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Religion should prevai1e upon those who are not subdued to the rule of Nature and
Reason," reflecting the widespread belief that the Indians would have to be civilized
before they could be Christianized.33 The first step in missionary work, therefore, was to
bring neighboring Indian tribes under the umbrella of benevolent English government.
The eschatological dimensions of the Puritan worldview invested their efforts to
incorporate Native Americans with cosmic importance. If God's design mandated the
spread of Christianity across America, and with it the civilizing influence of English
government, then any force obstructing that design logically served the purposes of the
Devil. The Puritans frequently interpreted any resistance to the exercise of their power as
the hand of Satan operating through his willing Indian minions.34 They cited this
connection most frequently in the midst of open war, when the clash of supernatural
powers invested the stereotype of the ignoble savage with an extreme brand of
malevolence. Massachusetts Commander John Underhill, for example, explained Pequot
hostility as the result of "the old Serpent according to his first malice" stirring "them up
against the Church of Christ. ,,35 The belief in Satanic direction also manifested in
reaction to more innocuous Indian behavior, such as objecting to unfair diplomatic
negotiations, resisting attempts to coerce food supplies, and even petty theft.36
33 [White], "Planters Plea," in Force, Tracts, 6. See also Pearce, "'Ruines of Mankind,''' 203.
34 Winslow, "Good Newes," in Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers, 356. See also Simmons, "Cultural
Bias," 60-65; Wood, "Worlds Apart," 62-64, 70-71.
35 Underhill, Newes from America, 19.
36 For early expressions of Indian resistance as Satanically inspired, see Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation,
84; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, September 1636, Winthrop Papers, 3:298; Winslow, "Good
Newes," in Chronicles ofthe Pilgrim Fathers, 357.
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For the Puritans, the shift from strategies of incorporation to strategies of
exclusion was often swift and terrible. Though they dreamed of regeneration, their vision
was totalizing and inflexible on a cosmic scale, making accommodation virtually
impossible. Even the smallest acts of resistance could not go unanswered because
compromise was tantamount to capitulation to Satan's dark designs and a failure of their
divinely ordained mission. Moreover, the latent violence inherent in their worldview
facilitated the slide from incorporation to exclusion. The Puritans' perceptions ofNative
Americans marked them as alien and dangerous. English theories of property ownership
invalidated Indian lifeways. The law of nations gave them the legal sanction for a
virtually unlimited response to defiance of their authority. Biblical episodes of sacred
slaughter and the Virginians' unrestrained retaliation against the Powhatan chiefdom
provided a ready precedent. The potential for genocide was there all along, nestled in the
combination of factors that encouraged radical exclusion. Pequot resistance brought the
Saints to the brink of the abyss. Then, faced with overwhelming crisis, they plunged over
the edge.
Crisis
Within just a few years after landing in 1630, the Massachusetts Bay colonists
faced challenges on a number of fronts, leaving them in a state of crisis by the eve of the
Pequot War in 1636. One of these challenges came from the imperial center, where
religious discord fueled a movement to revoke the Company's charter. The Saints had
enjoyed a certain level of royal neglect after King Charles I granted their charter in 1628,
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allowing them to remain nominally loyal to the crown but effectively in control of their
own affairs. In 1633, however, the virulently anti-Puritan William Laud became
Archbishop of Canterbury and launched a program to bring what he considered to be
subversive dissidents under the royal heel. He assembled the Commission for Regulating
Plantations, which successfully sued to have the Company's charter declared invalid.
News of this decision arrived in June of 1637, at the height of the Pequot War, when
messengers informed the Boston magistrates that they were no longer legitimate
authorities. The commission allowed their government to stand for the time being
because there were no royal officials to take over, but this state of affairs left the colony
uncertainly poised on the edge of disaster. 37
At the same time that Laud threatened Massachusetts from London, centrifugal
forces threatened to drain its power on the frontier. Flush with a continuous wave of
immigrants, the colony looked to the west and south for territories that they could use to
settle the newcomers. The Governor and General Court attempted to control this
movement to the best of their ability. They brokered treaties with the most powerful
Indian tribes to gain legal control over the land, peacefully extending Boston's authority
over a gradually expanding area of English settlement. Disaffected colonists chafed
under the Court's attempts to limit the pace of growth, however, and threatened to derail
Boston's plans for orderly expansion. In 1636 Thomas Hooker led a number of colonists
37 John Winthrop, Journal ofJohn Winthrop, 1630-1649, ed. Richard S. Dunn, James Savage, and Laetitia
Yeandle (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996), 221, 223-25. The rising tensions between King Charles and
Parliament, which led to the English Civil War in 1640, soon overshadowed Laud's attempt to take over
the Massachusetts By colony; see Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, English,
and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2005),29.
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outside the area of Massachusetts' control, buying land directly from small bands of
Indians and thereby rupturing the tributary networks of the sachems to whom those
bands owed allegiance. Massachusetts tried to establish control over these settlers
through legal action. Through two English lords friendly to the Puritans, they
incorporated the Saybrook Company and built a fort at the mouth of the Connecticut
River, claiming the right to govern the Connecticut settlers. Though the Saybrook patent
made them the legitimate authority on paper, the settlers spilling into the Connecticut
Valley north of the fort generally ignored them. The government of Massachusetts thus
began to compete with its own people for control of future territory and access to Indian
trade. Unruly settlers aggravated tensions with local Indians, and the borderlands
dissolved into a morass of competing territorial claims.38
In addition to challenges from the royal government and from its own people,
Massachusetts faced the encroachment of England's imperial rivals and its sister-colony
of Plymouth. The French to the north and Dutch to the south capitalized on the unstable
political climate in New England and endeavored, said Edward Winslow, "to divide the
land between them. ,,39 In 1633 the Dutch built a trading post called the House of Good
Hope, with which they intended to cement their control over the fur trade in southern
New England. This disputed territory was within the boundaries of English territorial
38 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 280-84; Winthrop, Journal, 126-28, 157-8, 161-62; Edward
Winslow to John Winthrop, Jr., June 22, 1636, Winthrop Papers, 3:274; Robert Stansby to John Wilson,
April 17, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:390-91; Thomas Hooker to John Winthrop, Jr., July 1636, Winthrop
Papers, 3:280-81. On Massachusetts' expansion and the Connecticut settlers, see Alfred A. Cave, The
Pequot War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996),76-98; Francis Jennings, The Invasion ~f
America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant o.fConquest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1975), 186-201; Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 215-17.
39 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 272.
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claims, and the incessant saber rattling of Dutch military contingents made English
traders nervous. Plymouth tried to weaken the Dutch hold over Connecticut by building
their own trading post at Windsor, one mile upriver of Good Hope. For all their bravado,
the Dutch troops left English traders in peace, but Plymouth's economic gains in
Connecticut threatened to strangle Massachusetts' future opportunities.4o French forces,
meanwhile, continually harried English holdings in Maine. In 1635 French soldiers
seized Plymouth's trading post at Penobscot and expelled its garrison. Plymouth was
willing to go to war in order to regain the post, but Massachusetts, concerned with its
own trading interests and dismissing worries about future French expansion, balked at
the suggestion of a joint expedition. Plymouth leaders believed that Massachusetts'
reticence was motivated by a desire to profit from their decline, leading to an atmosphere
of rancor and distrust between the two Puritan colonies that hampered their collective
ability to meet the French challenge. Even if they lacked imperial ambitions, warned
Bradford, French control of the north hampered the growth of the English colonies, and
the traders themselves provided the Indians with a steady stream of guns, bullets, and
intelligence on English vulnerabilities.41
The balance of power between Native American tribes was as chaotic as the
contest between European powers. Because of their proximity to New Amsterdam, the
Pequots had been the Dutch West India Company's principal trading partners since the
1620s. The fur-wampum trade nexus made them wealthy and powerful, fueling the
40 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 257-60; Cave, Pequot War, 57-8, 80-83.
41 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 245-46, 275-79; Winthrop, Journal, 153, 155-59,200; Edward
Winslow to John Winthrop, April 17, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:392.
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expansion of their political influence over surrounding tribes. The Dutch threatened their
hegemony with the construction of Good Hope in 1633. Dutch merchants, hoping to
expand the fur trade beyond the scale that the Pequots alone could provide, declared the
area to be a free trade zone open to all Native American tribes, including the Pequots'
main rivals, the Narragansetts. Spurred by economic competition, tensions between
Pequots and Narragansetts erupted into open war after a Pequot war party killed a group
of Narragansett traders in the neutral zone of Dutch control. Enraged at this blatant
provocation, the Dutch captured and murdered the Pequot sachem Tatobem. By the end
of the year the Pequots were embroiled in a two front war against Indian and European
powers.42
By 1634 the fortunes of the Pequots, now led by Tatobem's son Sassacus, were
in a precipitous decline. War against the Dutch cut them off from their source of wealth
and prestige. With diminished resources and less personal charisma than his father,
Sassacus proved unable to maintain the extensive tributary network that had followed
Pequot success in the previous decade. Formerly allied tribes, including the Mohegans
and their ambitious and politically astute sachem Uncas, defected to the Narragansetts,
lessening Pequot power at the same time that it added to their enemy's military capacity.
Already hard-pressed by these developments, the Pequots were devastated by a smallpox
epidemic that washed over southern New England, causing mortality rates as high as 95
percent. Finally, the Pequots miscalculated when taking their vengeance for Tatobem's
42 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 257-60, 269-70; see also Cave, Pequot War, 49-59.
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murder. Believing the disreputable English pirate John Stone to be a Dutch merchant,
they killed him and sank his boat.43
Desperate for reprieve, in 1634 Sassacus attempted to repair the breach with the
Puritans by sending a delegation to Bay Colony. The ambassadors offered a trade
monopoly in exchange for a military alliance against the Dutch and Narragansetts.
Instead, the Puritans demanded that the tribe relinquish the Stone's killers to face
English justice, pay an enormous tribute of wampum and furs, and surrender the land
rights to Connecticut. The Pequot emissaries, with few options, agreed to the terms. As
far as Boston was concerned, by signing this agreement the Pequots acknowledged
English sovereignty and subjected themselves to English law. It is doubtful that the
Pequots shared this understanding, and in any case the Pequot sachems under Sassacus
were dissatisfied with the treaty that the envoys had secured and chose not to ratify it, a
fact that Puritan leaders refused to recognize.44
Despite Boston's diplomatic victory over the Pequots, the 1634 treaty only added
fuel to the chaotic struggle for control ofthe Connecticut frontier. Bolstered by the
Pequot land cession, Massachusetts continued to assert its claims over the territory that
Connecticut settlers claimed for their own. Moreover, the treaty set the stage for conflict
43 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 260, 268-71; Winthrop, Journal, 108; John Winthrop to Sir Simonds
D'Ewes, July 21, 1634, Winthrop Papers, 3: 171-72. See also Cave, Pequot War, 63-68; Alfred A. Cave,
"Who Killed John Stone?: A Note on the Origins of the Pequot War," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd
ser., 49, no. 3 (July 1992): 509-521. The estimated death toll from the smallpox epidemic comes from
Bradford (p. 270), and is so high that even if grossly exaggerated would have dealt a serious blow to
Pequot power.
44 On the 1634 treaty, see Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 290-91; Winthrop, Journal, 133-35; John
Winthrop to John Winthrop, Jr., December 12, 1634, Winthrop Papers, 3: 177; see also Cave, Pequot War,
69-72.
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between Massachusetts and the Pequots two years later. Prior to 1634 Puritans and
Pequots had little contact with each other, but by 1635 both sides believed themselves to
be the rightful owners and legitimate rulers of Connecticut. Thus Massachusetts
considered the Pequots to be political subjects under the jurisdiction of English
authority, and treated them as such; Pequots considered themselves to be independent,
and fiercely resisted the exercise of English power. The clash of these rival claims to
sovereignty further destabilized a region already gripped by war.45
In addition to the fracturing of power in the borderlands, by 1636 the
Massachusetts colonists faced two situations that reached the level of full-fledged crisis.
The first crisis was internal, a religious insurgency that challenged the power of the
Puritan oligarchy and threatened to rip apart the fraying social fabric of the colonies. The
second crisis was external, as their tense alliance with the Pequots disintegrated and they
became convinced that the Indians threatened the survival of the colony. Edward
Johnson captured the magnitude of these twin dangers when he wrote,
With eyes full of anguish, they face to the right, upon the damnable Doctrines, as
so many dreadfull Engines set by Satan to intrap their poore soules; Then casting
forth a left hand looke, the labour and wants accompanying a Desert, and terrible
Wilderness affright them... behold a Messenger with sorrowfull tidings from
their fellow brethren, that inhabited the bankes of the River Canectico, who
having audience, informes them of the great insolency, and cruelI murthers
committed by a barbarous and bloudy people called Peaquods.46
45 Cave, Pequot War, 76; Karr, "'Why Should You Be So Furious?'," 881-83, 895-98, 907, 909; Pulsipher,
Subjects Unto the Same King, 21-22.
46 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 147.
122
Paradoxically, the sense of catastrophic weakness felt by the colonists pushed them
toward genocide. Societies that feel no need to demonstrate their power seldom commit
mass murder; rather, perpetrators are usually beleaguered and crisis-ridden societies,
which feel that their enemies are closing in on all sides.47 Such were the circumstances
the Puritans faced in 1636: threatened from within by insurrection and from without by
war. The intense anxiety and fear that resulted from these simultaneous crises unleashed
the lethal potential of their ideologies of violence and dispossession. The end result was
a "genocidal moment," when the Puritans used mass killing as a spectacular method of
overcoming crisis and exerting their contested, eroding power.
The strength of the New England colonies, the Puritans believed, came from their
unshakeable unity. The Saints, said Winthrop in Christian Charity, were "the body of
Christ," each of them a portion of muscle, ligament, and bone. They would stand or fall
together, and so for their mission to be a success they "must be knitt together in this
worke as one man... allwayes haueing before our eyes our Commission and Community
in the worke, our Community as members of the same body, soe shall wee keepe the
vnitie of the spirit in the bond ofpeace.,,48 In 1636, the Antinomian Controversy
threatened the roots of that unity: the faith of the Saints. John Cotton, a charismatic and
47 Mark Levene, The Meaning o/Genocide, Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State, vol. 1 (London: LB.
Taurus, 2005), 76, 91-92; Michael Mann, The Dark Side o/Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),6-7; A. Dirk Moses, "Genocide and Settler Society in
Australian History," in Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in
Australian History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004), 33-34; Jacques
Semel in, PurifY and Destroy: The Political Uses 0/Massacre and Genocide, trans. Cynthia Schoch (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007),15,61-62,225. There are notable exceptions to this
generalization, such as the virtual extermination of the Yuki Indians during the relatively confident and
prosperous period of the California Gold Rush. Further research is required into genocide in the United
States to determine the dynamics of violence in this context.
48 John Winthrop, "Modell of Christian Charity," Winthrop Papers, 2:289, 294.
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popular preacher, delivered a number of sermons that seemed alarmingly heterodox,
implying that some ministers in Massachusetts were preaching a "covenant of works. ,,49
While Cotton himself considered his theology to be acceptably mainstream and
attempted to reconcile his views with those of other ministers, his followers John
Wheelwright and Anne Hutchinson adopted a radically antagonistic stance that attracted
an increasing following. 5o
The General Court attempted to calm the brewing conflict by declaring a day of
fasting and prayer for January 19, 1637.51 Instead, Wheelwright brought the conflict to a
fever pitch with an incendiary sermon. He called the ministerial establishment "enimyes
to the Lord, not one1y Pagonish, but Antichristian," who sought to "take away the Christ,
the sonne of the living God, and put in false Christs, and to deceave the electe.,,s2
Winthrop sardonically summarized Wheelwright's accusations: "That the Magistrates
were Ahabs, Amaziahs, Scribes and Pharisees, enemies to Christ, led by Satan, that old
enemy ofFree Grace, and that it were better that a Milstone were hung about their
49 The phrase "covenant of works" referred to a theological position asserting that human agency is an
important part of achieving salvation. In the language of the Puritans, a Christian could demonstrate his
"justification" (the state of salvation) through "sanctification" (living a righteous life). This contrasted
with the orthodox view of the "covenant of grace," which held that human actions were irrelevant in the
eyes of God, and so the faithful needed to put themselves at God's mercy to decide who was saved and
who was damned. During the Antinomian Controversy, neither the legalist oligarchy nor their Antinomian
challengers advocated a belief in the "covenant of works"; each accused the other of that heresy. On the
theological issues of the Antinomian Controversy, see William Stoever, "A Faire and Easie Way to
Heaven": Covenant Theology and Antinomianism in Early Massachusetts (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan
University Press, 1978).
50 John Cotton, "Sixteene Questions of Serious and Necessary Consequence," in The Antinomian
Controversy, 1636-1638: A Documentary History, 2nd edition, ed. David D. Hall (Durham and London:
Duke University Press, 1990),4-59; "The Elders Reply," in Antinomian Controversy, 61-77; John Cotton,
"Mr. Cottons Rejoinder," in Antinomian Controversy, 79-15 I.
51 Shurtleff, Records ofMassachusetts Bay, 1:187,207.
52 John Wheelwright, "A Fast-Day Sermon," in Antinomian Controversy, 163, 159.
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necks, and they were drowned in the Sea. ,,53 Wheelwright's Fast-Day Sermon drew a
line in the sand that effectively split the community of Saints into warring camps.
The Antinomian crisis was more serious than any internal disagreement that the
Massachusetts Puritans had ever faced before. Shrill accusations of heresy on either side
shattered the religious harmony ofthe colony. "Thus every occasion increased the
contention," Winthrop observed, "and caused great alienation of minds" until "it began
to be as common here to distinguish between men, by being under a covenant of grace or
a covenant of works, as in other countries between Protestants and Papists.,,54 Religious
schism seemed not just possible, or even imminent-the Puritans were witnessing its
horror before their very eyes, "so that surely had this Sect gone on awhile," claimed
Johnson, the Antinomians "would have made a new Bible.,,55 These divisions were not
simply theological. Because the congregation was the heart ofthe commonwealth,
religious disagreements affected the full range of social relationships. The conflicts were
so pervasive, "both in Church and State," said Winthrop, that it even disrupted families,
"setting division between husband and wife!" Beset by enemies from within, many
Puritans began to doubt the that they could weather the storms of their own dissension.56
By threatening the foundations of Puritan social identity, the Antinomian
Controversy created a profound sense of existential anxiety. Colonists once guided by
53 John Winthrop, "A Short Story on the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians, Familists and
Libertines," in Antinomian Controversy, 211 (emphasis in the original).
54 Winthrop, Journal, 209.
55 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 129.
56 Winthrop, "Short Story," in Antinomian Controversy, 201-2,209 (quotation), 213, 283.
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unshakeable conviction began to lose their sense of purpose; the crisis sapped the
strength of their faith and their will to conquer the challenges of the New World.57 Some
of the most dramatic cases of Calvinist angst in the history of American Puritanism
occurred during these tense months. In February of 1637 a man from Weymouth, not yet
admitted into the company of the elect, was gripped by such distress that he leapt out of
his bed in the middle of the night, crying, "Art thou come, Lord Jesus?" He ran into the
frigid wilderness, stopping every so often to pray for guidance, until he froze to death in
the dark. In a similarly gruesome spectacle, that August a Boston woman grew to despair
about the uncertain state of her soul. Torn between the hope of salvation and the looming
tortures of hell, she could not bear to live without knowing her ultimate fate. One day
"she took her little infant and threw it into a well, and then came into the house and said,
now she was sure she should be damned, for she had drowned her child." Even Governor
Henry Vane, the vigorous and capable leader of the colony, was driven to such anguish
over "these differences and dissensions" that he broke down and wept in front of the
General court.58
Whatever the objective intensity of the Antinomian Controversy, the near-
hysterical tone of contemporary writings testifies to its perceived gravity.59 Thomas
57 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 133.
58 Winthrop, Journal, 20 1,209,229-30.
59 Some historians contend that the seriousness of the Antinomian Crisis has been overstated. James
Cooper, for example, argues that the Controversy was not a revolt of the laity against the elite, and that
most New Englanders followed the lead of their ministers. See James F. Cooper, Jr., Tenacious o/their
Liberties: The Congregationalists in Colonial Massachusetts (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999),46-67. Far from minimizing the danger of the Controversy, as Cooper implies, the fact that
champions of unorthodox beliefs had support among the elites would seem to reinforce the argument that
the crisis represented a serious threat to colonial unity. Janice Knight interprets the Controversy as a much
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Shepard feared that the religious quarrels would "flame out unles they be quenched in
time," and the church elders perceived "hot contentions and paroxysmes that have begun
to swell and burn in these poor churches.,,6o Wheelwright's Fast-Day Sermon rhetoric
gave them reason to fear. Reacting to the objection that "This will cause a combustion in
the Church and common wealth," he thundered in reply: "did not Christ come to send
fire upon the earth... and what is it, that it were alredy kindled, he desireth it were
kindled, and it is the desire of the Spirit and of the saynts that this fire were kindled...
therefore never feare combustions and burnings.'.61 Winthrop marveled, "It was a
wonder ofmercy that they had not set our Common-wealth and Churches afire, and
consumed us all therein.',62 Wheelwright, Hutchinson, and several of their prominent
followers were banished in November 1637, effectively shutting down the Antinomian
revolt.63 In the shadow of a major Indian war, however, it seemed entirely possible to the
embattled Saints that the flames of their contention would consume them from within.
Coinciding almost precisely with the turbulence of the Antinomian crisis,
colonists along the frontier began to believe that they faced a second crisis in the form of
a Pequot assault. In June of 1636 Jonathan Brewster, Plymouth's agent at the Windsor
trading post, wrote alarmed reports warning of imminent attack. "Out of desperate
more significant danger that verged on open rebellion. Janice Knight, Orthodoxies in Massachusetts:
Rereading American Puritanism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 14-31.
60 "Letters Between Thomas Shepard and John Cotton," in Antinomian Controversy, 29; "Elders Reply,"
in Antinomian Controversy, 61.
61 Wheelwright, "Fast-Day Sermon," in Antinomian Controversy, 165-66.
62 Winthrop, "Short Story," in Antinomian Controversy, 211 (emphasis in the original).
63 Shurtleff, Records ofMassachusetts Bay, 1:207-8.
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madnesse," he wrote, the Pequots "doe threaten shortly to sett both vpon Indians, and
English, [j]oyntely." That same day, in a second letter that frantically repeated the same
information, he reiterated that the Pequots continued "still in theyr blody mynds towards
the English," and warned emphatically that "shortly they intend an e[n]vasion both of
English and natives in this Riuer." To drive home his point, he relayed the story that one
Pequot raiding party had attempted to attack a Plymouth merchant ship, and another had
killed two English traders near Long Island. He recommended that no Englishman
should leave his house without girding himself for war.64
Brewster's assessment of Pequot intentions was almost certainly incorrect. His
main-perhaps only-informant was the Mohegan sachem Uncas, who had repeatedly
challenged the power of the Pequots and had a vested interest in undermining their
position. Given the Pequots' weakness, and their attempts since 1634 to forge peaceful
connections with the English colonies, they would have had no reason to provoke
hostilities. Moreover, calmer English observers, such as the trader William Pynchon,
believed that Uncas's reports were entirely fictitious. Nevertheless, news traveled
quickly in the tense climate, and colonists like Brewster began to imagine Pequots
hiding in the shadows and thirsting for English blood.65
The news of John Oldham's murder in July of 1636 struck like a spark in this
tinderbox of tension and fear. A party ofIndians from Block Island had boarded
Oldham's ship as he sailed to Block Island on a trading mission, killing Oldham and his
64 Jonathan Brewster to John Winthrop, Jr., June 18, 1636, Winthrop Papers, 3:270-71.
65 William Pynchon to John Winthrop, Jr., April 22, 1636, Winthrop Papers, 3:254; William Pynchon to
John Winthrop, Jr., June 2,1636, Winthrop Papers, 3:267. See also Cave, Pequot War, 98-101.
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crew, ransacking the ship, and capturing two young boys.66 In itself, this incident had
nothing to do with the Pequots. The Block Island Indians were allies of the Eastern
Niantics and tributaries to the Narragansetts. Canonicus and Miantonomo, the two most
powerful Narragansett sachems, hurriedly sent word to Boston that they condemned the
actions of their subordinates and sent a war party of two hundred men to punish the
Islanders. Wanting to underscore its own authority, Massachusetts nonetheless sent a
punitive expedition of its own. The ruling council dispatched ninety men under the
command of John Endecott to Block Island, with orders to punish the Islanders. In
addition, the council ordered Endecott to stop by Pequot territory on their way back to
demand the murderers of John Stone, one thousand fathoms of wampum, and some of
their children as hostages. The murder of John Oldham thus served as a pretext for the
Puritans to address their heightened fears of Pequot aggression. By sending Endecott and
his men to demand that Sassacus fulfill the terms of the 1634 treaty, Massachusetts could
assert its dominance and put the colonists' fears to rest.67
The raid on Block Island accomplished little. The Indians refused to engage the
English, so the militia borrowed the punitive tactics that Virginians had honed during the
Anglo-Powhatan Wars, setting wigwams on fire and burning the Islanders' cornfields.
Though tensions remained high between Massachusetts and the Narragansetts,
66 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 292; Underhill, Newesfrom America, 2-3; Winthrop, Journal, 179-
80.
67 John Mason, BriefHistory ofthe Pequot War, Especially ofthe Memorable Taking oftheir Fort at
Mistick in Connecticut in 1637 (Boston, 1736), ix; Winthrop, Journal, 180-83; Underhill, Newes from
America, 2-3. Puritan historians later attempted to link these two unrelated missions by claiming that
Oldham's murderers fled Block Island and sought sanctuary with the Pequots, thus making the Pequots
guilty by association; see Hubbard, Present State, 2:12. None of the contemporary accounts support this
assertion.
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Canonicus and Miantonomo calmed matters by immediately setting free the two captive
boys and returning John Oldham's belongings. More importantly, they delivered
Oldham's murderers to face the Court's judgment, reaffirming their allegiance by
submitting to the rule of English law.68 The Pequots, in contrast, remained intransigent.
When Endecott presented his demands, Pequot messengers sought out Sassacus, their
sachem, but they could not seem to find him. A succession of runners had trouble
locating any sachems, in fact, forcing the English militia to wait for more than four
hours. As the soldiers stood arrayed in battle ranks, baking in full armor under the hot
summer sun, a crowd of Pequots gathered to stare and snicker. Bristling with fury and
fearing an ambush, Endecott finally ordered his men to attack, but the Pequots faded into
the forest after shooting a volley of arrows. As at Block Island, the English fired the
houses, despoiled the cornfields, and sailed away. They managed to kill only a handful
of Pequots.69
Despite this disappointing outcome, Massachusetts was satisfied that it had
taught the Pequots a lesson by destroying homes and crops, and thereafter made no
further military preparations. At that point the Pequot threat was still more rumored than
real, and the Antinomian Controversy was just beginning to simmer. Sassacus, however,
interpreted Endecott's raid as an act of war and immediately sought vengeance. From
68 Winthrop, Journal, 183-84.
69 Gardiner, Relation o/the Pequot Warres, 10-11; Underhill, Newesfrom America, 4-13; Winthrop,
Journal, 184-86. The sources are inconsistent on the number of Pequot casualties. Underhill reported
fourteen dead (p. 7) and Winthrop repeated information gleaned from Narragansett allies that thirteen dead
and forty wounded. Gardiner, however, was contemptuous of the English performance, writing that only
one Pequot had been killed, and at the hands of their Indian interpreter Cutshamekin (p. 10-11). Since
Underhill was a participant and Gardiner a disgruntled garrison commander who continually complained
of Massachusetts' aggressive policies, Underhill is more likely to be correct.
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autumn of 1636 to the spring of 1637, Pequot warriors raided English territory up and
down the Connecticut and Thames Rivers. A large party laid siege to the isolated
garrison at Saybrook, killing several soldiers when they left the safety of the fort to
gather provisions. On several occasions the Pequots took captives and then tortured them
to death. When Pequot warriors captured John Tilley in April of 1637, they tied him to a
stake, flayed his skin, scorched the wounds with hot embers, and then cut off his fingers
and toes one by one. The English carried out atrocities of their own. One month after
Tilley's gruesome death, twenty English troops at Saybrook tied one leg of a Pequot
captive to a stake, the other leg to a long rope, and heaved. Not until the English had
"pulled him in pieces" did John Underhill kill him with a pistol shot. Though both sides
committed atrocities, such grisly episodes outraged the English and reinforced the
stereotype of the cruel and bloodthirsty Indian.7o
In the nine months following Endecott's expedition, Pequots killed about twenty
colonial soldiers in a series of small-scale engagements, but a flood of alarming reports
indicated that this was merely the tip of the sword in what would become a much wider
war. According to William Bradford, Pequot envoys attempted to make peace with their
old enemies, the Narragansetts, and form an anti-English league. They argued "that the
70 Gardiner, Relation o(the Pequot Warres, 12-18; Underhill, Newesfrom America, 20; Vincent, True
Relation ofthe Late Battell, 4-7 (quotation p. 7); Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr., November 6, 1636,
Winthrop Papers, 3:319-21; Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr., March 23, 1637, Winthrop Papers,
3:381-82; Winthrop, Journal, 189-90,207. Algonquian warriors often carried captured enemies back to
their villages, where their slow executions by torture acted as a form of communal catharsis that released
the intense emotions evoked by the violence of war. See Williams, "A Key into the Language of
America," in Complete Writings, 1:264; Wood, New England's Prospect, 102-105. As Adam Hirsch notes,
"Indians wove torture into their code of honor: the victims earned posthumous esteem by bearing
themselves stoically under the ordeal" (emphasis in the original). See Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of
Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," Journal ofAmerican History 74, no. 4 (March
1988): 1192 n. 14.
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English were strangers and began to overspread their country, and would deprive them
thereof in time, if they were suffered to grow and increase." The envoys proposed a
campaign that would minimize English firepower and maximize the Indians' skills in
forest warfare. Reasoning that "they should not need to fear the strength of the English,
for they would not come to open battle with them," the Pequots favored using guerrilla
tactics to "fire their houses, kill their cattle, and lie in ambush for them as they went
abroad upon their occasions." The English could not withstand such an assault, and so
"they would either be starved with hunger or be forced to forsake the country." The
Pequots had come to understand the logic of elimination inherent in English settlement,
and appealed to the Narragansetts to join them in opposing the invaders while they still
had the chance.71
Fearing the possibility of an Indian alliance, Edward Winslow urged
Massachusetts to mobilize for war, "otherwise the natiues we feare will grow into a
stronger confederacy to the further prejudice of the whole English."n War seemed "to be
an vniversall deluge creeping and encroaching on all the English in the land," wrote the
reverend John Higginson from Saybrook Fort; ''The multitudes of our enimies daily
encrease.,,73 The Saybrook garrison commander Lion Gardiner gave voice to a more
pervasive English fear: that a failure to deal decisively with the Pequots would
undermine English authority and thus embolden other Native American tribes to attack,
71 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 294; see also Winthrop, Journal, 187.
72 Edward Winslow to John Winthrop, April 17, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:391-92.
73 John Higginson to John Winthrop, May 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:405.
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"for all the Indian haue ther eyes fixed vppon vs," and while "this yeare the[y] will all
joyne with vs agaynst the Pequtt," he feared that "the next year the will be agaynst VS.,,74
It was not an idle fear: had the Pequots successfully formed an Algonquian coalition, as
Gardiner predicted, they might have had the power to sweep the fledgling colonies into
the sea.
On April 23, 1637, the Pequots crossed an invisible threshold when they attacked
the town of Wethersfield in Connecticut. They launched the raid in conjunction with the
Wongunk tribe, whom the Wethersfield settlers had expelled from the area, and probably
did not signal any significant escalation of hostilities. Rather, the Pequots were
compelled to attack in order to keep the loyalty of the Wongunks, one of their few
remaining allies.75 During their raid on the small settlement, the Indian raiders killed
nine settlers, including a woman and a child, slaughtered twenty cattle, and seized two
young women as captives. Up to this point the Pequot War had been confined to the
edge of the frontier, and no colonists had been killed except for members of the
Saybrook garrison and those supplying them. Suddenly the war came to English homes
and English farms; the dead were not soldiers or adventurers but English families.
According to the Puritans' informants, the Pequots had proposed exactly this sort of
attack to the Narragansetts. It now appeared that they would carry out their war, with or
without allies, until they had starved the Saints into extinction or driven them from the
shores of America. The Pequots, wrote the Connecticut captain John Mason, "resolved
74 Lion Gardiner to John Winthrop, Jr., March 23,1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:382. For a similar warning in
his own narrative, see Gardiner, Relation o/the Pequot Warres, 23.
75 Winthrop, Journal, 252.
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to Destroy all the ENGLISH and to Root their very Name out a/this Country.,,76 Since the
Pequots had violated the law of nations by raising their hatchets in rebellion,
Massachusetts declared war "vpon iust ground," and Connecticut soon followed, wrote
Mason, with the decision to "engage in an offensive and defensive War.,,77 In the eyes of
the Puritans, the Pequots had fired the first salvo of a total war, and they determined that
they would finish it.
It is a paradox of the genocidal mentality that perpetrators usually see themselves
as the true victims. They believe that their victims want to kill them, to destroy them, to
annihilate them. With the perverse logic of genocide they ask: how can we fight such an
enemy? How to defeat them, except to annihilate them first?78 By demonstrating their
supposed inhumanity through acts of cruelty, conspiring to forge an intertribal alliance
capable of challenging the colonies, and expressing genocidal desires of their own, the
Pequots became just such an enemy. Philip Vincent compared the Puritans' precarious
situation to the one faced by Virginians fifteen years earlier, writing that "The long
forbearance, and too much lenientie of the English toward the Virginian Salvages, had
like to have beene the destruction of the whole Plantation." Security required more than
military victory: "It is not good to give breathing to a beaten enemy, lest he returne
76 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory, 13-14 (emphasis in the original). John Winthrop made a similar warning,
writing that the Pequots "who though he may take occasion, of the beginning of his rage, from some one
parte of the English, yet ifhe peruaile, will surly pursue his aduantage, to the rooting out of the whole
nation." John Winthrop to William Bradford, May 20, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:417.
77 Shurtleff, Records ofMassachusetts Bay, 1:192; J. Hammond Trumbull, ed., The Public Records ofthe
Colony o.fConnecticut, 15 vols. (Hartford: Brown and Parsons, 1850-1885), 1:9; Mason, Mason, Brief
History, x (emphasis in the original); see also Hubbard, Present State, 2:32.
78 Levene, Meaning ofGenocide, 6,127,204-5; Mann, Dark Side ofDemocracy, 6, 24, 95, 503; Semelin,
Pur(fY and Destroy, 47-48.
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armed if not with greater puissance, yet with greater despight and revenge." And so the
English, "were now sent forth to chase the Barbarians and utterly roote them out. ,,79
Later Puritan historians scornfully wrote of the Pequots as if they were weeds that
needed to be extirpated from New England's plantation. The English "knew right-well,"
wrote Johnson, "till this cursed crew were utterly rooted out, they should never be at
peace."so And the Puritans were not alone, Hubbard confidently asserted, for while "they
unanimously agreed to joyn their Forces together to root them out of the Earth," they had
faith that they would have "Gods Assistance" as they did it,SI Of all the later chroniclers,
Cotton Mather expressed the Puritans' genocidal shift with the most elegant brutality;
"The Infant Colonies of New-England," he wrote, "finding themselves necessitated unto
the Crushing of Serpents, while they were but yet in the Cradle, Unanimously resolved,
that with the Assistance of Heaven they would root this Nest of Serpents out of the
world."s2
Holocaust
Just before daWfi on May 26, 1637, John Mason's band of seventy-seven
Englishmen, along with three hundred Narragansett and Mohegan allies, crept up to the
palisades surrounding the Pequot village along the Mystic River. In the soft liminal light
they split into three groups: two English assault teams, one commanded by Underhill
79 Vincent, True Relation a/the Late Battell, 8,13.
80 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 168.
81 Hubbard, Present State, 2:14.
82 Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, 7:42.
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and the other by Mason himself, with the Indians deployed in a ring to prevent any
Pequots from escaping. Pushing their way through the bramble-choked entrances, the
English fought through the tightly packed wigwams and fired upon any Pequots they
encountered. The defenders responded with ferocious resistance, killing two and
wounding twenty more, until Mason grabbed a firebrand from within a wigwam and
shouted, "WE MUST BURN THEM!" While Mason torched the western end of the village,
Underhill lit a second fire to the south and the blaze quickly became an inferno. Many of
the Pequots fought desperately, firing arrows at the English even as their bowstrings
snapped from the heat. Others fled the devouring flames only to be slaughtered by
English guns and English steel and the merciless arrows of their tribal enemies. Four
hundred Pequots died in the massacre. Fewer than ten escaped.83
The two commanders explained their actions at Mystic by linking the massacre
to biblical wars. Mason wrote, "Thus we may see, How the Face C?fGOD is set against
them that do Evil, to cut offthe Remembrance ofthem from the Earth ... the LORD was
pleased to smite our Enemies in the hinder Parts, and to give us their Landfor an
83 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory; Underhill, Newesfrom America; Vincent, True Relation ofthe Late
Battell, 8-10. As is often the case in war, the number of enemy casualties is not entirely clear. Sherburne
Cook estimates the dead at six hundred, though I believe this figure may be too high; see Sherburne F.
Cook, "Interracial Warfare and Population Decline among the New England Indians," Ethnohistory 20,
no. I (Winter 1973): 8. Mason reported six or seven hundred, Underhill reported four hundred, and
Vincent between three and four hundred. Winthrop recorded in his journal that Mason's party slew "one
hundred and fifty fighting men, and about one hundred and fifty old men, women, and children," and Lion
Gardiner gives similar numbers; see Winthrop, Journal, 220-21; Gardiner, Relation ofthe Pequot Warres,
20. The numbers given by Mason and Underhill should carry more weight, since they were the principal
actors in the massacre. Mason's figure of seven hundred is significantly higher than the casualties reported
by any other writer, however, and he wrote his account of the battle several decades afterwards, so John
Underhill's median figure of four hundred is probably the most accurate.
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Inheritance.,,84 Mason's apologia was a remarkable distillation of the genocidal
mentality: in just two sentences he invoked the mythical power of biblical antiquity,
reduced the Pequots to those "that do evil," and connected mass death to the
appropriation of land through acquisition of the fallen enemy's territory. Underhill
seemed more defensive, but nonetheless took refuge beneath the wings of sacred
violence:
I would referre you to Davids warre, when a people is growne to such a height of
bloud, and sinne against God and man, and all confederates in the action, there
hee hath no respect to persons, but harrowes them, and sawes them, and puts
them to the sword, and the most terriblest death that may bee: sometimes the
Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their parents; some-
time the case alters: but we will not dispute it now. We had sufficient light from
the word of God for our proceedings.85
For Underhill, David's massacre of the Ammonites set a precedent for the slaughter at
Mystic, and he had followed it to victory.
The Saints' Narragansett and Mohegan allies saw the massacre in a different
light. Witnessing the lethal resolve of the English soldiers, the Narragansetts, reported
Underhill, cried "mach it, mach it; that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is too
84 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory, 20 (emphasis in the original). Mason's phrasing ("to give us their land for
an inheritance") parallels a number of texts from Deuteronomy: 4:21, 4 :38, 15 :4, 19:10, 21 :23, 24:4,
25: 19, and 26: 1. Of these, only one refers to divinely sanctioned dispossession (4:38, "To thrust out
nacions greater and mightier the[n] thou, before thee, to bring thee in, and to giue thee their land for
inheritance") and only one contains a direct commandment for violence (25:19, "when the Lord thy God
hathe giuen thee rest from all thine enemies round about in the land, which the Lord thy God giueth thee
for an inheritance to possesse it, then thou shalt put out the remembrance of Amalek from vnder heauen").
It is not clear which of these passages Mason is quoting, but the context suggests one of these two.
85 Underhill, Newes.from America, 35-36 (emphasis in the original).
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furious, and slaies too many men. ,,86 The conflagration at Mystic was unlike the way of
war that Algonquian Indians were used to; the unceremonious butchery of women and
children violated their code of warrior ethics. Moreover, inter-tribal warfare generally
focused on limited objectives like individual revenge, obtaining captives, or
demonstrating bravery rather than the total destruction of the enemy force. The Indians'
way of fighting, Underhill noted contemptuously, was a dance of feint and counterfeints,
"more for pastime, then to conquer and subdue," and was ultimately so ineffective
compared to the devastating impact of English musket volleys that "they might fight
seven years and not kill seven men.,,87 The sheer number of casualties resulting from the
direct assault would have been unprecedented in the Indians' experience. Nevertheless,
hundreds of warriors from both tribes had participated in the assault on Mystic, blocking
the exits from the village and preventing any Pequots from escaping. Furthermore, both
Narragansett sachems, Miantonomo and Canonicus, as well as the Mohegan sachem
Uncas, remained English allies and participated in the summer campaign that followed
the massacre. Despite their evident horror, the Native Americans allied with the Puritans
seem to have participated in the genocide of their Pequot rivals.
The Mystic massacre shattered Pequot resistance. Sassacus, realizing that his
people could not survive such a war, dispersed the tribe to seek safe haven where they
86 Underhill, Newesfrom America, 36, 38 (emphasis in the original). According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, in seventeenth century usage "naught" was synonymous with "evil" or "wicked thing."
87 Underhill, Newes.from America, 36. Other observers made similar observations that Indian wars were
far less deadly than wars fought by Europeans; see Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in
Complete Writings, 1:264; Wood, New England's Prospect, 102-3. On Algonquian warfare, see Hirsch,
"Collision of Military Cultures," 1190-94; Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way ofWar: Technology and
Tactics Among the New England Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 1991),7-24,75-78.
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could. 88 Some fled to Long Island, others north to find shelter with the powerful
Mohawks. Rather than reassure the colonists, however, this diaspora brought a new
wave of concerns; Roger Williams took the news of the Pequots' movement seriously.
Thanks in part to William Wood's lurid accounts, the Mohawks were infamous for their
cannibalism and other savage behaviors. Williams feared that the Pequots would form an
alliance with the Mohawks, become cannibals themselves, and then bring an even more
savage assault on the English colonies. Though it is difficult to tell how many colonists
shared this view, Williams was hardly a credulous source. He had used his familiarity
with the Narragansetts to act as Massachusetts' diplomat, spy, and informant during the
war, and he was a critical source of intelligence for John Winthrop and the Boston
magistrates. For Williams, at least, the Pequots' devastating defeat perversely intensified
fears rather than allaying them.89
Puritan stereotypes of the terrifying "other" reacted with rising fears to create a
discourse in which the Pequots became more animal than human. Dehumanizing the
enemy in this fashion is a central process in the transition from "ordinary" hostility to
genocide.9o According to psychologist Philip Zimbardo, dehumanization "fosters the
perception that other people are less than human" until they lose their human status
88 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory, 14; Underhill, Newesfrom America, 40.
89 Williams, "A Key into the Language of America," in Complete Writings, 1:102; Roger Williams to John
Winthrop, June 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:436-37; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, July 3,1637,
Winthrop Papers, 3:438; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, July 15, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:451;
Wood, New England's Prospect, 75-78.
90 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology o.fGenocide: Analyses and Case Studies
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990),27-28; Donald G. Dutton, The Psychology o.f
Genocide, Massacres, and Extreme Violence: Why "Normal" People Come to Commit Atrocities
(Westport, Conn. and London: Praeger Security International, 2007), 108-12; Philip Zimbardo, The
Luc!!er Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil (New York: Random House, 2007), xii.
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altogether. 91 Instead of people, the animalized enemies become vermin and beasts,
disgusting parasites or savage predators. Once the target group has been stripped of its
humanity, killing loses its moral opprobrium. In a process that psychologists term
"moral disengagement," the ethical principles that prohibit violence and protect people
become subverted by the supposedly higher value of protecting the community through
the destruction of its enemies. Killing then becomes a moral imperative.92
The Pequots did not begin as animals in the Puritan imagination. As late as 1634,
Wood characterized them as "a stately, warlike people, of whom I never heard any
misdemeanor, but that they were just and equal in their dealings, not treacherous either
to their countrymen or English, requiters of courtesies, affable towards the English." But
by 1637, when large numbers of Pequots effectively besieged the garrison at Saybrook,
Underhill described them as "wicked imps," who "runne up and downe as roaring
Lyons, compassing all corners of the Countrey for a prey, seeking whom they might
devoure.,,93 The language of animalization moved the Pequots outside what sociologist
Helen Fein calls the "universe of obligation," so that the injunctions against murder
common to every ethical system no longer applied. With this rhetorical shift, the
91 Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect, 307.
92 Dutton, P5ychology o/Genocide, 108-9; Ervin Staub, The Roots o/Evil: The Origins o.fGenocide and
Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 126-27; Zimbardo, Lucifer Effect,
310-11. Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn ask the question, "How is it possible for people to kill other
people on such a massive scale? The answer seems to be that it is not possible, at least not as long as the
potential victims are perceived as people. We have no evidence that a genocide was ever performed on a
group of equals. The victims must not only not be equals, but also clearly defined as something less than
fully human." Chalk and Jonassohn, History and Sociology o/Genocide, 27-28.
93 Wood, New England's Prospect, 80; Underhill, Newes from America, 20.
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Puritans crossed a critical threshold into ideological territory that valued killing and
censured mercy.94
The tendency to liken Pequots to wild animals soon became commonplace.
Previously "stately," "just," and "affable," they became "wicked imps," "roaring
Lyons," "sullen Dogs," "a Kennell of devouring Wolves," "a Nest of Serpents," and
"Bears bereaved of their Whelps.,,95 Hubbard, perhaps thinking that comparing Pequots
to beasts might be overly generous, called them a "Company of treacherous Villains, the
Dregs and Lees of the Earth, and the Dross of Mankind.,,96 Thus when Puritan soldiers
relentlessly stalked the scattered Pequots through the forests and swamps of New
England, it was not difficult for them to think of themselves as hunters putting down
rabid wolves rather than slaughtering people. The Pequots, wrote Mason bluntly, "now
became a Prey.',97 To expand their grasp, the colonies enlisted the aid of surrounding
Indian tribes by offering bounties on Pequots, giving gifts in return for scalps, heads, and
hands. In this sense, the Puritans treated the fleeing Pequots, the wolves of their
imaginations, in a similar manner to the way they treated the actual wolves that preyed
on their cattle.98
94 Helen Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1993),26-27.
95 Wood, New England's Prospect, 80; Underhill, Newesfrom America, 19; Hubbard, Present State, 2:29;
Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 132; Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, 7:43.
96 Hubbard, Present State, 2:10.
97 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory, 17.
98 Gardiner, Relation ofthe Pequot Warres, 21-22; Winthrop, Journal, 186. On wolf bounties, see
Shurtleff, Records ofMassachusetts Bay, 1:81, 156,218; Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., Records ofthe
Colony ofNew Plymouth, in New England (Boston, 1855), 1:22-23, 31; see also Cronon, Changes in the
Land, 132-33. Andrew Lipman argues that the exchange of a body part in this fashion was not a "bounty"
but a symbolic act of special significance for both Indians and English; see Andrew Lipman, "'A Meanes
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The Pequot threat helped to seal the divisions within Massachusetts Bay and
bring its neighboring colonies together. Fear of the Pequots compelled the Puritans to
rally behind a common purpose, guided by the conviction that the Pequots were in fact
instruments of God, who wished to unite his chosen people against a common foe and
heal the rifts between them. John Higginson wrote that the Lord had sent
the Indians vpon his servants, to make them cleaue more close togither, and prize
each other, to prevent contentions of Brethren which may proue as hard to break
as Castle barres, and stop their now beginning breaches before they be as the
letting out of many waters that cannot be gathered in againe.99
The Connecticut colonists who had left Boston joined with their Massachusetts brethren
to storm Mystic and cooperated in the campaign that followed. Even Plymouth, which
had initially refused to participate in a war that its leaders felt had been started by
Massachusetts' aggression, raised a force of fifty men to aid in the war. IOO The
multipolar contest for control of territory and trade, which had fractured the exercise of
English power along the New England frontier, collapsed into a single front. Despite all
to Knitt Them Togeather': The Exchange of Body Parts in the Pequot War," William and Mary Quarterly,
3rd ser., 65, no. 1 (January 2008): 3-28. While the symbolic meanings of the body and its portions were no
doubt a factor, the sheer volume of parts involved somewhat undermines this argument. The
indiscriminate giving of "gifts" resulted in a flood of Pequot body parts-so many that Mason noted them
arriving daily to Windsor and Hartford and Winthrop seemed to lose count, noting simply that "The
Indians about sent in still many Pequods' heads and hands from Long Island and other places." See
Mason, Mason, Brie/History, 17; Winthrop, Journal, 231.
99 John Higginson to John Winthrop, May 1637, Winthrop Papers, 404.
100 Shurtleff, Plymouth Records, 1:60-61. On Plymouth's reticence and eventual decision to enter the war,
see Winthrop, Journal, 192,212-14,450; Edward Winslow to John Winthrop, June 5,1637, Winthrop
Papers, 3:428. Pequot resistance collapsed so quickly that Plymouth's forces never made it into the field.
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the divisions within the English colonies, they united to hunt the Pequots until they could
never again become a threat. lOl
Throughout the summer the English militia hunted small bands of Pequots,
summarily executed men of fighting age, and took women and children captive. lo2 The
last major engagement occurred on July 13, 1637, when a Massachusetts regiment
commanded by Israel Stoughton surrounded two hundred fifty Pequots in a swamp near
Fairfield. The Puritan commanders-who were, Mason wrote without evident irony,
"loth to destroy Women and Children"-offered the besieged Pequots the chance to
surrender. I03 One hundred eighty old men, women, and children filed out ofthe swamp
and yielded, giving themselves over to Puritan mercy. The remaining warriors readied
themselves for a last stand. The next morning between twenty and thirty Pequots broke
through the militia's lines and escaped, while the rest faced down the English guns. The
Saints captured thirty alive and killed the rest, allowing their bodies to sink into the
swamp. With this loss, reflected Johnson, the Pequots had "no such considerable number
as ever to raise warre any more.,,104
101 Salisbury, Manitou and Providence, 220-21.
102 Hubbard, Present State, 2:30; Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 170; Winthrop, Journal, 225-27;
Daniel Patrick to the Governor and Council of War in Massachusetts, June 19, 1637, Winthrop Papers,
3:430-31; Israel Stoughton to John Winthrop, June 28, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:435-36.
103 Mason, Mason, Brie/History, 16.
104 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 169. Because of the swampy conditions, it is unknown how
many Pequots died during this engagement. On the battle at Fairfield (then known as Quinnipiac), see also
Hubbard, Present State, 2:33-36; Winthrop, Journal, 226-27; Richard Davenport to Hugh Peter, Winthrop
Papers, 452-54.
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Captain Stoughton found the captured men to be collectively guilty of the crime
of starting the war and sentenced them to death. The English tied the warriors' hands
together, loaded them onto a boat, and then dumped them into the bay to drown. lOS They
spared the women and children, selling seventeen into slavery in the Bermudas and
sending some to become colonists' servants. Several leading figures-including
Stoughton, John Endecott, and Roger Williams-requested custody of Pequot children
to serve in their households, though Mason reported that ''they could not endure that
Yoke," and most escaped before long. 106 The Puritans allotted the remaining Pequots to
their Indian allies, the Mohegans and Narragansetts. These tribes absorbed the captives,
allowing them to survive war so long as they abandoned their identity as Pequots.107
The fate of these captive Pequots may help to explain why the Narragansetts and
Mohegans collaborated in genocide. In traditional Algonquian warfare warriors
generally spared women and children, who could be incorporated into the tribe.108 Both
of the tribes allied with the English had been devastated by the 1633 smallpox epidemic;
the Narragansetts suffered seven hundred deaths and the Mohegan tribe was reduced to
only a few dozen grim survivors. Canonicus and Miantonomo made it clear that they
105 Johnson, Wonder-Working Providence, 170; Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana, 7:44.
106 Mason, Mason, BriefHistory, 17. For a detailed examination of these servants and their experience of
captivity among the English, see Michael L. Fickes, "'They Could Not Endure That Yoke': The Captivity
of Pequot Women and Children after the War of 1637," New England Quarterly 73, no. I (March 2000):
58-81.
107 Winthrop, Journal, 226-27; Hugh Peter to John Winthrop, July 15, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:450;
Israel Stoughton to John Winthrop, June 28, ]637, Winthrop Papers, 3:435; Roger Williams to John
Winthrop, June] 637, Winthrop Papers, 3:436-37.
108 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History ofEarly America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 62-63; Howard S. Russell, Indian New England Before the Mayflower
(Hanover and London: University Press of New England, ] 980), 193.
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wished to minimize the number of Pequot casualties, possibly so that they could rebuild
their populations. 109 Reports by Massachusetts field commanders support this
hypothesis, and there is also some evidence that the Narragansetts, Mohegans, and
smaller tribes merely pretended to execute English orders by hunting down Pequots
while actually sparing their enemies in order to adopt them. Though these conclusions
must remain speculative, it is possible that English-allied Indians were only "complicit"
in the genocide of the Pequots in an attempt to spare Pequot lives and assimilate the
survivors. 110
In July of 1637, Sassacus, twenty of his best warriors, and most of the remaining
Pequot sachems sought refuge with the Mohawks. After an initial offer of sanctuary, the
Mohawks killed the Pequots in early August and sent their heads to Boston. Whether
Sassacus was killed at the Narragansetts' behest or in an attempt by the Mohawks to
curry favor with Massachusetts, his death marked the collapse of Pequot resistance. I I I
More than a year later, on September 21,1638, the English signed a treaty with the
Narragansett and Mohegan leaders that determined the shape of post-war New England.
The Treaty of Hartford claimed all Pequot land for the English, nullifying any claims
109 Winthrop, Journal, 109; Michael Leroy Oberg, Uncas: First ofthe Mohegans (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2003), 45.
110 Roger Williams to Sir Henry Vane and John Winthrop, May 15, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:412-14;
Roger Williams to John Winthrop, June 21,1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:434; Israel Stoughton to John
Winthrop, July 6,1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:441-43; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, August 12,1637,
Winthrop Papers, 3:480; Israel Stoughton to the Governor and Council of Massachusetts, August 14,
1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:481-83; Roger Williams to John Winthrop, September 9,1637, Winthrop
Papers, 3:494-95; Roger Wiliams to John Winthrop, October 26, 1637, Winthrop Papers, 3:500-502.
111 Bradford, OfPlymouth Plantation, 297; Gardiner, Relation ofthe Pequot Warres, 21; Vincent, True
Relation ofthe Late Battell, 14; Winthrop, Journal, 229. Different sources attribute both of these motives
to the Mohawks for their betrayal.
145
from other Indian tribes. The treaty also declared that all inter-tribal disputes should be
submitted to English mediation, cementing the extension of English sovereignty. As for
the Pequots, by war's end their dead numbered over seven hundred, about one-quarter of
the entire tribe. Most of the rest were captives, slaves, or newly minted Narragansetts
and Mohegans. 112
The treaty legally dissolved the tribe as a political entity and forbade the future
use of their name by Pequot survivors or any other group of Native Americans. This was
the clearest possible expression of the intent to destroy the Pequot group, as such, but the
English went beyond even that. "As also for those murderers," the treaty read, the allied
Indians "shall soon as they can possibly take off their heads, if they may be in their
custody ... or any where if they can by any means come by them." Just as Stoughton had
declared that all adult men were guilty of the crimes that started the war, the Treaty of
Hartford ruled all remaining Pequots collectively guilty and subject to immediate
execution upon capture. While ending the war, the treaty also acted as a death warrant
that was not rescinded until 1640.113
The genocidal wrath of the Saints followed a terrible logic, carrying the
eliminatory process inherent in settler colonialism to its appalling climax. Chaotic forces
112 Cook, "Interracial Warfare," 8-9.
113 "Treaty of Hartford," September 21, 1638, Rhode Island Historical Collections, 3:177-78; quoted in
Alden T. Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1629-1675, 3rd edition (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995),340-41. The death sentence for all "guilty" Pequots remained in
force until October 1640, when the magistrates of Connecticut and New Haven sent a letter to the
Massachusetts General Court in which they "declared their dislike of such as would have the Indians
rooted out," and furthermore expressed "their desire of our mutual accord in seeking to gain them by
justice and kindness, and withal to watch over them to prevent any danger by them." Winthrop, Journal,
341. Massachusetts agreed to abide by these terms; Shurtleff, Records ofMassachusetts Bay, 1:305.
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on the frontier pushed both sides towards conflict, and the seeds of violence in the
Puritan worldview escalated that conflict to increasingly violent extremes that led to the
brutal massacre at Mystic. Unlike the events in Virginia, when frontier forces caused the
conflict to wind down again, the Pequot War continued to escalate as the Puritans
became engulfed by crisis. Threatened from within by theological rebellion and from
without by the specter of a renewed Pequot invasion, they began to believe that their
social identity and physical survival were at stake. The noble goal of protecting the
community mutated into the ruthless determination to destroy the enemy by any means
necessary. The psychological processes of dehumanization and moral disengagement
facilitated this transformation of the colonists' mentality, turning the Pequots into beasts
and monsters, creatures that could-and in fact should-be killed with impunity. The
Puritans first erased the humanity of the Pequots, and then destroyed their bodies.
The "Destroyers," the conquering Pequots of myth that appeared in later
chronicles, never really existed. They were a historical fiction invented by Puritan
historians to erase the memory of the Pequots as surely as they had erased the tribe itself
with guns and flames and the force of law. The real destroyers were the Saints
themselves.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The Narragansetts profited from the destruction of the Pequots, but their victory
was ultimately pyrrhic. With the Pequot threat ended, English settlements continued to
expand and Puritan leaders exercised their legal authority over surrounding tribes with
increasing confidence. Looking on with increasing alarm, the Narragansett sachem
Miantonomo soon realized that the Pequots had been right: it was only a matter of time
before all Native Americans became dispossessed. By 1642 he had begun a campaign of
resistance by forging a pan-Indian alliance. He courted one sachem after another with
appeals to cultural solidarity, calling them brothers, "for so are we all Indians as the
English are, and say brother to one another; so must we be one as they are, otherwise we
shall be all gone shortly." He gave lavish gifts and grand speeches, trying to convince his
listeners that they could never coexist with the invading English. He declared that the
colonists' survival meant their own destruction, reminding his brethren that
our fathers had plenty of deer and skins, our plains were full of deer, as also our
woods, and ofturkies, and our coves full offish and fowl. But these English
having gotten our land, they with scythes cut down the grass, and with axes
felled the trees; their cows and horses eat the grass, and their hogs spoil our clam
banks, and we shall all be starved.
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In the face of this deadly transformation, Miantonomo said, they had no choice but to
band together, "all the Sachems from east to west," and finish the fight once and for all.
"[W]e are all resolved to fall upon them all, at one appointed day ... and kill men
women, and children."] Having helped the Puritans destroy their enemies, Miantonomo
realized that they would not stop with the destruction ofjust one tribe. So he plotted the
downfall of the Saints.
Miantonomo was not the first to grasp the zero-sum logic of elimination, nor the
first to comprehend the danger of the colonists' relentless advance. Opechancanough
came to understand it as he watched the tassantassas' settlements metastasize like a
cancer through the riparian veins of the landscape, patch by patch transforming the
forests and maize farms of Tsenacommacah into the vast tobacco fields of Virginia.
Sassacus understood it as he watched the stream of squatters that flooded the
Connecticut Valley and began to feel the vise of English power. Both leaders had
mobilized their people to meet the English threat, fought to the best of their ability, and
fell into ruin. Miantonomo was the first, though, to realize that one tribe alone could not
withstand the might of the English colonists. He knew that violent resistance was the
only force capable of halting colonial growth, and that only by standing together did the
Algonquians stand a chance of winning.
I Lion Gardener, "Relation ofthe Pequot War," in History ofthe Pequot War: The Contemporary
Accounts ofMason, Underhill, Vincent, and Gardener, ed. Charles Orr (Cleveland: Helman-Taylor
Company, 1897), 142-3.
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Miantonomo's dream ofIndian uprising came to nothing. Unable to convince the
firmly pro-English Uncas to join him, Miantonomo went to war against the Mohegans
and lost. Uncas submitted the Narragansett sachem to the magistrates of the newly
formed United Colonies of New England, who sentenced him to death and ordered
Uncas to carry out the sentence. Miantonomo met his end somewhere on a lonely forest
path, executed by a sharp blow to the head with a tomahawk. While his intertribal
alliance died with him, Miantonomo's pioneering call for pan-Indian unity became a
hallmark of Native American anti-colonial movements in the centuries to come.2
The Pequot War and the Anglo-Powhatan Wars demonstrated the lethality and
destructiveness of American warfare. What is most surprising about these episodes,
though, may not be the viciousness of inter-cultural conflict but the rapidity with which
the colonists shifted from strategies of radical exclusion to renewed attempts at
incorporation. In the aftermath of each conflict, settlers and Indians tried to reconstruct
spaces in which they could coexist.
The Powhatans, though dramatically weakened by the Third Anglo-Powhatan
War, remained on the Virginian fringe. Unable to stem the tide of the colony's growth,
they soon found themselves swallowed by the expanding borders of Virginia. Though
confined to reservations and forced into a state of permanent dependence on the colonial
government, the Powhatans nevertheless found that the Virginians' attitudes toward
2 David Pulsipher, ed., Acts ofthe Commissioners ofthe United Colonies ofNew England, 2 vols. (Boston,
1859), 1:10-12; John Winthrop, Journal ofJohn Winthrop, 1630-1649, ed. Richard S. Dunn, James
Savage, and Laetitia Yeandle (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996),471-73,478; Michael Leroy Oberg,
"'We Are All the Sachems from East to West': A New Look at Miantonomi's Campaign of Resistance,"
New England Quarterly 77, no. 3 (September 2004): 478-499; Neal Salisbury, Manitou and Providence:
Indians, Europeans, and the Making ofNew England, 1500-1643 (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 231-32.
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them quickly softened. As early as 1649 the Assembly passed laws recognizing basic
Powhatan rights. By 1656 the House of Burgesses passed a measure that allowed
Powhatan hunters to exchange wolf heads for cattle, asserting that this would encourage
Indians to adopt English methods of livestock husbandry and would therefore "be a step
to civilizing them and making them Christians.,,3 Despite this shift back toward policies
of incorporation, the survivors of the Anglo-Powhatan Wars became at best a marginal
people, who often suffered from the colonists' arrogance and aggression. Nevertheless,
Virginians accepted their limited presence until pressures along the frontier erupted into
Bacon's Rebellion in 1676.4
Hundreds of Pequots survived the war, despite the colonists' concerted efforts to
hunt down and either execute, enslave, or expunge their identities. Over the following
decades these groups gradually reconstituted themselves. Once the climate of hysterical
fear evaporated, the colonists no longer perceived these Indians as a threat. By 1650 at
least three Pequot communities existed, mostly on reservations set aside by colonial
governments. In 1651 the Connecticut Court made the landmark decision to allow the
Nameag Pequots to settle on five hundred acres at Noank. In doing so they effectively
nullified the Treaty of Hartford, allowing the Pequots limited political autonomy and the
right to settle on their original territory. By the outbreak of King Philip's War in 1675,
3 William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection ofAll the Laws of Virginia, from
the First Session ofthe Legislature, in the Year 1619, 13 vols. (New York: R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1923),
1:393-96 (quotation p. 395).
4 Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through Four Centuries
(Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989),90-127.
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the Pequots had carved out enough of a place among the colonists of Connecticut that
they were willing to fight on the English side against Metacom's Algonquian coalition.5
Despite these stories of resilience and survival, the long-term processes of settler
colonialism prevented Native Americans from finding any meaningful compromise with
English settlers. As colonial territory expanded, the surrounding Indian tribes
experienced a gradual decline punctuated by outbreaks of native resistance and settler
retaliation. Native Americans tried many different ways to secure their integrity and
independence, but every attempt crashed against the intransigence of English demands
for their total submission. The Powhatans and Pequots paid a heavy price for their
resistance, and they were ultimately able to endure only through capitulation. They
ceded the vast territories of their homelands and withdrew to reservation islands in the
colonial sea, sequestered where the colonists could safely ignore them in the hopes that
they would eventually fade away.6 In the meantime, the expanding frontier brought the
colonists into contact with new groups ofIndians on newly coveted ground. Then the
cycle of bloodshed, dispossession, and genocide began again.
5 Kevin A. McBride, "The Historical Archaeology of the Mashantucket Pequots, 1637-1900: A
Preliminary Analysis," in The Pequots in Southern New England: The Fall and Rise ofan American
Indian Nation, ed. Laurence M. Hauptman and James D. Wherry (Norman and London: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1990), 104-6; Neal Salisbury, "Indians and Colonists after the Pequot War: An Uneasy
Balance," in Pequots in Southern New England, 81-95. Changing colonial attitudes toward the Pequots
can be located within a broader discourse, identified by Kristina Bross, about the proper place ofNative
Americans in the colonial order. Bross describes a shift from a view ofNative Americans as an
impediment to colonization, prominent during the early years of the Great Migration, to a reconceptualized
New England mission based on converting Indians to Christianity. See Kristina Bross, Dry Bones and
Indian Sermons: Praying Indians in Colonial America (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
2004),4-10,18-21.
6 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 89.
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The agents of English colonialism in the seventeenth century, both those who
imagined America from thousands of miles away and those who dealt with unforgiving
realities on American soil, did not set out to commit these acts of extravagant violence.
They were chasing after a vision of a new England in the New World. They dreamed of
a path to regeneration and sought to build something truly magnificent: a country better
than the one that they had left behind and a society that matched their most cherished
ideals. Their dreams inevitably butted against the exigencies of survival in a foreign
land, especially the unwelcome presence of ancient peoples with dreams of their own.
When those two different visions clashed in the crucible of the frontier, what emerged
from the chaos was something that no one had foreseen. Whether the English imagined it
as Crakanthorpe's New Britain or Winthrop's City upon a Hill, they all sought an
England that existed only in their minds. What they found instead was an Albion
undreamed of, dearly bought, and stained red.
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